Where a person who has obtained written consent from others specifically and individually to make written consent to a specific insurance contract on his/her behalf or behalf of others, which is a requirement of the life insurance contract which covers the death of others as an insured event, has made written consent by proxy or proxy, the validity of such written consent

In an insurance contract which covers the death of another person as an insured event, the consent of the other person who is the insured must be obtained individually in writing for each insurance contract, and it is insufficient to obtain comprehensive consent or implied or constructive consent. However, since the written consent of the other person who is the insured does not mean only the signature of the other person in the written application for the insurance, since the written consent of the other person who is the insured does not mean only the signature of the other person in the written application for the insurance, the written consent of the other person is made effective by legitimate agents even if a person, whose authority to give written consent to a specific insurance contract has been granted to the other person is clearly and individually, acts on behalf of the other person within the scope of authority.

Article 731(1) of the Commercial Act, Article 114 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 2003Da24451 Decided July 22, 2003 (Gong2003Ha, 1780) Supreme Court Decision 2004Da56677 Decided September 22, 2006 (Gong2006Ha, 1790)

Plaintiff (Attorney Park Young-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2006Na6866 Decided September 22, 2006

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

With respect to an insurance contract which covers the death of another person as an insured event, the consent of the other person as the insured must be obtained individually in writing for each insurance contract, and it is insufficient to obtain comprehensive consent or implied or constructive consent (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da56677, Sept. 22, 2006). However, the written consent of the other person as the insured does not mean that the other person's written consent is signed by the other person. Thus, as a policyholder or insurance solicitor when entering into an insurance contract on the job where the other person as the insured was present, the other person's written consent is valid when the other person clearly and individually obtained the authority to give written consent to a specific insurance contract by proxy or proxy within the scope of his/her authority.

According to the facts and records established by the court below, the plaintiff who is a policyholder and the non-party 1, who is the insured, entered into the insurance contract of this case in the presence of the non-party 2, the insured, and the non-party 2, at that time, asked the plaintiff who is the policyholder, to sign his own signature on behalf of himself after clearly explaining the contents of the insurance contract of this case from the non-party 1 and explicitly consenting thereto. Accordingly, it can be known that the plaintiff acting on behalf of the non-party 2 and recorded the name of the non-party 2 in the part of the insured's letter of signature on behalf of the non-party 2. Thus, in light of the above legal principles, the non-party 2's written consent as the insured was valid by the plaintiff who was granted the authority to act on behalf of the non-party 2. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below finding that the insurance contract of this case was valid with the legitimate written consent of the non-party 2 is justifiable. There is no violation of the rules of evidence, incomplete deliberation, or misapprehension of legal principles concerning written consent.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below was justified in finding facts as stated in its reasoning after compiling the adopted evidence, and the non-party 2 was infected by the satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise satise

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Young-ran (Presiding Justice)