(영문) 대법원 2014.6.12.선고 2012도2701 판결

1. As to the grounds of appeal disputing the order to refuse to work at night and on holidays ( Saturdays), the recognition of facts constituting an offense ought to reach a proof to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the selection of evidence and the probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact finding belong to the free judgment of the fact-finding court (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act).

After finding the facts as stated in its holding, the court below determined that the defendants' statements and some of the statements made by H, I, and J are credibility, and further, considering the evidence as stated in its holding, including the statements, it is recognized that the court below ordered 48 members of the K branch of the Chungcheongnam-gu branch of the metal trade union (hereinafter referred to as the "K branch") to collectively refuse to engage in the remaining work and special circumstances after the defendants decided to refuse to engage in the night extension work (hereinafter referred to as "refence work") and work on holidays (hereinafter referred to as "special circumstances"), and encourage them to refuse to engage in the remaining work and special circumstances in group from April 1, 2008 to June 4, 2008.

was made.

The Defendants’ assertion in the grounds of appeal to the effect that the Defendants’ remaining business and the order of rejection of special circumstances is nothing more than an error in the judgment of the lower court on the selection and probative value of evidence, which belongs to the free judgment of the fact-finding court. In addition, even when examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the degree of proof necessary for the recognition of facts constituting an offense, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to logical and empirical rules,

2. As to the ground of appeal disputing power in the crime of interference with business

A. The crime of interference with business is established in a case where a person interferes with another’s business by deceptive means or by force (Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act). The power refers to any force that may suppress and confuse a person’s free will. The strike as an industrial action that interferes with the normal operation of business by refusing to provide labor for the purpose of accomplishing the claim is not simply an omission of refusing to provide labor under a labor contract, but is an actual exercise of power to collectively stop labor provision to accomplish the employee’s claim by going beyond the mere refusal of to refuse to provide labor under a labor contract, and thus, includes the elements of force as referred to in the crime of interference with business. However, the strike as an industrial action does not always constitute the crime of interference with business. However, it does not constitute the crime of interference with business even if it is sufficiently conducted at a time unforeseeable by the employer in light of the situation and circumstances before and after the strike, etc., and if it can be evaluated that the employer’s free will to continue the business may cause serious confusion or confusion in the employer’s business operation, it constitutes the crime of interference with business.

B. In full view of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted, the following circumstances are revealed.

(1) Workers belonging to K (hereinafter “K”) have worked on the basis of 5-day work per week on the basis of 2-day work, and two-day workers have worked on the basis of 08:30 to 17:30 per day, and two-day workers have worked on the basis of 8-day work hours per day from 08:30 to 17:30 of the day from 18:0 of the day to 02:0 of the day from 02:0 of the night workers have worked on the basis of 0:0 to 06:30 of the day from 0:0 of the day to 06:0 of the day, and all-time workers have continued to work on the basis of 08:30 of the day from 0 to 07:30 of the day.

(2) Around March 8, 2008, approximately 60 employees, including the Defendants, of K including the Defendants, held an inaugural general meeting, established a trade union and participated in the competition around March 10, 2008. Then, the Defendant et al. requested the K company to faithfully respond to the negotiations at the end of March 2008 and the two members of the trade union office and the union to be recognized as full-time officer, and delivered documents on the collective bargaining preparation (the draft collective agreement, the number of negotiations, the negotiation cycle, etc.). (3) After which some members of the K branch, including the Defendants, began to refuse to provide remaining and special services from April 1, 2008 to around 240 workers belonging to the K, but the entire members of the K branch did not engage in the business from around April 18, 2008 to April 18, 2008.

5. The number of union members who did not engage in the special circumstances was 18, and the number of union members who did not engage in the remaining business from April 14, 2008 to April 30, 2008 were 22, and the number of union members who did not engage in the remaining business from April 14, 2008, around April 12, 2008, around April 19, 2008, and around 208.

4.4, 19, 11 members who did not work for the 26th century were each 14, 19, 100, 2000 . (4) K branch offices around April 1, 2008, 2000 . 8 members who did not work for 40 billion won and 10 billion won for 200,000 . 8 members who did not work for 4th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 6th 200 6th 8th 6th 200 6th 6th 8th 2008.

C. Examining the above circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is difficult to view that certain members, including the Defendants, of the Union including the Defendants, suffered a serious confusion or enormous damage in the operation of the business since the refusal of remaining business and special circumstances was made at a time unpredictable by K, an employer, and therefore, it cannot be concluded that the refusal of remaining business and special circumstances in this case constitutes a force that may cause pressure or confusion with K’s free will in the continuation of business.

D. Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise solely on the grounds stated in its reasoning that the refusal by the Defendants to engage in the remaining and peculiar work of this case led by the Defendants was caused enormous damage to the business operation of the private sector or at least serious confusion, and thus, determined that such refusal constitutes “power of force” under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act. Therefore, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on force in the crime of interference with business by misapprehending the legal doctrine on force in the crime of interference with business, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

3. Scope of reversal

For this reason, the part of the judgment of the court below concerning the charge of obstruction of business should be reversed without examining the remaining grounds of appeal.

However, among the judgment below, the above reversal portion and the remaining conviction portion of the judgment of the court below should be sentenced to a single punishment for the whole crime under Article 40 of the Criminal Act. Thus, the remaining conviction portion of the judgment of the court below should be reversed together with the above reversal portion, and the judgment of the court below should be reversed in its entirety.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.