Seoul Central District Court-2015-Gohap-54172 (O6.30)

Whether the legal principle of unjust enrichment applies to the imposition of acquisition tax which becomes null and void and the subsequent defect in the special rural development tax.

It cannot be viewed that the taxation disposition that misleads the facts of taxation requirements is null and void as a matter of course.

Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act

2016Na2012975 Undue gains

Xx golf clubs (the successor bbb)

aa, ccc

Seoul Central District Court 2015 Gohap54172 ( October 30, 2016)

June 16, 2016

June 30, 2016

1. The appeal by the plaintiff succeeding intervenor and the claims extended in the trial are all dismissed. 2. The costs of the lawsuit after the appeal are filed shall be borne by the plaintiff succeeding intervenor.

1. Purport of claim

For the Intervenor’s Intervenor:

A. Defendant Aa 780,181,080 won and its related amounts from March 5, 2009 to March 5, 2015

for each period listed in the list, and for the service of the complaint from March 6, 2015 to March 6, 2015, attached Form 1.

1,000, 20% per annum from the following day to September 30, 2015, and 1.0% from October 1, 2015

Until the date of full payment, 15% per annum shall be paid;

B. From March 5, 2009 to March 5, 2015, Defendant Cc has 42,383,400 won and as to this.

Attached Table 1. The ratio by period specified in the list, and 1,000 per annum from March 6, 2015 to the service date of the complaint.

25 percent, 20 percent per annum from the following day to September 30, 2015, and 20 percent per annum from October 1, 2015.

By the day, 15% of the amount per annum shall be paid.

2. Purport of appeal

For the Intervenor’s Intervenor:

(a) Defendant Aa does not exceed KRW 780,181,080 up to the limit of KRW 1,500,000,000 and as regards them:

Attached Table 1. From March 5, 2009 to March 5, 2015, the ratio by period specified in the list, and March 3, 2015.

6. From the date of service of a complaint to the date of service of a complaint: 25/1,00 per annum, and from the following date to September 30, 2015:

20% per annum and 15% per annum from October 1, 2015 to the date of full payment.

payment;

B. Defendant CC up to the limit of KRW 100,000,000 and as to KRW 42,383,400, and as to this,

Attached Table 1. From March 5, 2009 to March 5, 2015, the ratio by period specified in the list, and March 3, 2015.

6. From the date of service of a complaint to the date of service of a complaint: 25/1,00 per annum, and from the following date to September 30, 2015:

20% per annum and 15% per annum from October 1, 2015 to the date of full payment.

under payment.

[Judgment of the first instance court only appealed by the plaintiff succeeding the plaintiff, and this case is a party to the lawsuit.

Inasmuch as the succession does not dispute the succession and does not constitute an indispensable co-litigation, the plaintiff must substitute the plaintiff.

In the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiff in the judgment of the court of first instance became final and conclusive because it does not affect the appeal.

The succeeding intervenor deleted the limit of the claim amount from the trial court to expand the purport of the claim

1. Basic facts

This Court's reasoning is the same as the "1. Basic Facts" of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except in the following cases. Thus, this Court's reasoning is accepted by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

○ 3rd, the part of the Plaintiff’s part of the 15th page to the “x golf club (hereinafter referred to as “x golf club”)”.

○ Heading 3, 18, 19, 22, 4, 22, 4, 2, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16, 16, 8, 9, 11, 14, 6, 4, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18, 3, 5, 7, 8, 8, 19, 8, 4, 6, 12, 16, 18, and 20 of the respective plaintiffs of "x golf clubs";

○ From the 5th bottom to the 7th Haak-si Part of the Haak-si by Defendant Woo-si to the Haak-si

○ by striking 7, 14 up to the part “(17)”.

○ In the last place of conduct on the 7th page 7, the part of the "Friju City Mayor" shall be applied to the defendant.

2. The assertion and judgment

A. Summary of the plaintiff succeeding intervenor's assertion

1) Even if the tax liability becomes effective once due to the fulfillment of the taxation requirements at the time of imposition of the main claim (the extinguishment of the taxation requirements of this case due to ex post facto reasons), in cases where the transaction or act which became the taxation requirements becomes final and conclusive as different by the judgment in the lawsuit related thereto becomes invalid due to the occurrence of the 'ex post facto reason as determined different by the judgment in the lawsuit related thereto', it is reasonable for the taxpayer to deviate from the burden of tax liability.

On the other hand, while the Framework Act on National Taxes and the Framework Act on Local Taxes stipulate the procedure to make a correction request where the latter causes have occurred, this is not the beneficial provision at a mutually advantageous level, but the procedure to confirm the duty to refund erroneous payments or the duty to return unjust enrichment by the tax authorities recognized from the previous year and to deal with them. Thus, in a case where it is confirmed that there was no acquisition act subject to the imposition of tax due to the confirmation that the acquisition act established by the initial imposition of acquisition tax is ex post facto null and void, even if the acquisition act was prior to the introduction of the request for correction request system, the amount of the acquisition tax paid should be refunded by mistake.

Therefore, even in this case where it was confirmed that there was no validity of the transactional act after the acquisition tax assessment was made before the introduction of the corrective claim system under the Framework Act on Local Taxes, the acquisition tax of this case where the x golf club paid by the x golf club shall be refunded as the erroneous payment. Thus, Defendant Cheongbuk-do is obliged to pay the Plaintiff’s successor to the Plaintiff, who received the entire claim, the total sum of acquisition tax and its additional dues, 780,181,080 won, and Defendant c is obliged to pay the additional tax for special rural development tax, which is a national tax, and the additional tax for special rural development tax, 42,383,40 won.

