2011Ra11. Provisional disposition to suspend the operation of a flag of No. 187

A and 96 persons

Attorney B of the appellant

The Korea Telecommunication and Nuclear Power Corporation

Attorney Park Jong-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellee

Government Law Firm Corporation, Attorney D

Busan District Court Order 2011Kahap211 dated September 19, 201

February 8, 2013

1. The appeal of this case is dismissed.

2. Costs of appeal shall be borne by the appellant.

The order of the court below shall be revoked. The debtor shall not continue to operate a nuclear power plant (hereinafter referred to as "highly No. 1 nuclear power plant") located in the head of the Busan-gun, the head of the Busan-gun, and the head of the Busan-gun.

1. Basic facts

The following facts may be acknowledged in full view of the overall purport of records and examinations.

A. The debtor is a company that operates Gori 1 machine, and the appellant is a citizen of Busan citizens or Gori 1 machine who resides within 30 km radius from the center of Busan citizens or Gori 1 machine.

B. The first commercial nuclear power plant in Korea has been operated after obtaining a license for operation. The expiration date of the design lifespan was June 18, 2007.

C. However, the debtor, even after the expiration of the design lifespan, submitted a periodic safety assessment report on June 16, 2006 to the Minister of Education and the Minister of Science and Technology on June 16, 2006, which was prior to the expiration date of the design lifespan for the purpose of continuously operating the high class 1 machine even after the expiration of the design lifespan, and submitted a report on the assessment of radiation impact assessment (hereinafter all of the assessment reports in this case) to the Minister of Education and the Minister of Science and Technology on June 16, 2006.

D. The Minister of Education, Science and Technology, based on the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety’s opinion on the instant assessment report, etc., permitted the continued driving of Dari No. 1 on December 11, 2007 for 10 years, and the debtor re-driving the Gari No. 1 on January 17, 2008.

E. The appellant alleged that he/she shall not continue to drive the aged 1 apparatus due to the expiration of the design lifespan period. However, the court below decided to dismiss all of the appellant’s applications on the ground that there is no evidence to prove specific risk of radioactive disasters in Gori 1, on the ground that the appellant cannot be deemed to have a judicial right to seek suspension of the operation of Gori 1, on the ground that no evidence exists to acknowledge specific risk of radioactive disasters.

2. Judgment on the appellant’s assertion

A. The appellant's assertion

1) Omission of hearing

Although the appellant filed an application for on-site inspection and the submission of the evaluation report of this case, the original court made a decision to dismiss all of the appellant's applications without adopting all of them, and the original judgment is erroneous in the incomplete hearing.

(ii) the suspension of continuous driving;

The expiration date of the design lifespan period of the Goi-ri 1 is June 18, 2007, and the obligor cannot be deemed to have submitted explanatory materials as to the safety of the continuous operation of Goi-ri 1 due to the failure to verify it due to the failure to remove the evaluation report of this case. Since the order of the court below, the possibility that serious accidents may occur due to the occurrence of the power failure, etc., and there was a question about the soundness of the nuclear reactor pressure vessel of Goi-ri 1, as well as the possibility of serious accidents due to the occurrence of the power failure after the order of the court below, it is probable that the appellant may infringe on the life, body, health, environment, etc. of the appellant, and the obligor's assertion that the continuation of the Goi-ri 1 on the ground of the economic feasibility of the nuclear power plant would not be persuasive. Therefore, the obligor shall not continue to drive the Go

B. Determination

1) Whether the hearing is incomplete

The court shall not conduct any investigation if it considers it unnecessary to provide evidence requested by the parties (main sentence of Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Act). The court below ordered the appellant's agent to submit a report on radiation environmental impact assessment in the evaluation report of this case on the fourth hearing date, and perused the report in the presence of the appellant's agent, and rejected the appellant's request for submission of documents. The appellate court ordered the appellant's agent to present a periodic safety assessment report and a statement on the inspection of major devices in the evaluation report of this case in order to determine whether the appellant's agent is obligated to submit documents on the third hearing date. The appellant's request for submission of documents was rejected on the fourth hearing date with the consent of the obligor's attorney. The appellant's request for on-site verification was filed again at the trial, and the appellant's request was rejected on the fifth hearing date. Thus, the appellant's above assertion is not justified.

2) Whether the continued driving has been suspended

A) Facts of recognition

The following facts may be acknowledged in full view of the overall purport of records and examinations.

(1) A power failure;

(A) On February 4, 2012, while stopping the operation of a nuclear reactor from around February 4, 2012 and conducting inspections and repair, an accident occurred where the supply of high-ri 1 electric power completely suspended for 12 minutes due to the failure of all employees to operate an emergency diesel power generator on February 20, 2012.

