In order to recognize "occupational accidents" under subparagraph 1 of Article 5 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and to bear the burden of proof of proximate causal relation between the accidents, and the degree of proof thereof.

Article 5 subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

Supreme Court Decision 96Nu14883 Decided February 28, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 973) Supreme Court Decision 201Du30427 Decided May 9, 2012

Plaintiff 1 and two others (Law Firm Dasan et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Seoul High Court Decision 2011Nu23995 decided August 21, 2014

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The term “occupational accident” under Article 5 subparag. 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act refers to an accident caused by an employee’s occupational accident while performing his/her duties, and there is a proximate causal relation between the employee’s occupational accident and the accident. In such cases, the causal relation between the employee’s occupational accident should be attested by the assertion of such causal relation. Although proximate causal relation is not necessarily required to be proved by direct evidence in medical and natural science, it should be proved to the extent that the proximate causal relation between the occupational accident is likely to be inferred by indirect facts, such as the health conditions at the time of employment, existence of existing diseases, nature of the employee’s occupational work, and working environment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Du30427, May 9, 20

2. Based on the facts stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that each of the instant dispositions rendered by the Defendant against the Plaintiffs was lawful, on the grounds that it is difficult to deem a proximate causal relationship between the deceased Nonparty, Plaintiff 2, and Plaintiff 3’s work and the instant disease or death.

A. In light of the fact that the deceased Nonparty only included a non-determined scar or non-determined steam scar, which cannot be deemed to have caused cancer to humans in the hexanization and booby process, and that he was detected in the 2nd Marap process, but he was found to have been exposed to a toxic substance of high concentration during a short time due to the characteristics of equipment DNA, even if he was exposed to a toxic substance of high concentration during a short time due to the characteristics of equipment, etc., it is difficult to view that even if the deceased Nonparty was exposed to a hazardous substance that occurred in the alphanization, flat, or other process and was subject to excess or stress, it is difficult to deem that the degree of exposure or excess, etc. was likely to cause the above disease or promote the progress thereof, and that the deceased Nonparty was exposed to other hazardous substances.

B. The chemical substances, including Trichloroethylene, handled by Plaintiff 2 in the process of cutting and cutting erogens, are not known to have a connection with the acute bruthal leconsis, or cannot be deemed to have caused cancer to humans. Even if Plaintiff 2 was exposed to the bee or alphaloids or alphaloids that may arise in the mald or printing process, it is difficult to view that the degree of exposure or overwork, etc. is the degree to cause the above disease, or to facilitate the progress thereof, and there is insufficient evidence to deem that Plaintiff 2 was exposed to other harmful substances.

C. It is difficult to view that Plaintiff 3’s lead, tin, sulfur, etc. dealt with in the gold process caused malicious species or promoted the progress thereof. Even if Plaintiff 3 was exposed to hazardous substances generated in other processes, including Trichloroethylene and bents that may arise in the printing process, it is difficult to view that the degree of exposure or overwork, etc. was likely to cause the above disease or to facilitate the progress thereof, and there is insufficient evidence to deem that Plaintiff 3 was exposed to other hazardous substances.

3. Examining the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the facts against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on proximate causal relation between the work and the disaster, without failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations as to hazardous substances exposed to the deceased Nonparty, Plaintiff 2, and Plaintiff 3 and diseases caused thereby, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-dae (Presiding Justice)