[1] Legislative intent of Article 8 of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business, and whether the validity of an agreement between a large franchise and retail business operator and a supplier that violated the above provision should be denied (negative)

[2] In order to exclude the application of the above provision from the application of the provision due to the existence of an agreement between a large franchise and retail business operator and a supplier on the basis of the existence of a statutory payment period and a damages rate as stipulated in Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business, whether the agreement was entered into with the supplier’s voluntary consent is recognized (affirmative)

[3] In a case where a large franchise and retail business operator violates the above provision against a supplier on the grounds that the supplier did not obtain a voluntary consent from the supplier as to the terms and conditions that are more unfavorable than those of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and retail Business, whether the supplier may claim damages for delay due to a tort against a large franchise and retail business operator (affirmative); and in a case where a large franchise and retail business operator fails to prove that the above provision or the terms and conditions are by a voluntary consent of the supplier, whether the Fair Trade Commission may issue a corrective order to order the payment of damages equivalent to the above damages for delay pursuant to Article 32 of the same Act (affirmative in principle)

[4] Whether a large franchise and retail business operator may be exempted from liability due to the lapse of statutory payment deadline solely on the ground that the supplier was served with a provisional attachment order on the supplier's claim for the amount of sales (negative)

[5] Legislative intent of Article 14(1) of the Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business Act and the meaning of “unfairness” required in the act of demanding the provision of management information prohibited under the same Article

[6] Requirements for determining whether an abuse of trade position under Article 23(1)4 and (3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, and Article 36(1) [Attachment Table 1-2] [Attachment Table 6(d) of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act constitutes an abuse of trade position under Article 23(1)4 and 36(1) [Attachment Table 1-2] 6(d) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade

[1] Article 8 of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business (hereinafter “Large Franchise and Retail Business Act”) is established in order to prevent a large franchise and retail business operator who has a superior position in transaction from causing unfair damage to a supplier by delaying payment by abusing his/her position and delaying payment. Article 8 of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business does not stipulate any provision concerning the validity of an agreement in violation of the provision, while Article 8 of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business does not stipulate that a principal contractor who has violated the provision shall be punished by a fine, and the Commission shall investigate only a certain violation of the provision, and require the Commission to order the principal contractor to take corrective measures or impose a penalty surcharge accordingly. Thus, the above provision does not necessarily necessarily deny the validity of an agreement between the large franchise

[2] The purpose of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business (hereinafter “Large Franchise and Retail Business Act”) is to contribute to the balanced growth and development of the national economy by establishing a fair trading order and by enabling large franchise and retail business operators, suppliers, etc. to mutually complementaryly develop on an equal footing (Article 1). A large franchise and retail business operator, who is in a superior position in the transaction, unilaterally inserting a contract provision that is more unfavorable than Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business, unilaterally introduces a supplier’s consent thereto, and makes such supplier consent thereto, and accordingly, commit an act of violating the said provision against the supplier is an act that damages the legislative purpose of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business, damages a fair trading order, and disadvantage the supplier. In addition, considering the transaction reality where a large franchise and retail business operator who is in a superior position in the transaction is likely to incorporate the above contract into a contract by taking advantage of his/her position, the agreement between a large franchise and retail business operator and a supplier should not be excluded immediately from the application of the above provision.

Here, the extent of the superior position of a large franchise and retail business operator in the transaction with the supplier whether the supplier voluntarily consented, the characteristics of the transaction, the circumstances surrounding the agreement, the details and degree of disadvantage suffered by the supplier, the circumstances leading up to the agreement and the degree of benefit of the contracting party arising therefrom, the degree of benefit of the contracting party, and the consideration that the supplier obtains upon delayed payment of the sales amount, etc. should be determined reasonably in light of normal transaction practices or commercial customs and empirical rules. The burden of proof is borne by a large franchise and retail business operator who asserts that the application of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act should be excluded.

Such a legal doctrine ought to equally apply to cases where a large franchise and retail business operator unilaterally prepares a standardized contract with a superior position in the transaction, inserting provisions unfavorable to the contents of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Large Franchise and retail Business, and then commits a violation on the ground that such provision was incorporated into the terms and conditions. Therefore, unless it is acknowledged that the supplier voluntarily consented to the provision of the said standardized contract with a large franchise and retail business operator through an individual negotiation, the supplier cannot be exempted from liability for the violation of the said provision solely on the basis of

