(a) A relationship between a bond broker and a party to a loan for consumption for his/her good offices;

(b) Whether the agent granted the authority to conclude a loan for consumption or a security contract has the right of representation to cancel the contract;

A. If a bond broker receives a request for lending money from a person who intends to obtain the bonds, and the person who would obtain the bonds will obtain the above collateral and offer a lending of money, then the bond broker shall obtain the above collateral and arrange the lending of money. If a person who has obtained the bonds is not superior to anyone who is the other party to the bonds and is entrusted with the other party to believe only the bond broker, the bond broker shall not be a representative of only one party, and if the creditor is represented by the creditor, he shall act as a representative of the debtor's side. On the contrary, if the debtor is represented by the debtor, he shall act as a representative of the creditor later.

B. Since the power of representation generally conferred by a juristic act ceases to exist upon termination of the underlying legal relationship, barring any special circumstance, it cannot be deemed that the agent granted the authority to enter into a loan for consumption of money or a contract to establish a security right therefor on behalf of the principal has the right of representation rescinding the original contractual relationship.

A. Article 114 of the Civil Act; Article 118 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 79Da425 delivered on October 30, 1979 (Gong1980, 1234) (Gong1234 delivered on February 24, 1981), 80Da1756 delivered on February 24, 1981 (Gong1981, 13732). Supreme Court Decision 85Meu971 delivered on April 28, 1987 (Gong1987, 865) (Gong199, 967) delivered on February 12, 1991, 91Da14987 delivered on June 23, 1992

Attorney White-gu, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Attorney Lee Jae-sung, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na67938 delivered on July 22, 1992

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The facts of this case and the summary of the judgment of the court below are as follows.

가. 원고는 1990.2. 하순경 친구인 소외 정우숙에게 금 100,000,000원을 차용할 수 있도록 알선하여 달라는 부탁을 하고, 위 정우숙은 다시 부동산중개업자인 소외 염윤호에게 이를 부탁하여, 위 염윤호가 ‘ 소외 1주식회사’(이하 소외 1회사라고 줄여 쓴다)라는 상호로 사채알선업을 영위하는 소외 2에게 그 알선을 부탁한 사실, 소외 1 회사측에서는 원고가 위 차용금의 담보로 제공할 수 있는 이 사건 부동산을 소유하고 있음을 확인하고, 그 달 23.경 소외 안전상에게 전화를 걸어 자기의 고객이 시가 금 350,000,000원 상당의 부동산을 담보로 제공하고 금 100,000,000원을 이자는 월 2푼 5리로 하여 차용하고자 하는데 그 자금을 마련할 수 있는지의 여부를 물은 뒤, 그 달 26. 오전 다시 그 대답을 구하여 온 사실, 이에 위 안전상은 이웃에 거주하는 피고 이수남, 채춘옥과 자기 동생인 피고 안옥상 등에게 위와 같은 대여조건을 알려 그들로부터 합계 금 85,000,000원을 대여자금으로 모을 수 있음을 확인하고 여기에 자기 인척인 소외 고민정이 가지고 있는 금 10,000,000원과 자신이 가지고 있는 돈을 합하면 금 100,000,000원을 마련할 수 있다고 보아 그 내용을 소외 1 회사측에 알려 준 사실, 이에 따라 소외 2가 원고에게 금 100,000,000원의 대출이 가능함을 통보하자, 원고는 그날 11:00경 위 정우숙과 함께 소외 1 회사의 사무실에 나가 소외 2와의 사이에 금 100,000,000원을 월 2푼 5리로 3개월간 차용하되 전체 금액에서 소개료 금 4,000,000원과 1개월분의 선이자 금 2,500,000원을 미리 공제하기로 합의한 다음, 그 담보로서 이 사건 부동산 위에 근저당권 및 그 효력을 강화하기 위한 전세권을 설정하기로 하여 그 해당 담보서류의 근저당권자, 전세권자란을 공란으로 한 채 서명날인을 하여 소외 2에게 교부한 사실, 한편 위 안전상은 소외 1 회사측 직원과 같이 위 대출금의 담보가 될 이 사건 부동산을 사전 답사한 뒤 그날 오후 소외 1 회사 사무실에서 소외 2를 처음 만나 그와의 사이에 금 100,000,000원을 월 2푼 5리로 대여하되, 1개월분 선이자 금 2,500,000원은 미리 공제하여 지급받기로 합의하고, 다만 당일에는 위 고민정과 연락이 되지 않아 위 선이자를 포함한 금 89,000,000원밖에 마련할 수 없는 관계로 위 금원만을 우선 지급하고 나머지 금 11,000,000원은 그 다음날 지급하기로 양해를 얻은 사실, 곧이어 소외 2는 위 안전상으로부터 피고들 명의의 주민등록증 사본과 도장을 교부받아 이를 보관중이던 위 근저당권 및 전세권설정 관계담보서류와 함께 사법서사에게 맡기고 그 설정등기절차를 의뢰함으로써, 그날 곧바로 이 사건 부동산 위에 그 날짜 설정계약을 원인으로 한 채권최고액 금150,000,000원으로 된 피고들 명의의 근저당권설정등기와 피고 안옥상 명의의 전세권설정등기가 모두 마쳐진 사실, 그 후 위 안전상은 귀가하여 그의 처가 피고 안옥상으로부터 받아 둔 금 5,000,000원, 피고 이수남으로부터 받아 둔 금 30,000,000원, 피고 채춘옥으로부터 받아 둔 금 50,000,000원에다 자신이 가지고 있던 금 1,500,000원 등을 합한 금 86,500,000원을 마련하여 다시 소외 1 회사 사무실에 이르렀는바, 그 곳에서 원고를 처음으로 만나 소외 2의 소개하에 서로 인사를 나누면서, 그에게 사후 이자의 지급을 위한 통장 온라인 번호를 확인해 주고, 또 자신의 연락처를 소외 1 회사로 정하기로 한 사실, 그런데 소외 2은 원고에게 그 날 대여금의 일부가 준비되지 않은 사정을 알리지 않고 위 안전상으로부터 교부받은 금 86,500,000원을 원고에게 건네주지도 않은 채, 원고를 계속 기다리게 하다가 원고가 다른 약속관계로 그 수령을 위 정우숙에게 맡기고 떠나자, 위 정우숙에게 금 80,000,000원만을 교부하면서 당초의 합의와는 달리 근저당권 및 전세권 설정비용, 약속어음 공증비용 등으로 금 3,000,000원을 추가로 공제하겠으며, 나머지 금 10,500,000원은 다음날 지급하겠다고 한 사실, 위 정우숙이 일단 위 금 80,000,000원을 수령한 뒤 다음날인 그 달 27. 아침 원고에게 그 취지를 알려 오자 원고는 그와 같은 조건으로는 돈을 차용할 수 없다면서 위 금원을 반환하고 근저당권 관계서류 등을 찾아 올 것을 요구한 사실, 이에 따라 위 정우숙이 즉시 소외 2를 찾아가 당초 약속대로 소개료 금 4,000,000원과 1개월분의 선이자 금 2,500,000원을 공제한 금 93,500,000원을 교부하여 주든지 그렇지 않으면 근저당권 관계서류 등을 돌려주든지 할 것을 요구하자, 소외 2는 위 정우숙에게 이 사건 부동산 위에 이미 근저당권설정등기를 경료하였다면서 그 달 28.까지 이를 원상태로 말소하여 줄 것을 약속하는 취지의 확인서를 작성하여 주고 그로부터 위 금 80,000,000원을 돌려받은 사실, 위 안전상은 그 달 27. 오전에 서울공사 직원인 소외 양동식을 통하여 위 대여금 중 나머지 금 11,000,000원을 소외 2에게 교부하였으나, 소외 2는 그 다음날 오전경 위와 같이 교부받은 돈을 어느 누구에게도 돌려 주지 아니한 채로 그 행방을 감추어 버렸다.

