Seoul Administrative Court 2012Guhap15425 ( November 02, 2012)

Cho High Court Decision 201Do3807 ( October 30, 2012)

Services provided by the plaintiff to the general public cannot be deemed as proper purpose business, and they are subject to value-added tax regardless of whether they are provided as actual expenses.

According to the instant consignment contract, since the proper purpose business is limited to juvenile training activities for juvenile welfare and fostering, it is reasonable to interpret the incidental services subject to value-added tax exemption as limited to the services supplied "in relation to juvenile training activities", and the services provided to the general public cannot be deemed as services related closely to juvenile training activities, and it cannot be deemed as incidental services.

Article 12 (1) 17 of the Value-Added Tax Act

Article 37 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act

2012Nu37601 Revocation of Disposition of Imposition of Value-Added Tax

Seoul AAAAA Maintenance Foundation, a foundation

Head of Yeongdeungpo Tax Office

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2012Guhap15425 decided November 2, 2012

June 19, 2013

July 17, 2013

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. Of the appeal costs, the part arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is assessed against the Intervenor, respectively.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. Each disposition of the Defendant rendered on January 17, 201, 200 won of value-added tax (including additional tax) for the second half-year value-added tax (including additional tax) for the Plaintiff on March 7, 201, and the first half-year value-added tax (including additional tax) for the first half-year value-added tax (including additional tax) for 2004 on March 7, 201, and the second half-year value-added tax for 2004 for the second half-year value-added tax (including additional tax) for the first half-year value-added tax (including additional tax) for the first half-year value-added tax for 2005, shall be revoked.

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasons why this Court should explain, and except for addition to the following paragraphs, the decision on the argument that the plaintiff emphasizes in particular in this Court is being followed by Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, because it is the same as the reasons stated in the judgment of the first instance.

2. Judgment on the plaintiff's assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff, ① allowed the general public to use the instant training center for the purpose of appropriating the operating expenses of the instant training center, collected actual expenses, and controlled user fees from Seoul Special Metropolitan City, so the services provided to the general public are subject to value-added tax exemption because the nonprofit corporation under Article 12 (1) 16 of the Value-Added Tax Act, and Article 37 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act constitutes services temporarily supplied or supplied at cost or without compensation for its own business purposes, and ② there has been no value-added tax exemption practices on the entrusted operation of the youth training center, and the plaintiff did not report value-added tax, and the disposition of this case was made five years after the completion of the instant entrustment contract, and the disposition of this case was in violation of the principle of trust protection, and ③ The training center is "Juvenile facility" under Article 3 subparagraph 6 of the Framework Act on Juveniles, which is public facilities and welfare facilities for the promotion of the welfare of local residents, and if the instant training center operation is imposed, it would cause interference with the youth's educational activities by increasing financial burden and increase the user fees, and result in violation of proportionality principle.

B. Determination

(1) As to the Plaintiff’s assertion

The evidence adopted in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as cited above and the whole purport of the arguments are as follows. ① According to Articles 3 and 4 of the plaintiff's articles of incorporation, and Articles 3 and 4 of the training center articles of incorporation of this case, and the plaintiff are widely defined for the purpose of supporting the proper purpose business, and all these profit-making businesses can not be interpreted as being included in the object of value-added tax exemption. ② According to the entrustment contract of this case or the Ordinance on Juvenile Facilities, the user fees for the use of the training center of this case can be collected from the general public, but if they are deemed as part of the proper purpose of the support project and are included in the object of value-added tax exemption, they may be against the purpose of the establishment of the training center of this case, and there is a possibility of avoiding the provision of value-added tax exemption (the revenue received from the general person is more than 15% compared to the total income, and it is more than 00 won per year). ③ Since the entrustment contract of this case is limited to juvenile training activities, it cannot be interpreted to 16.

(2) As to the Plaintiff’s assertion

The evidence and the whole arguments adopted in the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance court cited in this judgment, which was cited in this judgment, seems to have been imposing value-added tax on the services provided by the previous taxpayer to the general public. Accordingly, the plaintiff's above assertion on the premise that the defendant's public opinion was presented is without merit.

(3) As to the Plaintiff’s assertion

As seen earlier, the instant disposition is a legitimate disposition based on the law that was conducted to realize the state’s taxation authority, and its suitability is recognized as appropriate, and even though the instant disposition causes increase in the user fee of the instant training center, it is incidental, and the balance between the public interest increased by the instant disposition and the private interest infringed upon, is sufficiently recognized. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s allegation that the instant disposition goes against the principle of proportionality is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.