[1] In a case where the damage claim against the victim victim Eul as joint tortfeasor Eul has expired by prescription, whether the right to indemnity against the victim Gap as joint tortfeasor Gap is also extinguished (negative)

[2] The starting point of counting the extinctive prescription between joint tortfeasors (at the time of joint exemption) and the period (at the time of ten years)

[3] In a case where a mutual-aid association acquires the right to indemnity against another joint tortfeasor by paying damages directly, whether the right to indemnity becomes a commercial claim (negative)

[1] The right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor who has paid damages to the victim is a separate independent right that differs from the damage claim against the other joint tortfeasor of the victim. Thus, the damage claim against the other joint tortfeasor has expired after the victim acquired the right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor. Thus, the right to indemnity already acquired shall not be extinguished on the ground that the damage claim against the other joint tortfeasor has expired after the victim acquired the right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor.

[2] The extinctive prescription of the right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor shall be calculated from the time when the right to indemnity occurred, that is, when the right to indemnity has committed the joint tort liability, and the period shall be deemed ten years, such as the general claim.

[3] In a case where a mutual aid association directly compensates the victim for a joint tortfeasor pursuant to a mutual aid agreement concluded with one of the joint tortfeasors, and acquires it in accordance with the legal principles of subrogation of the insurer of the liability for damages against another joint tortfeasor, the mutual aid agreement constitutes a commercial activity, and thus, the right to indemnity acquired therefrom cannot be deemed as changing into a commercial claim.

[1] Articles 162(1) and 760(1) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 162(1) and 760(1) of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 162(1) and 760(1) of the Civil Act, Articles 64 and 682 of the Commercial Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 93Da32958 delivered on January 11, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 695) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 93Da1770 delivered on June 29, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2132), Supreme Court Decision 94Da61410 delivered on September 29, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3611) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 78Da528 delivered on May 15, 1975 (Gong1979, 11974) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 93Da21569 delivered on September 14, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 275)

The National Freight Trucking Association (Attorney Transferred-gu)

Defendant (Attorney Lee Chang-chul, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 95Na26423 delivered on December 5, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

The First Ground for Appeal

The right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor who has paid damages to the victim is a separate independent right that differs from the damage claim against the other joint tortfeasor of the victim. Thus, the damage claim against the other joint tortfeasor has expired after the joint tortfeasor acquired the right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor, on the ground that the damage claim against the other joint tortfeasor has expired by prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da32958 delivered on January 11, 1994).

In the same purport, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant’s damage claim against Nonparty 1 against the Defendant, who is a joint tortfeasor, has expired at the expiration of the three-year prescription, and thus the Plaintiff’s right to indemnity against the Defendant, which was acquired by the Plaintiff in accordance with the principle of subrogation by the insurer, was extinguished. Such determination by the lower court is justifiable. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the evasion of judgment or the extinguishment of the right to indemnity, as otherwise alleged in the arguments.

The Second Ground of Appeal

The main reasons of the judgment of the court below are that the non-party limited partnership company incurred damages due to the accident of this case by the non-party limited partnership company's liability for damages to the victim, and thus the plaintiff is responsible for compensating for the damages in accordance with the terms and conditions of mutual aid. Such judgment of the court below is just and there is no error of law in the misapprehension of legal principles. It is nothing more than an additional fact that the accident of this case occurred due to the operation

As to the third ground for appeal

The extinctive prescription of the right to indemnity against another joint tortfeasor of the joint tortfeasor shall be calculated from the time when the right to indemnity has occurred, that is, when the right to indemnity has committed a joint-liability act, and the period shall also be deemed ten years, such as the general claim (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da32958 delivered on January 11, 1994). In a case where the mutual-aid association directly compensates the victim for the joint-liability act in accordance with the mutual-aid agreement concluded with one of the joint-offender, and thereby, acquires it in accordance with the legal principles of subrogation against the insurer of the right to indemnity against the other joint-offender, the mutual-aid agreement constitutes a commercial activity, and thus, the right to indemnity acquired therefrom cannot be deemed as changing into a commercial claim.

In the same purport, the defendant's rejection of the defendant's assertion that the right to indemnity of this case against the defendant has expired by prescription is justifiable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the extinctive prescription as alleged in the arguments. The argument is without merit.

As to the fourth ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below recognized that the accident of this case occurred due to the defendant's joint tort committed by the non-party 2 and the non-party 3's employee, and judged that the defendant's liability ratio was 3/10. In light of records, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the apportionment ratio of damages as alleged in the arguments. The issue is that when determining the scope of damages to be shared by the defendant, the negligence of supervision against the employees should also be considered,

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)