Whether there is a separate crime of fraud, in addition to forest larceny, in a case where a person deceptions the relevant authorities to legally produce the stolen timber which is the object of forest larceny and purchases it by means of a negotiated contract after being recognized as the person having the right to file a complaint under the Forestry Act.

Forest larceny under Article 93 (1) of the Forestry Act is limited to products in a forest, and its nature is the same as larceny under the Criminal Act. Thus, barring any other special circumstance, even if the Defendants deceptioned the relevant authorities as if they were legally produced with respect to the original trees that they stolen and purchased them through a negotiated contract, it cannot be deemed as a violation of new legal interests, and it does not constitute a separate crime of fraud as a single non-permanent and ex post facto act by nature of forest larceny.

Article 93(1) of the Forestry Act Article 347(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes Article 9(1) of the Criminal Act Article 48(1) of the Criminal Act

Defendant 1 and eight others

Defendant 1 and seven others

Attorney Kim Jong-ho (Korean National University), Kim Jong-ho (Korean National University), and Kim Awards and Decorations

Seoul High Court Decision 74No259 delivered on June 26, 1974

1. Of the judgment below, the part against Defendant 1 and 2 and the part against Defendant 3 are reversed, and this part is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

2. All appeals filed by Defendant 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 and prosecutor’s appeals filed against Defendant 5 and 9 are dismissed.

3. The number of days of detention after the appeal of the defendants 4, 6, 7, and 8 shall be included in each original sentence of the above defendants.

1. First, Defendant 1, 2, and 3 and their defense counsel's grounds of appeal are examined as to the part concerning fraud among the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that Defendant 1 and 2 jointly sold in the name of the above non-party 1 and 6 (1) as shown in the judgment of the court below, and as shown in Article 9 (1) 1 of the Specific Crimes Punishment Act, Article 93 (1) of the Forestry Act, Article 347 (1), the former part of Article 37 (2), Article 37 (1), Article 38 (2) of the Criminal Act, Article 38 (1) of the Criminal Act, Article 50 (1), Article 38 (2) of the Criminal Act, Article 37 (1) of the Criminal Act, Article 37 (1) of the Criminal Act, Article 50 (1), Article 38 (2) of the Criminal Act, and Article 37 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the former part of the above non-party 1, etc. are concurrent crimes, in collusion with the above non-party 1 and 2, thereby deceiving them by fraud.

However, the forest larceny under Article 93 (1) of the Forestry Act is limited to the product in a forest, and the crime is also the same as larceny under the Criminal Act (see Supreme Court Decisions 4292Du250 delivered on September 18, 1959 and 65Do826 delivered on December 10, 1965), so long as there are no other special circumstances, it cannot be deemed that there is a violation of new legal interests even if the defendant deceivings the authorities concerned as being legally produced with respect to the original item that the defendant stolen and purchased it through a profit contract, and it cannot be deemed that there is a violation of new legal interests, and it does not constitute a crime of fraud separately as a single imprising act in the nature of forest larceny, which is a situation offender, unless there are other special circumstances.

Therefore, in this case without any fact-finding or explanation on other special circumstances, the lower court’s judgment that deemed the Defendants’ above so-called as a crime of larceny and concurrent crime of larceny cannot be said to have affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on larceny and fraud.

2. The following grounds of appeal are examined together with Defendant 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.

When examining the various evidence as stated in the judgment of the court below and the court of first instance as cited by the court below based on the records, the adoption of evidence by the court below is legitimate and sufficient to recognize the criminal facts of this case against the defendants based on the evidence, and it does not seem that there was an error in violation of the rules of experience or logical rules, such as theory of lawsuit, or in incomplete hearing or incomplete hearing. The defendants' appeal on this point is nothing more than that of the court below's exclusive right as to the determination of the probative value of evidence and the preparation of evidence, and it cannot be said that there was an error in the misapprehension of the interpretation of the evidence No. 807 (a sale contract) No. 735 (a sale contract) in Chuncheon District Prosecutors' Office No. 707 (a sale contract), as argued by the defendant 6 in the process of fact-finding by the court below. Of the grounds of appeal by the defendant 8, the defendant is not only a new argument at the court of first instance that the defendant voluntarily ceased after commencing the crime of this case

In addition, in the case of this case where a sentence less than 10 years has been imposed on each of the Defendants, it cannot be deemed as the grounds of appeal on the grounds of mistake of facts or unfair sentencing in light of the purport of Article 383 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, so there is an error of mistake of facts in the judgment of the court below, and an appeal to the effect that the sentence against the Defendants is excessive and unfair, it is without merit.

3. We examine the prosecutor's grounds of appeal on the defendant 9 and 5.

(A) First of all, the court below decided that Defendant 9's purchase of the original wood at the time of public prosecution from Co-defendant 3 based on its timely evidence that Non-Indicted 1's purchase of the original wood at the time of public prosecution is subject to the special interest and authorization from the State. Further, Defendant 45 (1) and (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Forestry Act and Article 3 (1) 6 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act should take over the original wood of this case after obtaining permission from the head of the forest management office after taking the procedures provided for in Article 45 (1) and Article 45 (1) 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act and Article 3 (1) 6 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act. Accordingly, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence as to the above fact-finding process, but did not err in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence under the premise that it did not constitute a violation of the rules of evidence under Article 4 of the Forestry Act.

(B) The lower court acknowledged Defendant 5 as to the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, which is the primary charge of forest larceny by the prosecutor, and in such a case, the seized articles are merely subject to voluntary confiscation, and are not subject to necessary confiscation. The lower court maintained the first inquiry group to the same purport, which is justifiable and does not constitute an unlawful act.

4. Therefore, without examining the Defendants’ other grounds of appeal and the Prosecutor’s grounds of appeal as to Defendant 1, 2, and 3, the part against Defendant 1, 2, and the conviction against Defendant 3 among the judgment below is reversed and remanded to the court below without examining the Defendants’ other grounds of appeal and the Prosecutor’s grounds of appeal as to Defendant 2. Each appeal against Defendant 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 and the Prosecutor’s Defendant 5, and 9 as to Defendant 5, and 9 are without merit, and all appeals are dismissed, and 110 days out of the detention days after the appeal against Defendant 4, 6, 7, and 8 under Article 57 of the Criminal Act are to be included in each principal sentence of the Defendants. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Yang Byung-ho (Presiding Justice)