Evaluation methods for land changing the form and quality of illegal land determined and publicly announced as a site for urban planning facilities (park) before January 7, 1995, the enforcement date of the Enforcement Rule of the Gu Public Use Compensation Act.

Article 6 (6) of the Enforcement Rule of the former Enforcement Rule of the Public Use and Compensation Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 3 of January 7, 1995) cannot be applied to land that was determined and publicly announced as a site for urban planning facilities (park) before January 7, 1995, under paragraph (4) of the Addenda of the Enforcement Rule of the former Public Use and Compensation Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 3 of January 7, 1995) so that the land use situation at the time of the change of the form and quality can not be evaluated according to the actual use situation at the time of the expropriation decision. However, if the method

Article 6 (6) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Public Compensation for Loss (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 121 of October 15, 1997), and Article 6 (4) of the Addenda (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, January 7, 1995

Supreme Court Decision 99Du9957 delivered on December 8, 2000 (Gong2001Sang, 288) Supreme Court Decision 2000Du3160 Delivered on June 12, 2001

Plaintiff 1 and three others (Law Firm ro, Attorneys Lee Young-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Central Land Tribunal and one other (Law Firm Rois, Attorneys White-gu et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2002Nu2668 delivered on July 11, 2003

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. As to the condition of land use in this case

Article 6 (6) of the Enforcement Rule of the Public Special Act cannot be applied to the land of change of form and quality determined and publicly announced as the site of urban planning facilities (park) before January 7, 1995, its enforcement date pursuant to paragraph (4) of the Addenda to the Enforcement Rule of the Public Special Act on the Compensation for Land Use (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 3, Jan. 7, 1995; hereinafter referred to as the "Enforcement Rule of the Public Special Act") (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Du3160, Jun. 12, 2001). Thus, if the method of use is temporarily determined and publicly announced in view of the surrounding environment, it shall not be considered in assessing the land merely because it is a temporary state of use.

According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment as cited by the court below, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning after compiling the adopted evidence, and judged that the land in this case was most forests and fields at the time of 1977, but part of the land was altered or form was illegally constructed without permission for conversion, etc. under the Forestry Act for the construction of a new building to build a melt apartment on the adjacent land, the construction of a melt apartment, after the construction of a melt apartment, the temporary building was demolished on the ground of this case, and its use method and area are also demolished, and the neighboring residents are growing, and the above illegal land alteration can be easily restored to forest land if it is used by the competent authority as miscellaneous land and transition. In light of various circumstances such as the fact that the land in this case can be recovered to forest land where the order of restoration is issued by the competent authority. Thus, it is justifiable to evaluate the actual use of the land in this case as forest land in this case.

In light of the relevant laws and records, although some of the judgment below's explanation is not appropriate, the conclusion that the court below's determination of the actual use of the land in this case as forest land is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law such as misconception of facts in violation of the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of legal principles as to the appraisal of the land, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different from this case, and are not appropriate to be invoked in this case.

In addition, the part of the land in this case where the illegal change of form and quality was made is merely the temporary use under Article 2-10 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Special Public Officials Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 17854 of Dec. 30, 2002), and it cannot be evaluated in consideration of this. Thus, the above provision cannot be viewed as being applied to this case under Article 6 (6) of the Enforcement Rule of the Special Public Officials Act. Therefore, on the premise that the above provision was applied to this case, the above provision was illegal interpretation excluding the application of Article 2-10 (1) and (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Special Public Officials Act, or all of the grounds of appeal are without merit.

2. As to the selection of comparative standard land

According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the court below, on the premise that the appraisal institution of this case’s land is a forest and field, the court below determined that its specific use area belongs to a general residential area like the land in this case’s case’s land, and its land category on the public record is a forest and field located in the vicinity of the land in this case’s land, and that it is just to select the forest and field 137 forest land in Geumcheon-dong, Geumcheon-gu, Seoul. The court below determined that the difference between the land in this case’

In light of relevant laws and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the selection of reference land as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different from this case, and are not appropriate to be invoked in this case.

3. As to the transaction cases of similar neighboring land

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance cited by the court below, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning after compiling the adopted evidences, and determined that each appraisal agency in this ruling was not considered as trading cases of neighboring land on the premise that the land was used as a site different from its land category and that it would be used as an apartment site in the future. Thus, the court below determined that each appraisal agency in this ruling was not considered as trading cases of neighboring land, on the ground that it is reasonable to view that the above land was purchased at KRW 1,397,480,00 in the price of KRW 1,39,426 square meters in Geumcheon-dong, Geumcheon-gu, Seoul Metropolitan City located near the land of this case.

In light of the relevant laws and records, we affirm the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below as just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of facts against the rules of evidence or in the misapprehension of legal principles as to cases of transactions in neighboring similar land, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Shin Hyun-chul (Presiding Justice)