Whether approval of the obligation after the expiration of the extinctive prescription constitutes waiver of the benefit of prescription

The act of recognizing the existence of an obligation by the obligor after the expiration of the extinctive prescription and determining the transaction volume which serves as the basis of the larger amount of goods as a result of the settlement of accounts by presenting the settlement of accounts to the obligee shall be deemed as the act of giving up the benefit of extinctive prescription, as it recognizes the existence of an obligation with knowledge

Article 184 of the Civil Act

66Da2173 delivered on February 7, 1967 (Supreme Court Decision 1523Da1996 delivered on November 30, 196, Supreme Court Decision 65Da1996 delivered on November 30, 196, Supreme Court Decision 13Du261 delivered on June 1, 196, Supreme Court Decision 184Da269 delivered on February 7, 1967

Plaintiff

Defendant

Sungdong Branch of Seoul District Court (76Gahap180 delivered on July 1, 200)

1. Revocation of the original judgment;

2. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 3,885,350 won with an annual interest rate of 6% from March 24, 1976 to the date of full payment.

3. The costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant in both the first and second instances.

The above judgment and provisional execution declaration

1. First, we examine the plaintiff's primary claim.

Since the above-mentioned dispute over non-party 1 through 10, 12 through 10, 12, 14, 15, and 10 of the above-mentioned international sales contract between the non-party 2 and the non-party 4 were not entered in the above-mentioned international sales contract for the non-party 1 to the non-party 5, and the non-party 4 and the non-party 5's remaining sales proceeds were not entered in the non-party 1 to the non-party 6's non-party 6's domestic sales price for the non-party 1 to the non-party 3's non-party 6's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 4's non-party 6's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 9's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 3's non-party 1'6'

Therefore, barring any other special circumstances, the defendant is obligated to pay 3,85,350 won, excluding 2,464,650 won, remaining 3,85,350 won, excluding 2,464,650 won, which the plaintiff himself/herself has received from the defendant, among the agreed transaction amount of 6,350 won (1,300 won x 970+1,400 won x 3,635) agreed on the consignment sale contract with the non-party international mother.

However, the defendant asserts that the amount of goods already repaid to the above international mothership is KRW 2,96,450,00, but the above defendant's defense is not reasonable, since the items of evidence Nos. 2-1 through 10, 3-1 through 8, 4-1 through 10, 3-1 through 8, 3-1 through 4-1, 4-1, and 16-1 through 4 of the above evidence are not evidence to acknowledge the fact of repayment of the above defendant's assertion, or there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

In addition, the defendant, around May 6, 1971, agreed that among the claims against the defendant in this case against the defendant in this case against the non-party 1 of Seoul branch office and the defendant of the above international mother office representing the above international mother office, the amount of 1,750,000 won which the defendant had not been collected from the purchaser at the time of the above international mother office shall be reduced to 500 won per the entrusted supply price of the remaining goods which the defendant had not been sold at the time of the above company's abandonment from the purchaser. However, as shown above, the part of Eul evidence Nos. 6-2 (Notice) of this case's evidence No. 6 shall not be trusted in light of the evidence produced below, and the defendant's testimony of the non-party 3 at the court below shall not be deemed to have reached an agreement to reduce the quality of the above goods as alleged in the above defendant, and shall not be deemed to have been reduced to the non-party 1 of the above international mother office's rejection of the above claim and the above testimony of the non-party 1 of this case.

In addition, the defendant's assertion that the non-party international mother's claim for the purchase price of the goods in this case against the defendant is extinguished because the short-term extinctive prescription for the three years has already been completed.

If the consignment contract between the above defendant and the international mother of the non-party is sold to the non-party company, the agreement was made to pay the price agreed upon in the contract to the non-party company immediately, and the fact that the defendant sold the remaining goods to the non-party company other than the amount partially returned out of the Mala Welfare supplied by the non-party company to the non-party company to the non-party company from August 1970 upon the termination of the transaction relation with the above international mother of the non-party, as seen earlier. Thus, the payment deadline for the non-party's obligation to pay the price for the goods in this case to the non-party international mother of the non-party company shall be deemed to have been transferred to the police officer at least on August 1970, and as seen earlier, the short-term extinctive prescription period under Article 163 of the Civil Act shall be deemed to have been applied to the claim for the goods in this case arising from the transaction between the

However, in full view of the whole purport of the court below's decision and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2's witness (excluding the part rejected above) and the whole purport of the oral argument, the above international mother's claim for the goods of this case may be acknowledged as having been given a peremptory notice on several occasions from the first day of August 1970, which is the due date, to the defendant, on several occasions. However, there is no evidence to deem that the above international mother was a judicial claim or other act that constitutes a cause of interrupting prescription within six months after the peremptory notice. Thus, barring any other special circumstances, it cannot be deemed that the above goods payment claim was already extinguished due to the expiration of the extinctive prescription period from the fourth day of August 1970, which is the due date to the expiration of the said three-year period from the fourth day of August 1973.

However, in full view of the above facts and the whole purport of the argument, the defendant acknowledged that he had the above obligation to purchase the goods from the above international office until the short-term extinctive prescription of the claim to purchase the goods of this case was completed on or around February 1974, and requested that the above international office pay for several times to settle the accounts, and there is no counter-proof, otherwise, the defendant's act of recognizing the debtor's obligation after the expiration of the extinctive prescription as the debtor's act of recognizing the existence of the obligation after the expiration of the extinctive prescription and determining the volume of the transaction between the parties, which form the basis of the substituted amount, by proposing the settlement of accounts to the creditor, shall be deemed to have waived the benefit of the extinctive prescription, and therefore the defendant's objection to the extinctive prescription is eventually without merit.

2. Thus, barring other special circumstances, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff the balance of the above goods prices of KRW 3,885,350 and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from March 24, 1976 to the full payment date, on the record that the plaintiff is the next day from March 24, 1976 to the next day from March 24, 1976 to the next day from the date of repayment of the complaint of this case filed by the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff's claim for the plaintiff's main claim is reasonable, and this conclusion is unfair, and the plaintiff's appeal is reasonable, and therefore the judgment shall be revoked, and the costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant who has lost both the first and second court, and the provisional execution shall

Judges Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Judge)