The case holding that the cancellation of a construction business license is an illegal disposition that abused discretionary power;

The case holding that the cancellation of a construction business license is an illegal disposition that abused discretionary power;

Article 52 of the Construction Business Act, Article 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1 and 3 others

Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor

Seoul High Court Decision 87Gu992 delivered on December 17, 1987

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the plaintiff company did not own the above 1983.2.3 Construction Business License for the above 1986.2.2. Construction Business License for the above 1986.2. Construction Business License for the above 198.2. The defendant did not own the above 194.2. Construction Business License for the above 194.1 Construction Business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's construction business's new construction business's construction business's 19.6. The plaintiff company's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's new construction business's construction business's 1.6.7 billion won or more without the above 19.6 billion won's previous construction business's new construction business's construction business's new construction business's construction business's 9.5 billion won or more, and its existing construction business's new construction business's 2.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and there is no error of law by misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles as to the scope of administrative discretion.

2. As to the third ground for appeal:

Since the Plaintiff Company did not receive orders for construction works from 1984 to 1986, it constitutes a ground for revocation of Article 52(1)2 of the Construction Business Act, and the Plaintiff Company received a renewal of license on the condition that its capital should be increased in accordance with the Construction Business Act amended until February 24, 1986 and the Enforcement Decree thereof, as the Plaintiff Company received a renewal of license on the condition that its capital should be increased in accordance with the same Act and the Enforcement Decree, it is clear that the Defendant’s assertion was made only in the final appeal, and that there was no assertion in the lower judgment, and therefore, it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal against the lower judgment.

3. As to the fourth ground for appeal:

The issue is that the Plaintiff Company purchased the said investment certificate on February 26, 1987 after the revocation of the instant license is not legitimate in light of the relevant provisions of the Construction Mutual Aid Association Act, and thus, the fact that the Plaintiff Company purchased the investment certificate after the revocation of the instant license cannot be a circumstance to determine the validity of the instant license disposition.

Examining the judgment below in detail, the revocation of the instant license does not deviate from the scope of discretionary authority in light of the overall circumstances at the time of revocation, and it does not deviate from the scope of discretionary authority in light of the circumstances in which the construction mutual aid association was held after the revocation of the instant license. In light of the records of the case, it is not a legitimate attack against the judgment of the court below, but a legitimate attack against the judgment of the court below. In light of the records, it cannot be viewed that the first price of the so-called so-called Plaintiff company’s ownership does not constitute a conclusion different from the judgment of the court below.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)