(B) Meanwhile, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety reviewed the safety control system and safety operation system of 1st century from March 13, 2012 to June 29, 2012 through the on-site inspection of the debtor's implementation plan and reviewed major safety issues, such as nuclear power system and safety operation system of 1st, through the on-site inspection of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. The causes of electric power accidents are the blocking of the external power supply facility and the off-site failure of the emergency diesel generator. Of them, the blocking of the external power generation of 1st century occurred not only in the outside power supply facility itself but also in the process of the inspection, but also in the process of the inspection, it was confirmed that the emergency power failure of the diesel generator was caused by the emergency power supply valve's failure in the process of the emergency power supply facility, but also in the case of the improvement of the safety control system of 2nds of the diesel power supply equipment after the completion of the 2nd of the 1st mobile power generation of the diesel.

(C) Furthermore, as a result of a safety inspection conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency from June 4, 2012 to June 11, 2012 with regard to the static accident of the period of the period of the period of the period of the 1st nuclear power plant, the International Atomic Energy Agency suspended for 19 minutes due to on-site inspections, but the cooling temperature of the nuclear reactor increased for 19 minutes due to on-site inspections, not affecting the safety of the period of the 1st nuclear power plant. The safety of the period of the 1st nuclear power plant, including the apparatus that was the cause of the power failure, improved the equipment of the period of the 1st nuclear power plant and replaced the equipment for the successful operation of the period of the 1st nuclear power plant. In the inspection conducted in 207, the period of the 1st nuclear power plant was assessed to meet the international standards for continuous operation, and it was established to implement the management program for the period of the 1st nuclear power plant and to strengthen the safety of the 1st nuclear power plant.

(2) Repair and replacement of equipment;

(A) On June 18, 2007, the expiration date of the design lifespan of the 1st class flag.

B. On the other hand, the debtor has formulated and regularly conducted an annual regular and periodic test implementation plan for the 1st class season in order to conduct a safety inspection, under the inspection by the Minister of Education, Science and Technology, and has formulated and implemented a plan to monitor and deliberate on the degree of vulnerability with respect to the functions and performance of safety-related structures, apparatus, etc. every ten years, and continuously repaired and replaced major safety equipment of 1st class season on the basis of the results of the safety inspection.

(C) In addition, since 193, the debtor has conducted an inspection of the thickness of hydrogen pipelines with respect to nuclear power plants including the high-ri 1 nuclear power plants. From September 2002, the debtor was responsible for the management of the soundness of the hydrogen pipelines, and from around September 2002, he developed and operated the pipeline reduction management program based on the piping reduction technology of the United States Electric Power Research Institute for the management of the gas pipes, such as prediction of the remaining number, evaluation of the replacement time, etc., and measures to early determine the thickness of pipelines by expanding the quantity of the pipeline reduction inspection, thereby preventing the pipeline wave in advance, and then, he replaced the whole quantity of the pipe 4,90 and 903 around 16% of the total number of the pipelines by 785 and about 170 years after the replacement of the pipe.

(D) According to the 'International Atomic Energy Accident' level prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency, etc. (INES, International Nu Rives EV), an accident that does not affect the radiation of employees and their neighboring residents is classified into levels 1 to 3, 4 to 7, and an accident (Acident) that may affect the radiation of the outside people is classified into levels 4 to 4.7. In addition, an accident that may affect the external radiation does not occur, and in particular, from May 10, 2005 to January 13, 201, the record of safe driving was achieved.

(3) Soundness, etc. of reactor pressure vessels

(A) The reactor pressure vessel of the high-ri 1 flag was manufactured with the initial design lifespan of 40 years.

(B) Even after the expiration of the design lifespan, the Minister of Education, Science and Technology had the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety examine the instant evaluation report submitted in order to continue to operate the high-ririth 1 machine. As a result of the evaluation conducted by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, the plan for the evaluation of lifespan and the management of the high-rith lusive devices, such as nuclear reactor pressure vessels, safety grade pipes, and shocking buildings, was established in a timely fashion in accordance with relevant requirements, and the contents of the radiation exchange impact assessment reflecting the changed natural environment and site characteristics after the operating license are satisfied, and the high-ri 1 machine is deemed to be able to continue to be operated in a safe state for the next ten years.

C) In addition, the Minister of Education, Science and Technology requested the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify the adequacy of the instant evaluation report, the safety of continuous operation, etc. from July 23, 2007 to August 3, 2007, the said International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that there is no particular error in the safety of the instant evaluation report, and that the said recommendation was made in the first five paragraph, including the analysis of the location of the non-safety management equipment. After that, the debtor performed all follow-up measures under the said recommendation, and reported the results thereof to the Minister of Education, Science and Technology around November 2007, and the said recommendation was proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency by directly visiting the Gari 1 flag from May 18, 2010 to May 20, 2010.