2) Even if the preliminary assertion (it is void as a result of the instant taxation) is not a domestic matter, if the circumstances of the instant taxation are considered specifically, individually, and reasonably, then the instant taxation disposition should be determined as invalid as a matter of course. Therefore, the Defendants are obliged to pay the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor each of the above amounts and damages for delay.

B. The Plaintiff’s primary argument by the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor is based on the following premise: (a) the Plaintiff’s primary argument by the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor satisfies the taxation requirements at the time of the instant disposition of acquisition tax; (b) however, there was no later existed at the time of the subsequent imposition (which did not exist at the time of the imposition).

2) However, in light of the facts and legal principles as seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s primary assertion on the premise that the Plaintiff’s primary assertion, other than the Plaintiff’s acquisition of golf clubs, cannot be seen as a “actual acquisition” subject to acquisition tax under the Local Tax Act, which became null and void since the act was conducted from the time of the act. As such, the instant taxation disposition was made with respect to the Plaintiff’s Intervenor’s acquisition of golf clubs, which had already been subject to legitimate taxation since it was erroneous from the time of the disposition, as otherwise alleged in the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor’s first declaration, determination, or correction, as stipulated in Article 51(2)1 of the Framework Act on Local Taxes (hereinafter “the first declaration, determination, or correction becomes final and conclusive as different from the judgment regarding the relevant lawsuit.” Thus, the Plaintiff’s primary assertion on the premise that the Plaintiff’s succeeding Plaintiff’s acquisition of the instant golf clubs cannot be accepted from the first instance judgment on the grounds that it did not affect the judgment that it did not affect the Plaintiff’s subsequent acquisition of the instant golf club by the first instance judgment.

○ Had the 10th 9th 1998 part of the Act on 1998 to the "198."

○ At the bottom of the 10th page, each part of the 6th, 11th, 2, 5, 7, 9, and 10th, to the x golf club.

○○ Part 4 of the Defendant’s 11th page 4 (hereinafter “Defendant”). Whether the obligation to return unjust enrichment due to the per se invalidation is established or not.

1) As seen earlier, the instant disposition of imposition of acquisition tax is erroneous and defective. However, in order to make the tax abundance unjust enrichment, the defect in the taxation disposition must be null and void as it is significant and apparent. If the defect in the taxation disposition is limited to the extent that it can only be revoked, it cannot be said that the tax office’s own revocation or revocation by the appeal procedure constitutes unjust enrichment unless it is revoked (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da28000, Nov. 11, 1994). Meanwhile, in order to make the tax disposition abundently null and void, the mere fact that there is an unlawful reason is insufficient to deem that the defect is in violation of an important law and objectively obvious. If there is objective reason to believe that it is subject to taxation with respect to a certain legal relation or factual relation that is not subject to taxation, and if it is possible to accurately investigate the factual relation, it can only be said that it is obvious that the tax disposition is unlawful and unreasonable (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 97Da197597, Nov. 197, 297).

2) The reasons stated in this part are as follows: (a) the part of the first head of Part 9 on the ground of this part is deleted; and (b) the part of the Plaintiff’s part on the 12th page 9, 11, 14, 15, and 16 on the 12th page 9, 11, 14, 15, and 16 are as follows: (c) the part of the Plaintiff’s part on the 12th page 9 through 13 on the grounds of the judgment of the first instance except for the case to

3) Therefore, since the instant taxation disposition cannot be deemed as null and void as a matter of course, so long as the Defendants, who are the tax authorities, voluntarily revoke it or by the appeal procedure, cannot be deemed as unjust enrichment, and thus, the Plaintiff’s conjunctive assertion based on a different premise cannot be accepted.

D. Whether the statute of limitations has expired (family judgment)

1) Summary of the defendants' assertion

The Defendants asserts that even if the instant taxation disposition is null and void as a matter of course, the instant lawsuit was filed after the lapse of the five-year statute of limitations from the date on which the instant acquisition tax was collected, and the statute of limitations expired.

2) Determination

This Court's explanation is consistent with the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, except for the following reasons: (a) the 13th to 14th to that of the 14th judgment; and (b) the 14th to that of the 13th judgment.

○○ The part of the Plaintiff’s portion of the 11 and 13th page 14 is “x golf clubs”, and the part of the Plaintiff or the 15th page 14 is made “x golf clubs or”.

Even if the 14th page 11’s 11’s 14’s 11’s 14’s 11’s 11’s 11’s 14’s 14’s 11’s 14’s 11’s 11’s 14’s 11’s 11’s 200s

○ From the 14th end to the fourth end, the following parts are added to the lower end (as alleged by the Plaintiff-Successor, the circumstance that the appellate court continued to hold a trial on the validity of the act of acquiring membership rights of the instant golf course at the time of March 4, 2009 cannot be deemed as a ground impeding the running of extinctive prescription, and there is no special circumstance to deem that the Defendants’ assertion for the completion of extinctive prescription in the instant case constitutes an abuse of rights against the principle of trust and good faith.)

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff succeeding intervenor's claim is dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff succeeding intervenor's appeal and the claim extended in the trial are all dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.