Whether the completion of the acquisition by prescription can be claimed if the landowner changes after the completion of the acquisition by prescription and the owner's change as the new starting point is considered as the new starting point.

A person who asserts the acquisition by prescription may choose at will the starting point of the acquisition by prescription for land without changing the owner during the period of possession, and recognize the acquisition by prescription for not less than 20 years, unless it is found that it is not an autonomous possession, regardless of the change in the landowner after the completion of the acquisition by prescription, even if there is a change in the owner of land after the completion of the acquisition by prescription, it is also reasonable in cases where the acquisition by prescription continues to be occupied by the original possessor, and the change in the owner as the new starting point is considered as the new starting point, so the possessor who asserts the acquisition by prescription may claim the completion of the acquisition by

Article 245(1) of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 76Da487,488 decided Jun. 22, 1976 (Gong1976,9292) 82Da565 decided Nov. 9, 1982 (Gong1983,84) 92Da2074 decided Nov. 10, 1992 (Gong1993,76) 92Da29740 decided Nov. 10, 192 (Gong1993,86)

Plaintiff (Law Firm Central Patent Office, Attorneys Choi Jong-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Thai-gun

Daejeon District Court Decision 93Na775 delivered on July 30, 1993

The appeal is dismissed,

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

A person who asserts the acquisition by prescription may arbitrarily choose the starting point of the acquisition by prescription for land without changing the owner during the period of possession, and recognize the acquisition by prescription for not less than 20 years retroactively from the date of claiming the acquisition by prescription, and unless it is found that it is not an autonomous possession. This is also reasonable even in cases where the land owner changes after the completion of the acquisition by prescription, even if the original possessor continues to occupy the land after the completion of the acquisition by prescription, and the period of possession by prescription is completed again by considering the change of the owner as the new starting point of starting. Therefore, a possessor who claims the acquisition by prescription can claim the completion of the acquisition by using the new starting point of the acquisition by using the transfer

If the original possessor cannot acquire by prescription even if he/she has continuously occupied the third party's registration even after the expiration of the acquisition period, the real estate transferred to a third party in the name of the third party after the expiration of the acquisition period shall not be subject to the acquisition by prescription permanently unless there is any possession by new title, and the third acquisitor after the expiration of the prescription period shall be subject to more strong protection than the ordinary owner by holding the real estate that is not subject to the acquisition by prescription. In this case, it would result in the de facto denial of the acquisition period system.

The purport of preventing a party member from arbitrarily choosing the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition at will by allowing a third party claimant to choose the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition at will, and the party claiming the completion of the prescriptive acquisition at will would always always be entitled to a registration request due to the completion of the statute of limitations against the third party purchaser even without registering the acquisition of the title after the expiration of the statute of limitations, so it would be likely to weaken the function of the registration system and undermine the safety of transaction on real estate, thereby preventing it (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 76Da487,488, Jun. 22, 1976), as in the instant case, a third party acquired the registration after the completion of the prescriptive acquisition, but there was a new legal relationship in which the prescriptive acquisition again has been completed by possession for twenty (20) years without any change of the owner, even if the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition is the time of the acquisition registration by a third party, which would undermine the function of the registration system or undermine the safety of real estate transactions, and rather, it would be in line with the original purport of the statute of limitations.

Therefore, the decision of 82Da565 delivered on November 9, 1982 by a party member with a different purport is to abolish it.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the defendant continued to use the land of this case from March 1946 to March, 194 as the principal of the above school, teacher's official site, and deep art practice site since ○○ National School under the defendant's Taean Office of Education opened on June 20, 1929. Meanwhile, the plaintiff occupied the land of this case after the registration of preservation of ownership on June 12, 1970, without changes in the form of possession. Even if the owner of the land of this case changes to a third party after the completion of the acquisition period, the original possessor continues to occupy the land of this case, and the owner of the land of this case has continuously occupied the land of this case as the starting point of the new acquisition period, and it is reasonable to interpret that the possessor can claim the completion of the acquisition period as the starting point of the acquisition of ownership at the time of acquisition of the land of this case as the starting point of the acquisition by transfer to the third party, and therefore, the court below's decision that the acquisition by prescription can not be accepted.

2. On the second ground for appeal

If the evidence cited by the judgment below is compared with the records, the ○○ National School located in Tae-gun, Chungcheongnam-gun, Chungcheongnam-do is a school opened on June 20, 1929, and the defendant recognized the fact that the non-party, the owner of the land at the time of the time of around March 1946, as a donation of the portion of the land in this case, is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or incomplete deliberation as to the facts of donation claimed by the theory of lawsuit.

We cannot accept this issue because it is merely criticizes the selection of evidence and the recognition of facts belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below.

3. Accordingly, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul, Kim Jong-chul, Kim Jong-ho, Kim Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-ho, Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)