1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the Defendants exceeding the money ordered to be paid under the following subparagraphs shall be revoked.

1. The reasoning of the court's explanation concerning this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance other than the following, and thus, it is consistent with the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Of the basic facts of paragraph 1 of the judgment of the court of first instance, the first line of Paragraph 1 of the judgment of the court of first instance, “a vehicle was leased to a person other than the small part D” shall be read as “a vehicle was leased to a person other than the small part D.”

The provisions of paragraphs (4) and (4) of the judgment of the first instance shall be applied as follows.

Inasmuch as a vehicle for business damage is damaged to the extent possible due to a tort committed by another person, if the use under ordinary usage of the vehicle was impossible, the owner of the wind that failed to use the vehicle as above during the period required for its repair at least constitutes ordinary damages arising from such damage (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 72Da2235, 2236, Jan. 30, 1973). In such a case, the benefit of using the vehicle for compensation shall be based on the period required for repair according to ordinary methods (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 77Da249, Sept. 25, 1973; 73Da335, Sept. 25, 1973). In this case, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s vehicle was in the maintenance station on Jan. 2, 2013 and received the repair of the vehicle for a prolonged period of up to 13.4, 2013.