[3] Although a large franchise and retail business operator, in a superior position in the transaction, did not obtain a voluntary consent from the supplier as to the contract terms and conditions or the terms and conditions that are more unfavorable than those of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business (hereinafter “Large Franchise and Retail Business Act”), it constitutes a tort by intention or negligence, regardless of whether the contract terms and conditions or the terms and conditions are legally effective. In such a case, the supplier may claim against a large franchise and retail business operator for damages equivalent to the damages for delay that could have been paid if the supplier had not committed a violation of the large franchise and retail business operator on the ground of a tort

Therefore, in a case where a large franchise and retail business operator only claims the exclusion of the above provisions on the grounds of a contract clause or a standardized contract clause that is more unfavorable than Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business, and fails to prove that the above contract clause or the standardized contract clause is by voluntary consent, the Fair Trade Commission may issue an order to take corrective measures to pay an amount equivalent to damages for delay pursuant to Article 32 of the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business

[4] A provisional attachment of a claim is limited to prohibiting a third party obligor from paying for a provisional attachment. Thus, even if a provisional attachment is made, a third party obligor cannot be held liable for delay if the due date of the claim has arrived at. In such a case, a third party obligor may escape from the risk of double repayment by making a deposit under Articles 291 and 248(1) of the Civil Execution Act, and thereby, is also exempted from liability for delay. Therefore, a large franchise and retail business operator is not liable for delay solely on the ground that he/she was served with a provisional attachment order on the claim for the proceeds of sale by a supplier.

[5] The purpose of Article 14(1) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business (hereinafter “Large Franchise and Retail Business Act”) is to establish a fair trading order in a large franchise and retail business and to enable large franchise and retail business operators and suppliers to develop mutually complementaryly on an equal basis by preventing a supplier from requesting a large franchise and retail business operator to provide management information under each subparagraph of Article 14(1) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business, taking into account the fact that such management information might be used for a subsequent unfair trade practice by a large franchise and retail business operator and to restrict fair and free trading order.

Considering the language and legislative intent of Article 14(1) of the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business, “unfair” required in the act of demanding the provision of management information prohibited under Article 14(1) of the Act refers to a case where the required act goes beyond normal transaction practices and is deemed to be beyond normal transaction practices and is likely to impede fair trade, taking into account such various circumstances as the situation of the market where the transaction party is faced with, the characteristics of the goods subject to the transaction, the intent of demanding the provision of management information, circumstances, purpose, effect, impact, the form of the requested information, the details and scope of the requested information, the details and degree of disadvantages that the other party may receive or may receive when he/she does not comply with the request, the degree of the superior position in the market of the large franchise and retail business operator demanding the provision of management information, and the gap in overall business capacity between the parties.

[6] Article 23(1)4 and (3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and Article 36(1) [Attachment Table 1-2] 6(d) of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act provide that “an act of unfairly taking advantage of one’s transaction position and making a transaction with the other party to the transaction” refers to an act of establishing or altering transaction conditions so that the other party to the transaction may suffer disadvantages to the other party to the transaction,” or “an act of causing disadvantages to the other party to the transaction.” In order to constitute an abuse of transaction position, the fact that the contents of the pertinent act are somewhat unfavorable to the other party to the extent that it can be deemed the same as enforcement of purchase, coercion of provision of profits, enforcement of sale goals, etc., it is insufficient to say that one party to the transaction position unfairly used his/her transaction position to establish or change transaction conditions or puts disadvantage to the other party in the process of implementing the transaction, and thereby, it is likely to unfairly disadvantage fair trade in light of the purpose, effect and influence of the pertinent act, degree and degree of disadvantage of the other party to the transaction.

[1] Article 8 (1) and (2) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business / [2] Article 8 (1) and (2) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business / [3] Articles 8 (1), (2), and 32 of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business / [4] Articles 248 (1), 276, and 291 of the Civil Execution Act, Article 392 of the Civil Act / [5] Article 14 (1) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business / [6] Article 23 (1) 4 and (3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Article 36 (1) [Attachment 1-2]6 (d) of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da53457 Decided January 27, 201 (Gong2011Sang, 412) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 93Da951 Decided December 13, 1994 (Gong1995Sang, 463) Supreme Court Decision 2015Da23473 Decided June 23, 2016 / [5] Supreme Court Decision 2015Du36010 Decided December 22, 2017 (Gong2016Du30897 Decided October 12, 2018) / [6] Supreme Court Decision 2010Du250937 Decided April 25, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2010Du253097 Decided April 25, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2010Du53475 Decided May 23, 2017

Homeb shopping (Attorneys Hwang Chang-sik et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The Fair Trade Commission (Attorney Park Jong-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2015Nu49292 decided September 23, 2016

The part of the judgment below regarding the delayed payment of the sales amount is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the part of a contract, as to the violation of the duty to deliver immediately (ground of appeal No. 1)

A. (1) Article 6 of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business (hereinafter “Large Franchise and Retail Business Act”) provides that a large franchise and retail business operator shall immediately enter into a contract with a supplier, etc., provide the supplier, etc. with a written statement (including an electronic document; hereinafter “written face”) stating the contract details prescribed by Presidential Decree, such as the type of transaction, and that the supplier, etc. and the supplier, etc. shall respectively sign (including a certified digital signature) or sign and seal the document (Paragraph 2).

