2013 Gohap 37925 Damage, Claim

1. A;

2. B

3. C.

4. D;

East Asia AP Co., Ltd., a litigation taking over the same lawsuit

September 5, 2014

October 23, 2014

1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed. 2. Costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 10 million won with 5% interest per annum from January 1, 2005 to the service date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Status of the parties

1) The Plaintiffs, as the policyholders of the National Health Insurance, are those who have purchased and consumed drugs manufactured and sold by the Defendants, as follows.

2) The Defendant was transferred all rights and duties regarding prescription drugs, medical appliances, diagnosis, overseas business, etc. among the businesses run by the East Asia Amyan Bank Co., Ltd. as a company incorporated on March 4, 2013 after division from the East Asia Amyan Bank Co., Ltd.

B. The defendant's act of inducing customers from January 1, 2003 to September 30, 2006 provided support to the Jeju University Hospital that he traded for a period of time one million won per month in order to increase the prescription for Rolofin and Schlage, and continuously supported a meeting ceremony to increase the prescription for the master, string, debate pules, and Schlage pule. The defendant continuously provided a meeting ceremony to increase the prescription, such as cash, and the selection of drugs or the payment of prescription or prescription and non-payment of prescription expenses through provision of meals, supplies of equipment or goods, golf entertainment, support through rink, product selection expenses through contribution, etc., and the act of inducing customers under the Fair Trade Act, such as the act of inducing customers through provision of donations. The defendant imposed a penalty surcharge against the defendant.

1) The Fair Trade Commission established a sales promotion plan at the head office for the purpose of promoting the prescription of the pharmaceutical products produced by the Defendant, and continuously supported through goods support and golf entertainment with a long-term period from individual members to large general hospitals within the nation, in light of normal transaction practices, the act of providing unfair or excessive profits in light of normal transaction practices, and constitutes an act of inducing customers of competitors (including potential potential competitors) to deal with oneself, and then imposed a penalty surcharge of KRW 4,430,000 on the part of the Enforcement Decree of the Fair Trade Act and Article 36(1) [Attachment 1-2] 4(a) of the Fair Trade Act.

2) Although the Defendant filed an appeal against the imposition of a penalty surcharge by the Fair Trade Commission, the Seoul High Court did not err in the process of finding facts by the Fair Trade Commission on November 5, 2008 and the process of determining illegality and the process of determining illegality, and thus, the Seoul High Court rendered a judgment that the corrective order and the payment order of a penalty surcharge are lawful (Seoul High Court 20082462). The above judgment became final and conclusive on December 23, 2010 (Supreme Court 2008Du22815).

D. The plaintiffs' purchase of drugs manufactured and sold by the defendant 1)

1) Plaintiff A

During the period from November 3, 2004 to June 18, 2005, Plaintiff A purchased an amount equivalent to KRW 26,103 (the principal’s charges of KRW 5,221) out of 60 meters as medical care benefits; ② during the period from November 3, 2004 to February 27, 2005, an amount equivalent to the sum of KRW 170,940 in East Asia’s 20 meters as non-payment; ③ during the period from March 27, 2005 to March 31, 2005, equivalent to the amount of KRW 100mg,4,430 (the principal’s charges of KRW 886) as medical care benefits; ④ during the period from July 21, 2005 to February 27, 2005, each of the medical care benefits charges of KRW 30,530m25m2 (the principal’s charges of KRW 365m25.5m20).

2) Plaintiff B

Plaintiff B purchased an amount equivalent to KRW 204,040,00 for the period from March 18, 2004 to November 28, 2004 as non-paid benefits; ② an amount equivalent to KRW 100 cm-si, 100 gh 886,00 (177 won per person) as medical care benefits; ③ during the period from September 2, 2004 to September 28, 2004, an amount equivalent to KRW 23,200 (the principal charges 4,640 won) as medical care benefits; ④ during the period from October 18, 2004 to October 31, 2004, the sum of the amount equivalent to KRW 50,500,00 for each of the medical care benefits; and ④ during the period from October 18, 2004 to October 31, 2004, the sum of the amounts equivalent to KRW 365,505 g.

3) Plaintiff D

Plaintiff D purchased the sum of KRW 51,800 for a period from May 14, 2003 to June 4, 2003, equivalent to the sum of KRW 51,800 for the Easter 20mg, and the sum of KRW 51,240 for the period from June 26, 2003 to July 7, 2003, respectively, as non-payment.

