Whether the intention of unlawful acquisition exists in a case where he arbitrarily takes the property owned by another person, returns it, or prepares a loan certificate.

Even if the defendant voluntarily brought the Kamera which was brought up by the defendant, returned the Kamera to the next day because the Bamera was not infashed, or borrowed the Kamera temporarily at the time of taking cash, it is deemed that the defendant had the intention of illegal acquisition if he brought the Kamera and cash without the prior consent of the owner.

Article 329 of the Criminal Act

Supreme Court Decision 4294 Form179 Delivered on June 28, 1961

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee So-young

Gwangju High Court Decision 82No833 delivered on December 16, 1982

The appeal is dismissed.

The number of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In the case of larceny, the expression "the intention of acquisition" refers to the intention to use and dispose of goods, such as those owned by others, in accordance with the economic usage of the goods owned by others (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 4294Ma179, Jun. 28, 1961). Therefore, if the defendant arbitrarily brought about the Kameras which was brought by the defendant, thereby making it possible to return the Kameras to the next day or temporarily borrow the Kameras at the time when the Kameras was brought about because the Kameras was not taken by his own discretion, and even if the Kameras's ownership of the non-indicted transferred goods and cash was brought about by the owner of the Kameras's prior approval

2. According to the records, we affirm the first instance judgment's measure which held that the defendant's act of larceny was committed in the course of larceny, excluding the defendant's act of larceny again within a period of less than 6 months, and 5 times by the end of a six-month period, and the defendant's act of larceny was committed habitually, and the judgment of the court below which maintained it is also justifiable.

3. In this case, it is clear that the assertion of mistake of facts and of sentencing is not a legitimate ground for appeal, and Article 383 of the Criminal Procedure Act is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

Therefore, all of the arguments are without merit, and the appeal is dismissed, and part of the number of days pending trial after the appeal is added to the case is decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Jeon Soo-hee (Presiding Justice)