(2) The proviso to Article 35(1) of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business provides that a fixed amount of penalty surcharge may be imposed within the limit of 500 million won for a violation for which the calculation of sales is difficult. In such a case, the public notice of imposition standards for penalty surcharges on a person violating the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business (established by the Fair Trade Commission Notice No. 2012-4, Feb. 28, 2012) established pursuant to delegation of Article 28(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Fair Transactions in Large Franchise and Retail Business (amended by the Fair Trade Commission Notice No. 2012-4, Feb. 28, 2012) shall be given depending on the content and degree of the violation, ① “an act violating the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business” shall be between KRW 10 million and KRW 300 million, and ③ “large amount of violation” shall be imposed between KRW 300 million and KRW 500,000. The amount of penalty surcharge shall be determined within the scope of discretion.

B. The lower court recognized that the Plaintiff violated Article 6(1) and (2) of the Large-Scale Distribution Business Act by failing to deliver a contract face or delaying delivery to suppliers 34 times from January 1, 2013 to October 31, 2014. The lower court determined that the Defendant’s calculation based on this part of the violation constituted “serious violation” is unlawful, taking into account the following: (a) the Plaintiff’s violation was 94 times in total; (b) the Plaintiff’s violation was 94 times in total; (c) the Plaintiff’s violation was 0.7% out of the total supply contract concluded by the Plaintiff; and (d) the content of the contract was unclear; and (e) the Plaintiff and the supplier did not actually dispute due to the uncertainty of the terms of the contract under this part.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on deviation and abuse of discretionary power, contrary to what is alleged in

2. As to the delayed payment of the sales of goods (ground of appeal No. 2)

A. (1) Article 8 of the Large Franchise and Retail Business Act provides that, where a large franchise and retail business operator sells goods entrusted by a supplier and manages the sales proceeds thereof, he/she shall pay the sales proceeds of the relevant goods to the supplier, etc. within 40 days from the monthly due date for sales (hereinafter “legal due date”) (Article 1(3)); and that, where a large franchise and retail business operator pays sales proceeds after the statutory due date for payment, he/she shall pay interest pursuant to the interest rate determined and publicly notified by the Fair Trade Commission in consideration of economic circumstances, such as overdue interest rates applied by banks under the Banking Act within 40/100 per annum (Article 2)

(2) This is a provision prepared in order to prevent a large franchise and retail business operator who has a superior position in transaction from causing unfair damage to a supplier by abusing his/her position and delaying payment. Article 8 of the Large Franchise and Retail Business Act does not stipulate any provision concerning the validity of an agreement that violates the provision, while Article 8 of the Large Franchise and Retail Business Act does not stipulate any provision concerning the validity of the agreement that is in violation of the provision, and requires the Fair Trade Commission to investigate a principal contractor who has violated the provision, and thereby requires the Commission to order the principal contractor to take corrective measures or impose a penalty surcharge accordingly. Thus, the above provision does not necessarily deny the validity of the agreement between a large franchise

(3) However, the purpose of the Large Franchise and Retail Business Act is to contribute to the balanced growth and development of the national economy by establishing a fair trading order and by enabling large franchise and retail business operators and suppliers, etc. to mutually complementaryly develop on an equal footing (Article 1). A large franchise and retail business operators, who are in a superior position in the transaction, unilaterally inserting a contract provision that is more unfavorable than Article 8(1) and (2) of the Large Franchise and Retail Business Act, and unilaterally subjected the supplier to consent thereto, and accordingly, compel the supplier to commit a violation of the above provision against the supplier on the grounds of such provision, is to damage the legislative purpose of the Large Franchise and Retail Business Act, disrupt a fair trading order, and put a disadvantage to the supplier. Moreover, considering the transaction reality where a large franchise and retail business operator who is in a superior position in the transaction, might incorporate the above contract provision into a contract by taking advantage of his/her position, the application of the above provision cannot be immediately excluded, and the circumstance that the agreement was concluded with voluntary consent of the supplier is insufficient.