[Grounds for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap's statements, 12, 63, 64, 66, 89 through 94, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Summary of the plaintiffs' assertion

According to the reimbursement system, medical care benefits are determined on the basis of the amount actually purchased by a medical care institution within the notified maximum amount. Therefore, even if a medical care institution received unfair rebates from a pharmaceutical company and obtained corresponding economic benefits, if it reported the purchase cost of the medicine and received such payment in accordance with the notified maximum amount, the patient who purchased the relevant medicine shall be liable for damages equivalent to the percentage of rebates out of the patient’s charges.

However, as seen earlier, the Defendant violated the Fair Trade Act, such as unfairly inducing customers by providing rebates to medical care institutions, and the medical care institutions, even if they obtained the actual benefits of purchasing medicines at a low price in the amount of rebates, shall make a report on the purchase price of medicines in accordance with the maximum amount publicly notified by each other and make the Plaintiffs pay the relevant expenses based on this. As such, the Plaintiffs shall have suffered damages equivalent to the amount of rebates.

On the other hand, since the Defendant’s offering of rebates was conducted through a systematic marketing at the company level, even if the intent that prescribed the drug to the Plaintiffs did not receive rebates, the Plaintiffs suffered losses from the overall perspective.

Accordingly, according to the plaintiffs' amount of damages, the amount of rebates unfairly offered between June 1, 2003 and September 30, 2006 by the defendant is KRW 133,657,000,000. The defendant's total sales of the medicines for which rebates was offered during the above period are KRW 443,003,00,000. Thus, 30.17% of the purchase price of the medicines purchased by the plaintiffs ( KRW 133,657,000,000 / 443,003,000,000 】 100% of the purchase price of the medicines purchased by the plaintiffs.

Therefore, the plaintiffs suffered damages equivalent to the amount equivalent to 30.17% of the purchase price of pharmaceutical products paid by the plaintiffs due to the defendant's offering of rebates.

3. Determination

In order to recognize the plaintiffs' assertion in this case, it is recognized that the defendant, a pharmaceutical company, conspired with medical institutions for drug prices, or the defendant's unfair rebates provision prevents the plaintiffs from purchasing medicines at a price discounted by the amount of rebates amount, thereby causing damage to the difference. However, as a premise to determine this, it is necessary to first examine the characteristics of the pharmaceutical market, the pharmaceutical price pricing structure, and the characteristics of the rebates for drugs.

(a) Characteristics of the pharmaceutical market;

1) Unlike other general competition markets, a wide range of industrial regulation pharmaceutical markets are being regulated by various laws in order to protect public health, and their results are restricted in advance. In particular, the government has a significant impact on the market in a way that regulates the prices and quality of pharmaceutical products and medical services, including entry regulations and structural regulations.

2) In Korea, the interested parties surrounding the health insurance in the third party payment system are largely divided into the government, sick and research, and pharmaceutical companies, and the insured (consumer). In the case of insurance benefits, the insured uses the medical care (medical care benefits) in the health care institution, the National Health Insurance Corporation, which is the insurer, not the method of paying the price to the health care institution, takes the third party payment system that the insured pays the price to the sick and Medical Institute (However, due to the budget, etc., the insured bears part of the cost in the form of his own charge), and there are some distinctive features

First, consumers or patients do not bear expenses according to the quality and quantity of the medical service they choose, and the quality of the medical service cannot be compared and assessed properly due to the absence of information, which eventually leads to a prudent incentive to balance cost benefits.

On the other hand, as well as the ethical obligation to treat patients in the best way, the existing insurance benefit system is not sufficiently linked to the quality and performance of medical services, it is not likely to actively attract the improvement of the quality of medical services. In particular, since the actual transaction has been implemented since 1999, incentives to purchase and administer drugs at low price have become virtually dead. In addition, as a pharmaceutical company is prohibited from mass advertising of prescription drugs, there is little room for competition centered on the price or quality meat, and because there is little difference between original drug and its character, i.e., reproduction drug, there is no incentive to develop new medicine, and since there is no incentive to develop new medicine because there is no difference between the insurance contract price and the original drug, and even at the time of reducing the price of the drug product, there is no increase in profits due to the reduction of the standard drug price rather than the increase in profits through the increase in sales, there has become a reason for the weak competition.