(D) Under Article 41(1)7 of the Enforcement Decree of the Nuclear Safety Act, Article 21(4) and Article 63(1)3 of the "Rules on Technical Criteria for Reactor Facilities, etc.," Article 15(1) of the "Standards for Monitoring Test of Reactor Pressure Containers" provides that if the test result fails to meet the "requirements for 10CFR Part 50, Apendendix G, IV destruction nature" of the United States, the operation of the relevant reactor may not be continued, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (1) of the "Rules on Standards for Technical Standards for Reactor Facilities, etc.," Article 15(1) of the "Standards for Monitoring Test for Reactor Pressure Pressure Pressure Reactors for the purpose of establishing necessary technical standards for conducting large monitoring tests and evaluation of the results thereof, etc.,

(E) The Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety established around July 2012, in the report on the results of the comprehensive safety inspection of Gori-ri 1, which was 68J, found that the maximum absorption energy of Gori-ri 1 is less than 100% of the core core testing, the results of destructive testing, destructive test, and the soundness of the reactor pressure vessel of Gori 1 until the end of the continuous operation. The current assessment method is expected to exceed the permissible temperature of 149°C, which was 127°C at the end of the continuous operation. However, according to the Mari-ri 127° at the end of the continuous operation.

F) In addition, according to the agreement of the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, the representative of the head of Busan Gun, the debtor, 7 experts recommended by the resident representative and 3 experts recommended by the debtor, and the result of the verification on the residents' question about the soundness of the pressure vessel of the high 1st nuclear reactor from July 16, 2012 to August 6, 2012, based on relevant data, ① the maximum absorption energy of the high 1 nuclear reactor is less than 68 J. 1 is less than 10%, ③ the high 10% high powered vessel of the high 4 nuclear reactor was confirmed that there is no internal defect of 10% high destructive test on the adjacent part of the nuclear reactor, ④ the high destructive vessel of 14 nuclear power plant was conducted, ④ the high destructive vessel of 1 nuclear power plant was used, ④ the high destructive vessel of 1 nuclear power plant was used, ③ the high destructive test method of 1 nuclear reactor installation and its analysis of the high destructive pressure of 1 nuclear reactor.

(4) Disaster prevention facilities, etc.

(A) Hari No. 1 is located in the city of the head of the city of Busan, and there are many residents, including the appellant, around the area.

(B) On the other hand, Gori 1 was designed in accordance with the earthquake-proof criteria of 6.5 (Maximum Site 0.2g) by reflecting the maximum time for safety against earthquakes that may occur in preparation for earthquakes, and thereafter, the earthquake-proof performance has been strengthened by performing all necessary measures for improvement, which is the most advanced level of technology, in the process of continuing operation permission. In the event an earthquake is reduced by 0.18g or more at a maximum rate of 0.18g, automatic stop is also installed to automatically set a nuclear reactor.

(C) Also, in preparation for tidal wave, etc., a 10-meter protection wall has been installed at a height of 10 meters high to meet the domestic safety standards for tsunami, storm sea wave, and wave wave against flood, etc., two emergency diesel power generators and one alternative hydroelectric power generator is installed in preparation for the power failure due to flood, etc., and the improvement of facilities has been completed in order to operate an emergency diesel power generator even in the event of a malfunction in one valve after the power failure in one valve occurs after doubleation of the air supply valve of the emergency diesel generator.

(D) The debtor, on March 11, 201, caused the Japan's late nuclear accident, resulting in an increase in national concern about the safety of nuclear power plants, requested a close safety inspection on the nuclear power plant that has contained 1 equipment at the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, as a result of the examination conducted by the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, securing safety against the maximum earthquake and tidal wave that may occur at the same time, and there are still a long-term and short-term improvement measures so that safety can be secured even in the situation of natural disasters that exceed the design standards, and there is no particular problem about the continuous operation safety of 1 equipment at the same time.

E) The debtor established a radiation emergency plan pursuant to the "Act on Measures for the Protection of Nuclear Facilities, etc. and Prevention of Radiation Disasters" to establish a radiation emergency plan, thereby setting the emergency command criteria, functions and duties of the emergency response organization, organization of emergency personnel, direction and control systems, etc., and organizing and operating the 1 and 2 emergency medical institutions centering on the nuclear power plant. At the same time, the debtor is able to effectively cope with the extreme situation in which emergency is issued.

B) Determination

According to the above facts, the materials submitted by the appellant are insufficient to prove that there is a serious accident, etc. that may affect radiation in the first period of ancient 1, and thus, it is difficult to prove that there is a possibility of infringing on the appellant's living benefits, such as life, body, health, environment, etc., and thus, the appellant's above assertion cannot be accepted.

However, as the debtor is in the case of a serious accident in a nuclear power plant, including Gori-ri 1 nuclear power plant, it is practically difficult or considerable time and expenses to recover the degree of damage wide, significant, and so it is practically difficult to say that prior prevention is more efficient than ex post facto cure, and that a series of accidents surrounding a nuclear power plant, including Gori 1 nuclear power plant's power failure to reflect the cost of decommissioning of the nuclear power plant, nuclear waste management cost, accident countermeasure cost, etc., in advance of economic superiority based on the unit price of the nuclear power power generation that is not often reflected in large scale, and it is pointed out that there is no need to recover trust from the appellant, including the appellant, by enhancing transparency so that there is no doubt about the safety of the nuclear power plant, including Gori 1 nuclear power plant.

3. Conclusion

The appeal of this case is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

February 8, 2013

Lee Jae-young (Presiding Judge)

Scene Scene

Decather and leather