Here, whether the supplier voluntarily consented to the supplier should be reasonably determined in light of normal transaction practices or commercial customs and empirical rules (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da53457, Jan. 27, 201). The burden of proof is borne by a large franchise and retail business operator claiming that the supplier should be excluded from the application of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Large Franchise and retail Business Act.

(4) Such legal doctrine should be equally applied to a case where a large franchise and retail business operator, who is in a superior position in the transaction, unilaterally prepares a standardized contract and adds a provision unfavorable to the content of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Large Franchise and retail Business Act, and then commits a violation of the above provision on the ground that it was incorporated into the contents of the contract. Therefore, unless it is acknowledged that the supplier voluntarily consented to the provision of the above standardized contract with a large franchise and retail business operator through individual negotiations, the supplier cannot be exempted from liability for the violation of the above provision

(5) Meanwhile, even though a large franchise and retail business operator who is in a superior position in the transaction did not obtain a voluntary consent from the supplier with respect to the terms and conditions that are more unfavorable than those of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Large Franchise and retail Business Act, it constitutes a tort by intention or negligence regardless of whether the terms and conditions of the contract are legally effective or not. In such a case, the supplier may claim against the large franchise and retail business operator for damages equivalent to the damages for which it would have been paid if the violation of the large franchise and retail business operator would have been caused by tort.

Therefore, in a case where a large franchise and retail business operator only claims the exclusion of the above provisions on the grounds of a contract clause or a standardized contract clause that is more unfavorable than Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business, and fails to prove that the above contract clause or the standardized contract clause is by voluntary consent, the Fair Trade Commission may issue an order to take corrective measures to pay an amount equivalent to the damages for delay pursuant to Article 32 of the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business

(6) Meanwhile, a provisional seizure against a third party obligor is limited to prohibiting a debtor from paying a provisional seizure. Thus, even if a provisional seizure is made, a third party obligor cannot be exempted from liability if the due date has come to the due date, and in such a case, a third party obligor may escape from the risk of double payment by making a deposit under Articles 291 and 248(1) of the Civil Execution Act, and thereby, is exempted from liability for the delay of payment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da951, Dec. 13, 1994; 2015Da23473, Jun. 23, 2016). Therefore, it should be deemed that a large franchise and retail business operator is not exempt from liability due to the statutory deadline for payment solely on the ground that a supplier was served with an order for provisional seizure on a claim for sales of goods by a supplier.

B. Under the premise that a large franchise and retail business operator may be excluded from the application of statutory payment period by a special contract with a supplier, the lower court determined that: (a) the Plaintiff’s provision of Article 27(3) provides that “where there is a request for suspension of payment from a court, tax authorities, or pension management corporation, etc.; (b) seizure; (c) disposal; (d) collection order is issued by a cooperative company or a cooperative company; and (e) “where the cooperative company is objectively determined that it is unable to conduct normal business activities or A/S due to the default, bankruptcy, closure of its business; and the aggravation of its significant financial standing, etc.; and (d) the Plaintiff’s provision of supply can be suspended for the following reasons: (b) the Plaintiff’s provisional attachment on the supplier’s claims is suspended on the ground that there is a provisional attachment on the supplier’s claims; and (c) where the amount of provisional attachment or provisional attachment is less than the entire price of supply (e.g., Shep, Sheet); (b) the Plaintiff’s violation of the Act can be objectivelyed during the normal distribution period.

C. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the supplier voluntarily consented to the Plaintiff’s standard transaction agreement or Article 27(3)1 and 4, which is the basis of the agreement as above, and there is no unfavorable part to the supplier than the content of Article 8(1) and (2) of the Act on Large-Scale Distribution Business.

Therefore, in light of the above legal principles, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff’s failure to pay damages for delay to the supplier whose claim for the sale of goods was provisionally seized based on the standard transaction agreement provisions as above is an act violating Article 8(1)3 and (2) of the Large-Scale Distribution Business Act, and thus, can be subject to a corrective order under Article 32 of the Large-Scale Distribution Business Act.

Therefore, the lower court should have deliberated and determined whether suppliers voluntarily agree to the agreement under Article 27(3)1 and 4 of the above standard transaction agreement, whether suppliers are more unfavorable than the content of Article 8 of the Act on Large-Scale Distribution Business, and whether suppliers have any circumstance leading to such agreement and any benefit from such agreement.

The lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on interpretation and application of Articles 8(1) and 32 of the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment, solely on the grounds stated in its reasoning. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

3. As to the act of demanding unfair management information (ground of appeal No. 3)

A. (1) Article 14(1) of the Large Franchise and Retail Business Act provides that a large franchise and retail business operator may not require a supplier “unfairly” to provide a supplier with information on the terms and conditions of supply of goods (including supply prices) supplied by the supplier to another business operator (Article 14(1)1; “Information on the Terms and Conditions of Sales (including Rent) to enter a store of another business operator” (Article 2); and “other information corresponding to subparagraphs 1 and 2 on the transaction partner of the supplier, etc. or supplier, as prescribed by Presidential Decree” (Article 14(1).