Finally, while the government is in a position to operate a enormous insurance finance and pay insurance benefits, it may cause unefficiency in that it is the promotion of patient's rights and interests because it is not a patient who is actually receiving benefits.

3) In the case of prescription drugs under the current Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, the incompleteness of medical information (including internal medicine) information, and in the case of prescription drugs, public advertisements using television or Internet portal, etc. are prohibited, and only advertisements using a medium of expertise and academic purpose relating to medical or pharmaceutical science are possible. As such, there is no information on the patient’s own choice of drugs. Moreover, due to the implementation of pharmaceutical medicine, it is impossible for the patient to properly understand the contents of prescriptions or affect the prescription itself. This is because, in the case of prescription drugs, the non-disciability of information is structuralized or institutionalized, and such incomplete and non-discimation of information makes it difficult for the patient to compete in relation to medical and pharmaceutical areas, pharmacies, pharmacies, and patients.

(b) The structure of determining the price of drugs;

1) A pharmaceutical product to which the Health Insurance Act does not apply may be sold at a free price by a medical care institution that is the final seller. However, the price of the pharmaceutical product to which the health insurance applies is determined and publicly notified by the Government as an insurance. At the time of the instant case, the standard pharmaceutical product for the pharmaceutical product to which the health insurance applies was determined differently depending on whether the relevant pharmaceutical product, its administration route, and ingredients are listed in the health insurance, and determined and publicly notified by the Medical Special Evaluation Committee under the Ministry of Health and Welfare after the business operator applied for the determination of the maximum amount, assessed the pharmaceutical product, and announced by the Health and Welfare.

2) Changes in the system of reimbursement for a contract

A) Prior to the redemption scheme (from July 1, 197 to November 14, 1999), the so-called public notice notice given by the Minister of Health and Welfare by adding a certain distribution profit to the shipment price to the factory of medicines submitted by a pharmaceutical company, which is paid to a medical care institution, was applied to the redemption scheme. However, under the redemption scheme, even if the actual transaction price is lower than the public notice, the public notice would give the medical care institution a redemption with a notice, thereby unfairly taking the difference between the purchase and the public notice, into consideration the difference between the health care institution and the health care institution’s profits, and not only transferred the difference at the health insurance provider’s expense, but also there were problems such as risk of excessive medication, decrease in the desire for research and development

B) In order to solve the foregoing problem, the actual transaction was introduced on November 15, 1999 for the purpose of transparent and rationalization of illegal and audio drug transactions by compensating for the actual transaction price and reducing the insurance amount as much as the difference. The actual transaction was implemented on September 30, 2010 after purchasing materials from pharmaceutical enterprises or wholesalers within the maximum amount set by the Government. Accordingly, medical care institutions have made efforts to request for reimbursement based on the weighted average price of medicines purchased within the scope of the standard drug price in accordance with the Medical Insurance Standard Table, and the Health Care Institution has to submit to the Defendant the details of the actual purchase price in each quarter, such as the actual purchase price, purchase volume, and weighted average price, and the redemption price in each quarter, which would have become less than the average average price of medicines purchased by it, and the Health Care Institution has made efforts to verify and submit the actual market price of medicines to the Defendant by the method of public health care institution’s announcement of the increase in the quarterly price of medicines and its details. This is ultimately the so-called weighted average price of medicines purchased and its details.

C) In the end, the government decided on October 1, 2010 that the previous “actual transaction price redemption scheme” in which a medical institution purchases and sells the drug again results in the transaction practices by rebates, and that the “market-type real transaction price redemption scheme” was implemented from October 1, 2010. The market-type real transaction scheme provides a medical institution with a motive to purchase the drug at a low price by providing the difference between the upper limit and the purchase price if the medical institution purchases the drug at a low price in the redemption scheme.

C. Statutes and characteristics related to the rebates of drugs

1) Acts and subordinate statutes relating to pharmaceutical rebates

[1] Article 23 (Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices) (1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices) and Article 23 (Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices) (1) of the same Act shall not engage in, or cause its affiliated company or other enterprisers to engage in, any act which falls under any of the following subparagraphs and which is likely to impede fair trade (hereinafter referred to as "unfair trade practices"). 3. Unfairly inducing or inducing customers of competitors to engage in a transaction with oneself, the types of or criteria for unfair trade practices shall be determined by the Presidential Decree (Article 20360 of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20360 of Nov. 2, 2007), Article 36 (Designation of Unfair Trade Practices) (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act) and Article 23 (Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices) (2) of the Act. (2) The Fair Trade Commission may, if deemed necessary, determine and announce detailed criteria to apply the types or criteria of unfair trade practices under paragraph (1).

