[1] Requirements for workers' industrial action to become a justifiable act under the Criminal Code

[2] In a case where the representative of a trade union made it clear that a collective agreement should be concluded after a resolution of the general meeting of union members even if the representative of a trade union prepares a collective agreement with an employer, whether a labor dispute action on the ground that the employer avoided collective

[1] In order to become a legitimate act under the Criminal Act, the first person shall be a person to be the subject of collective bargaining, second, the purpose of which shall be to create autonomous negotiations between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions. Third, when the employer refuses to conduct collective bargaining with respect to a specific demand for the improvement of working conditions of workers, the employer shall undergo procedures such as a decision to approve the union members and a report on the occurrence of labor disputes, unless there are special circumstances, and fourth, the means and method should be in harmony with the employer's property rights, as well as the exercise of violence.

[2] The main text of Article 33(1) of the former Trade Union Act (amended by the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) provides that "the representative of a trade union or a person delegated by a trade union shall have the right to negotiate on the conclusion of a collective agreement with an employer or an employers' association for the worker or union members," and "the right to negotiate" here includes the right to conclude a collective agreement according to the result of negotiations other than the right to collective bargaining as an act of fact, but if the representative or the delegated person of a trade union clearly stated that a collective agreement will be concluded only after the resolution at the general meeting of the union members of the union regarding the purposes of the collective agreement after agreement with the employer is reached, it is difficult for the trade union to refuse to accept the collective agreement as a result of compromise and concession between the union and the union members, and thus, it is difficult for the employer to see that the collective agreement constitutes an act of collective bargaining with a third party to avoid or oppose the final decision without the right to negotiate.

[1] Article 20 of the Criminal Code / [2] Article 33(1) and Article 39(1)3 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Law No. 5244 of December 31, 1996)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 90Do357 delivered on May 15, 1990 (Gong1990, 1306), Supreme Court Decision 90Do1431 delivered on October 12, 1990 (Gong1990, 2334) Supreme Court Decision 91Do324 delivered on May 24, 1991 (Gong1991, 1817), Supreme Court Decision 95Do1959 delivered on January 26, 1996 (Gong196Sang, 838) / [2] Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Nu1257 delivered on April 27, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 1579), Supreme Court Decision 90Nu31975 delivered on May 11, 1993 (Gong19951, Nov. 36, 197)

Defendant 1 and five others

Defendants

Attorney Jeong-ju

Changwon District Court Decision 96No1766 delivered on February 5, 1997

All appeals are dismissed.

We examine the Defendants’ grounds of appeal.

1. Whether the industrial action is justifiable or not

In order to become a justifiable act under the Criminal Act, the following conditions should be met: (a) the subject of collective bargaining should be the subject of collective bargaining; (b) the purpose of the collective bargaining should be to create autonomous negotiations between labor and management to improve working conditions; (c) the employer should commence collective bargaining with respect to a specific demand for the improvement of working conditions of workers; and (d) the employer should follow procedures such as the consent and decision of union members and the report on the occurrence of labor disputes; and (d) the means and method should be in harmony with the employer’s property rights, as well as the exercise of violence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Do1959, Jan. 26, 1996; 91Do324, May 24, 1991; 90Do357, May 15, 1990).

However, according to the record, Defendant 1 was elected as the chairman of the above labor union on December 21, 1995 on the ground that "it would make public the contents of collective agreement and enter into collective agreement with the majority of the union members" as a pledge, and on March 19, 196, Defendant 1 was elected as the chairman of the above labor union. The above labor union submitted a request for renewal of collective agreement to the non-indicted stock company on April 10, 1996 and notified that the employer would respond to collective bargaining on April 12, 196, except for reinstatement of dismissal and withdrawal of compensation, but the collective agreement was commenced on April 12, 196. Since the first, second, and third negotiations were at issue of uniforms of the negotiating members of the labor union, the above labor union did not interfere with the above collective agreement on the ground that the employer's demand was within the above labor union, and even if the above labor union did not interfere with the collective agreement, the above labor union's agreement was concluded on the ground that it did not interfere with the above collective agreement.

The main text of Article 33(1) of the former Trade Union Act (amended by the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 5244, Dec. 31, 1996) provides that "the representative of a trade union or a person delegated by a trade union shall have the right to negotiate on the conclusion of a collective agreement or other matters with an employer or trade union for the worker or union members." Here, the term "right to negotiate" includes the right to conclude a collective agreement according to the result of negotiations other than the right to collective bargaining as an factual act. However, if the representative of a trade union or the delegated person has agreed on the contents of the collective agreement with the employer after going through a resolution of the general meeting of the union members, it is difficult to see that the above collective agreement was concluded only after the conclusion of the collective agreement with the employer and the agreed on the contents of the collective agreement, and it is difficult to see the legal principles as to the industrial action of this case as to wages or other working conditions by refusing to accept the collective agreement at the general meeting of the trade union and thus, it cannot be deemed as a final representative or 9.

2. As to the violation of the rules of evidence

Examining the evidence adopted by the first instance court as cited by the court below in comparison with the records, the court below was just in finding the Defendants guilty of all the charges, and there is no error of misconception of facts due to the violation of the rules of evidence, as argued in the above. There is no reason to discuss this issue.

3. As to the assertion of unfair sentencing

In this case where the Defendants were sentenced to punishment more than 10 years of imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for a minor term, it cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal for unjust punishment. There is no ground of appeal for discussion.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)