(a) Whether the Assembly and Demonstration Act is unconstitutional;

(b) Whether Article 3 (1) 4 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act is unconstitutional;

(c) Relationship between Article 3 (1) 4 and subparagraph 5 of the same Article of the Assembly and Demonstration Act;

A. The Assembly and Demonstration Act enacted for the purpose of protecting assembly and freedom as well as maintaining public peace and order is not unconstitutional, since the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the Constitution itself is not limited by itself.

B. Whether an assembly, which is likely to cause a significant social anxiety prohibited by Article 3(1)4 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act, is likely to lead to an objective evaluation of the specific situation of the demonstration. Thus, the above Article does not stipulate the elements of the demonstration strictly and specifically.

C. An assembly or demonstration under Article 3 (1) 4 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act does not require any assembly or demonstration against the basic democratic order as provided by Article 3 (1) 5 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act, and Article 3 (1) 5 of the same Act, which is deferred by the structure or interpretation of the same Article, shall be construed as a provision which separates only an assembly or demonstration against the basic democratic order as provided by the Constitution, in addition to Article 3 (1) 1 through 4.

(a) Articles 20(1) and 35(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Article 3(1)4(c) of the Assembly and Demonstration Act; Article 3(1)5 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 85Do3248 delivered on March 8, 1983

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney above-at-law

Suwon District Court Decision 86No98 delivered on May 22, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The defendant and his defense counsel's grounds of appeal are also examined.

With respect to the First Ground:

Inasmuch as the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is not an unlimited freedom, it cannot be deemed that the Assembly and Demonstration Act, enacted for the purpose of protecting assemblies and demonstrations as well as maintaining public peace and order, is in violation of the Constitution (see Supreme Court Decision 82Do3248, Mar. 8, 1983).

In addition, the issue of whether the assembly or demonstration, which is likely to cause a significant social anxiety, is prohibited under Article 3 (1) 4 of the same Act and is likely to cause considerable social anxiety, is considered to be evaluated and evaluated by taking a general view of the detailed situation of the demonstration. Therefore, the above Article does not seem to be an unconstitutional legislation because it did not stipulate the elements of the demonstration strictly and specifically. The argument is groundless.

With respect to the second ground:

According to the evidence in the judgment of the court of first instance maintained by the court below and the court of first instance, it is not difficult to recognize the criminal facts of this case against the defendant.

A. As to the crime No. 1 of the holding

According to the facts of recognition, it is reasonable for the court below to apply Article 3 (1) 4 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act to the case, since the defendant's act is likely to cause a significant social anxiety.

B. As to the crimes listed in holding 2:

According to the facts of recognition, the defendant was the subject of the first demonstration in the status of the head of the office of Ansan Labor, the head of the office affiliated with the Taeyang Labor Association. Accordingly, it is justifiable for the court below to apply Article 3 (1) 4 of the above Act to this case to the above defendant, and the defendant explained the background of the first demonstration in its position, and the decision was made to have been made by the joint committee of the Ayang Labor Counseling Center. The location of the Mayang Labor Center was also determined as the close to the office of the Mayang Labor, and the defendant received 500 printed articles so that he could spread it to another person. Thus, considering these circumstances, even if the person or organization of the above Mayang Labor Association cannot be clearly identified, the defendant would not be deemed the subject of the above Mayang Labor Association. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as alleged in the judgment below, or by violating the rules of evidence.

The argument should not be further determined on the premise that the defendant is not the organizer of the assembly and demonstration in the crime 2 of the judgment of the court.

In addition, Article 3 (1) 4 of the above Act provides that an assembly or demonstration which is likely to cause considerable social anxiety shall not necessarily violate the basic democratic order of the Constitution as provided in subparagraph 5, and the above Article 3 (1) 5 provides that an assembly or demonstration shall not necessarily be contrary to the basic democratic order of the Constitution as provided in subparagraph 5, and rather, it shall be presumed that the above Article 3 (1) 5 provides that an assembly or demonstration which violates the basic democratic order of the Republic of Korea as provided in the Constitution, in addition to subparagraphs 1 through 4 of paragraph (1) of the same Article, shall be removed separately from only the assembly or demonstration against the basic democratic order of the Republic of Korea as provided in the Constitution. Therefore, the court below's failure

With respect to the third point:

In light of the records, the court below's confiscation of the articles as provided or attempted to be provided for the crime of this case is just and there is no violation of law such as confiscation of articles which cannot be confiscated.

The assertion is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Kim Jong-hee (Presiding Justice)