The following matters shall be observed in order to establish a distribution system of drugs:

2) Characteristics of drug rebates

Generally, rebates means that a seller returns part of the sales amount to a buyer, but most of the options related to medical treatment are used as a "act of offering economic benefits, such as money, goods, entertainment, etc., to a medical care institution, medical person, pharmacist, or herb pharmacist, either directly or through a wholesaler, for the purpose of facilitating sales, such as adoption of drugs and inducement of prescription." Ordinary rebates is an infringement of fair and free competition in a case where a buyer does not make a decision of purchase according to the price or quality of the relevant product because of unfair or excessive transaction practice, and the domestic pharmaceutical market also does not focus on the quality and price of the relevant drug due to the pharmaceutical regulation.

However, economic competition in the pharmaceutical market is taking place at almost a stage of securing customers of pharmaceutical companies, i.e., wholesale market, and in particular, as a medical institution which is a consumer under the repayment system has no incentive to purchase drugs at a low price, one of the fundamental causes of the rebates of drugs is difficult to deny that it is the price regulation of drugs.

D. Determination

In full view of the characteristics of the pharmaceutical market as seen earlier, including the characteristics of the pharmaceutical market and the structure of pharmaceutical price pricing and the features of the rebates, and the following various circumstances recognized by the purport of the pleading, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs alone is insufficient to view that there is a proximate causal relation between the Defendant’s act of offering rebates to medical institutions and the Defendant’s damages, and the Plaintiffs’ assertion is not acceptable, on the grounds that there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

1) In principle, the price of a good is determined by the principle of demand and supply in the market economy system and the structural and market economy system for determining the price of a good. If the price of a good by a supplier is higher than the price of the good by another supplier of the same quality, consumers will purchase the good by another supplier. As such, if the market in question exists, whether the complete competition is limited or not at the time of the complete competition, the supplier will endeavor to reduce the cost of manufacture and sale, thereby reducing the cost of the good and improving the quality.

In light of the determination structure of the product price, even if the supplier paid excessive costs without removing internal non-efficiency in the process of manufacturing and selling the product and then calculated the product price by reflecting it in the product price, such determination of the price cannot be considered to be a tort in principle belonging to the authority of the supplier, unless there are special circumstances such as contrary to the pricing laws and regulations. The increase in the price of the product due to internal non-efficiency of the supplier brings about the result that inevitably results in the competition of the consumer by removing the purchase of the product. Therefore, the issue of internal non-efficiency of the supplier can be removed by the reasonable choice of the consumers in the product market in question.

However, in the pharmaceutical market, there may be cases where goods are purchased by a supplier who has set the price of the goods at an unreasonable and high level by failing to make a reasonable choice on the basis of their price and quality due to various reasons. However, even in such a case, it is not different from that of a supplier to readily conclude that the supplier’s act of determining the price of the goods is unlawful by reflecting the costs incurred in the actual process of manufacturing and selling the goods. If a consumer’s unreasonable choice of goods arises from the characteristics and structural problems of the product market in question, the State may establish the price upper by participating in the pricing of the product market through legislation, and implement the appropriate and efficient price regulation system so that the consumers can make reasonable choice, while the product distribution structure can be reasonably improved. However, even if the price regulation system through legislation was not introduced, the act of determining the price of the goods can not be deemed unlawful solely on the basis that the supplier’s price of the goods that had paid excessive costs, etc. than ordinary trading practices, such as sales promotion, publicity, etc., was lower than the price of the goods.

However, in a case where the suppliers distort the pricing process to be determined by the principle of demand and supply through price collusion and engage in an unfair collaborative act that restricts mutual competition, consumers' right to purchase the goods at a reasonable price is infringed, and thus, they can claim damages for tort against the suppliers who engaged in price collusion.

2) Whether the Defendant conspired with a medical institution for price collusion

The plaintiffs asserts that the defendant conspired with medical institutions to the effect that the defendant would make a collusion with the plaintiffs who are the final consumers by raising the drug price equivalent to the price of rebates offered to medical institutions.