(2) The purpose of this is to establish a fair trading order in a large franchise and retail business and to enable large franchise and retail business operators and suppliers to develop mutually on an equal basis by not asking whether a large franchise and retail business operator went to a subsequent unfair trading act under certain conditions, taking into account the fact that if a large franchise and retail business operator requests and receives management information from a supplier, etc. under each subparagraph of Article 14(1) of the Large Franchise and retail Business Act, such management information may be used for a subsequent unfair trading act by a large franchise and retail business operator and thereby restricting fair and free trading order.

Considering the language, legislative intent, etc. of Article 14(1) of the Act on Large Franchise and Retail Business, “unfair” required in the act of demanding the provision of management information prohibited under Article 14(1) of the Act means a case where the required act goes beyond normal transaction practices and is deemed likely to impede fair trade, taking into account various circumstances, such as the situation of the market where the transaction party is faced, the characteristics of the goods subject to the transaction, the intent, circumstances, purpose, effect, impact, and specific mode of the request for the provision of management information, the details and scope of the requested information, the details and degree of disadvantages that the other party in receipt of the request for the provision of management information may receive or may receive when he/she does not comply therewith, the degree of superior position in the market of the large franchise and retail business operator demanding the provision of management information, and the overall gap in business capacity between the parties (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2015Du36010, Dec. 22, 2017; 208Du36786, Oct.

B. The lower court acknowledged that the Plaintiff’s employees of the supplier ○○○○, who wished to supply 100D products, sent text messages to the Plaintiff for the possibility of delivery by contacting the Plaintiff’s employees first, and sent the Plaintiff’s broadcast records in other home shopping, and requested supplementation as to whether the Plaintiff’s employees could change broadcast records in accordance with the broadcasting terms and conditions, and that the Plaintiff’s employees’ request correction was sent via e-mail by arranging the broadcasting hours, sales goods, target achievement rates, sales volume, installment months, and running hours that the Plaintiff continued five times in other home shopping, and determined that it was difficult to view that the Plaintiff unfairly demanded the supplier to provide management information.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower judgment did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the act of demanding unfair management information.

4. As to the act of disadvantageous provision through mobile order inducement (ground of appeal No. 4)

A. Article 23(1)4 and (3) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act and Article 36(1) [Attachment Table 1-2] 6(d) of the Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act provide that “an act of unfairly taking advantage of one’s position in a transaction with the other party to a transaction” shall be construed as “an act of setting or altering terms and conditions of transaction or giving disadvantages to the other party to the transaction” as the type of “an act of trading with the other party to the transaction.” In order to constitute “an act of abusing one’s position in a transaction,” the mere fact that the contents of the act are somewhat disadvantageous to the other party to the extent that it can be deemed as identical with compulsory purchase, coercion of provision of profits, enforcement of sale goals, etc., it is difficult to recognize that one party to the transaction was unfairly taking advantage of one’s position in the transaction, and thereby, it is likely to unfairly disadvantage the other party to the transaction in light of normal transaction practices, and whether the act constitutes an act of unfairly taking advantage of one’s position and degree of the other party to the transaction.

B. The lower court: (a) acknowledged that the Plaintiff entered into a contract with 153 suppliers from January 2014 to October 2014 in a mixed manner with a fixed rate and fixed rate; (b) recognized the fact that the Plaintiff’s fees for the mobile media are separately determined by the fixed rate; (c) compared with the mobile rate and the total TV conversion rate based on the result of converting the fixed rate of the TV service fees into the fixed rate, the mere fact that the fixed rate of the TV service fees is relatively lower than that of the TV service fees cannot be readily concluded that the sales through the mobile media are always disadvantageous to the supplier; and (d) determined that the Plaintiff’s act of offering the mobile service fees to the supplier was not sufficiently known or anticipated to be subject to the Plaintiff’s act of offering the mobile service sales order in light of the fact that the consumers whose intention was not determined due to the mobile order were to make a decision on the purchase on the grounds of the discount and reserve benefits, thereby increasing the sales of the supplier; and (d) subsequent to the Plaintiff’s act of widely inducing the use of the smartphone from the mobile service contract.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower judgment did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the act of disadvantageous provision under the Fair Trade Act.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment below regarding the delayed payment of the sales amount is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jung-hwa (Presiding Justice)