Whether Article 6 (5) of the former Real Estate Brokerage Act (negative) provides that this broker shall be exempted from liability for damages (negative)

Article 6 (5) of the former Real Estate Brokerage Act (wholly amended by Act No. 7638, Jul. 29, 2005; hereinafter "Business Affairs of Licensed Real Estate Agents and Report of Real Estate Transactions Act") (see Article 15 (2) of the current Business Affairs of Licensed Real Estate Agents and Report of Real Estate Transactions Act)

Plaintiff (Attorney Jeon-dong, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant (Law Firm Tae, Attorneys Choi So-young et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2010Na103439 decided July 21, 201

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the occurrence of liability for damages

Where a real estate brokerage assistant employed by a real estate broker inflicts property damage on a transaction party intentionally or by negligence, the brokerage assistant shall, as a matter of course, be liable for the damage suffered by the transaction party as a tort, and Article 6(5) of the former Real Estate Brokerage Act (wholly amended by Act No. 7638 of July 29, 2005, referred to as the "Real Estate Agents Business and Report of Real Estate Transactions Act") provides that the broker shall also be liable for the damage to the transaction party by prescribing that the act of the broker assistant is deemed as the act of the broker who employs the broker. Therefore, where the broker assistant inflicts property damage on the transaction party intentionally or by negligence, the broker who employs the broker assistant shall be liable for the damage and the broker shall not be liable for the damage (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da29945, Sept. 14, 2006).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below which cited the judgment of the court of first instance, based on the fact that the defendant, an assistant to the real estate brokerage office operated by the real estate broker 2 of the court below, was requested by the representative director of the new comprehensive construction company for the apartment of this case, and notified the above co-defendant 2 of this fact and recommended the plaintiff to provide and purchase information about the apartment of this case. The above co-defendant 2 of the court below and the above co-defendant 2 of the court below were living together in the place where the plaintiff completed the sales contract of this case and paid the price for the apartment of this case. After the above sales contract was concluded, the defendant and the above co-defendant 2 of the court below did not properly confirm whether the new comprehensive construction company of this case had the authority to dispose of the apartment of this case, and therefore, they did not act as a broker for the above sales contract, and therefore, they did not compensate the plaintiff for damages caused to the above co-defendant 2 of the court below.

In light of the above legal principles and records, we affirm this fact-finding and judgment of the court below, and there is no violation of the law of logic and experience and the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or omission of judgment on the party's assertion, or misunderstanding of legal principles as to brokerage.

2. Regarding scope of compensation for damage:

The fact-finding or determination of the ratio of comparative negligence in a tort compensation case is within the discretion of the fact-finding court unless it is deemed that it is remarkably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decisions 84Da440, Jul. 10, 1984; 2001Da2129, Jan. 24, 2003, etc.).

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, it is difficult to accept the allegation in the grounds of appeal as to this point, as it is within the scope of acceptable finding of facts or determination of its ratio as to the grounds of comparative negligence, and it cannot be deemed significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)