However, the Defendant’s act of offering rebates to a medical institution by receiving an administrative disposition from the Fair Trade Commission in relation to the offering of rebates to the medical institution and the final and conclusive judgment in an appeal litigation is limited to “unfair act of attracting customers” [Attachment 1] of Article 36(1) [Attachment 1] of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20360 of Nov. 2, 2007), which provides or provides unfair or excessive profits in light of normal transaction practices, and does not constitute a “act of inducing competitors to deal with their customers.” As seen earlier, the actual transaction, which was in force at the time of the instant case, functions as “the upper limit of the medicine price according to the reimbursement system,” and under this circumstance, the medical institution could be paid all by filing a claim with the Health Insurance Corporation, and it is difficult to find that the Defendant’s act of offering rebates to a medical institution was an unfair competition with the competitor, and thus, there was no need to recognize the Defendant’s act of offering rebates to the medical institution as an unfair competition.

Therefore, we cannot accept the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Defendant conspireds with medical institutions at the time of the instant case to unfairly increase the amount of rebates.

3) Whether there exists a proximate causal relationship between the Defendant’s offering of rebates to the Defendant’s medical institution and the damages claimed by the Plaintiffs

In order to impose liability for damages due to a tort, there should be a proximate causal relationship between the illegal act and the damage suffered by the plaintiff. The existence of such proximate causal relationship should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the probability of occurrence of the outcome, the form of the above legal act, the nature of the benefits of infringement, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2004Da1162, May 11, 2007; 2010Da102755, Apr. 26, 2012).

However, in full view of the following circumstances as well as the aforementioned circumstances, it is difficult to view that there is a proximate causal relationship between the Defendant’s act of offering rebates to a medical institution that is a consumer and the Plaintiffs, the final consumer, by purchasing medicines at prices that include an amount equivalent to the amount of rebates from the medical institution.

① After the implementation of the repayment system, almost all the drugs nationwide were paid by medical personnel and medical care benefit costs on the basis of the maximum price publicly notified by the Minister of Health and Welfare, and each pharmaceutical company and drug wholesaler also have already been determined by the public notice without any need to separately negotiate on the supply price of the drugs. Accordingly, since the actual transaction was paid at least 9% of the number of pharmaceutical payments after the implementation of the repayment system, the actual transaction was actually operated as the public notice in the previous repayment system. This is expressed that the maximum price publicly notified by the Minister of Health and Welfare under the repayment system functions as the "actually fixed price" in the pharmaceutical market.

② The substance of rebates offered by the Defendant to a medical institution was the promotion and public relations expenses paid by the medical institution in order to induce the medical institution to deal with the drug at low prices as the motive or incentive for the medical institution to purchase the drug at low prices under the repayment system. In other words, the Defendant, when offering rebates to a medical institution, did not provide the price of the drug at a direct discount to the medical institution, but paid cash, meal expenses, academic expenses, golf expenses, supplies, etc. in the form of cash, entertainment expenses, supplies, etc., and thus, the Defendant has the character of inducing the adoption and continuous use of the product of a specific supplier rather than discounting the price of the drug to the medical institution.

③ Even if the Defendant reflected the considerable portion of promotion and promotional expenses increased in the course of offering rebates as above in the pharmaceutical price, there is no assertion or proof that it violates the relevant statutes governing price regulation, and considering the fact that the price determination of the goods in the market economy system is in principle within the scope of the supplier’s authority, it cannot be readily concluded that the Defendant’s act of price determination is unlawful.

④ Meanwhile, in light of the structural characteristics of the pharmaceutical market as seen earlier (the wide range of industry regulation, third-party payment system, information incomplete or irregular) and the actual transaction functioned as the price actually fixed, it is difficult to view that there was a motive or economic incentive to purchase drugs at low price or to resell at low price only in the amount equivalent to the rebates price provided by medical institutions without the Defendant’s offering of rebates.

The Plaintiffs asserted to the effect that, in cases where a pharmaceutical company is aware of the fact that the pharmaceutical company has offered rebates to a medical care institution, the drug price of the relevant drug is reduced ex officio (i.e., the pharmaceutical price of the pharmaceutical product). In light of this, even if the Defendant offered rebates to a medical care institution, so long as the Defendant offered rebates to the medical care institution, the actual transaction of the pharmaceutical product is limited to the amount equivalent to the rebates amount. However, it is inappropriate to view that the market price of the pharmaceutical product is less than the amount equivalent to the rebates amount or the pharmaceutical price of the pharmaceutical product was purchased at low prices of the pharmaceutical company on January 13, 2009 as the first revision and enforcement of the Regulations on the Standards for Medical Care Benefits in National Health Insurance on January 13, 209, and that the market price reduction linkage is taking a compulsory administrative measure that reduces the price of the pharmaceutical product to which the health insurance applies to the medical care institution as a sanction for the payment of rebates.

⑤ The fundamental reason why a medical institution, which can be called a consumer of medicines in relation to pharmaceutical companies, is the failure of the price system in force at the time, that is, the actual transaction in which the principle of pricing in accordance with the principle of demand and supply, is considered to be a defect in the repayment system. It is reasonable to deem that the act of offering rebates by pharmaceutical companies is the act of inducing a medical institution as a consumer to increase their sales in a market situation where the principle of price competition is not operated, and therefore, it is difficult to view that the medical institution purchased the drugs at the upper limit of public notice and then resells them to the end-consumers.

(6) The practices of receiving rebates for drugs are arising from structural factors, such as the distribution system of drugs and unreasonable medical insurance medicine medical insurance, and it cannot be denied that many unreasonable problems arise, such as the formation of drug prices according to the maximum publicly notified price, the insolvency of insurance finance, and the increase in social expenses, inasmuch as these practices act in combination with each other. However, it is a separate issue that each consumer who finally purchased drugs from a medical institution can be assessed as having suffered legal losses due to the offering of rebates for the medical institutions of pharmaceutical companies. These problems are different from each other. The final consumer’s attempt to resolve these problems by claiming for compensation from pharmaceutical companies for losses caused by the offering of rebates for the offering of rebates to the pharmaceutical companies. This is, there are various legal problems to reasonably improve the distribution structure of drugs and that the market-type transactions currently implemented according to the principle of demand and supply and price competition, such as the redemption system.

It is desirable to take measures such as strengthening sanctions against the act of offering rebates, taking strict recovery measures when it is discovered, and taking measures such as appropriately reflecting the maximum amount of the recovered medicines when calculating the maximum amount of the recovered amount.

4) Whether the plaintiffs can prove the amount of damages

The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant should compensate for the plaintiffs' damages caused by the excessive claim, since the price of the medicine was unfairly claimed in proportion to the total amount of rebates provided to medical institutions from the total amount of pharmaceutical products sold by the defendant to medical institutions.

As long as the plaintiffs rejected all the arguments above, it is unnecessary to determine this part, but even if examined, it is difficult to accept this part of the argument for the following reasons.

First, even if the offering of rebates to a medical institution of a pharmaceutical company affects the formation of a pharmaceutical price, insofar as the purpose of the offering of rebates lies in inducing or inducing the use of the products of a specific supplier, it cannot be readily concluded that there is no increase in sales promotion and promotional expenses in other forms if the pharmaceutical company does not offer rebates. Therefore, it cannot be readily concluded that the Defendant’s offering of rebates would affect the pharmaceutical price, as alleged by the Plaintiffs.

Second, it is reasonable to view that there is a difference in the number of rebatess offered for each individual drug and the price fluctuation therefrom. As such, in relation to the plaintiffs' names of damages caused by the defendant's offering of rebates, all drugs cannot be generalized to calculate the amount of damages, and ultimately, it should be clarified that the price of the drug has increased to a certain extent due to the offering of rebates for each individual drug purchased by the plaintiffs. However, in this case, the plaintiffs in this case, since the defendant's offering of rebates was conducted systematically without any assertion and proof as to these issues, even if the doctors who prescribed the drugs did not receive rebates, the plaintiffs suffered losses from the overall perspective, and the amount of damages are also calculated by calculating the arithmetic average of all the drugs

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' arguments are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge of the presiding judge;

Judges Seo-won

Judges Ish Jeong-hee

1) The Plaintiffs also purchased 8mg of Chogo-su and 8mmmm of Chon-ri and Chon-ri from the preparatory brief dated June 12, 2014, as well as the amount claimed against the Defendant.

Although the above drugs contain, they are drugs manufactured and sold by the galslovascl Co., Ltd., not the defendant.