B. Based on these factual relations, the above safety level seems to have dealt with the business of acquiring collateral and lending money on behalf of the defendants and the above consideration. On the other hand, the above safety level or safety level, which was intended to establish collateral and acquire bonds, and agreed upon contract terms such as interest on loan and loan, interest payment period, contents of security right, etc., which are both parties, and the other party's formal personnel division, but the other party's contact details were used as contact details of the non-party 2. The other party's personality and credit status were not superior. However, it was interested only in the plaintiff's clear person as collateral, and it was believed that the plaintiff's establishment of mortgage and right to lease on a deposit basis and right to lease on a deposit basis, delivery of related documents related to the establishment of mortgage and right to lease on a deposit basis, and delivery of loan money to the non-party 2, the above safety level and right to the above defendant's agent's establishment of mortgage, which had been accepted by the plaintiff's agent for the purpose of safety and right to cancel the above registration.

2. Although the purport of the judgment of the court below is whether the loan contract of this case, the right to collateral security, and the right to lease on a deposit basis between the plaintiff and the defendants was not established, and all of them were established effective, it is clear whether the non-party 2, on behalf of the defendants, rescinded the agreement and the right to lease on a deposit basis and the right to lease on a deposit basis, but the opinion of the court below is not acceptable even if it

First of all, as decided by the court below, if a corporate bond broker receives a request for lending money from a person who intends to obtain the bonds as his/her business, and if it is certain that the bond broker will borrow money from the person who intends to obtain the bonds, he/she shall obtain the above collateral and arrange the lending of money. In cases where a person who has used the bonds is not superior to who is the other party, and is entrusted with all of the bond broker's belief and trust, such corporate bond broker shall not be a representative of only one party, but if he/she acts as a representative of the debtor, and if he/she stands for the debtor, he/she shall be deemed to act as a representative of the creditor later (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da1756, Feb. 24, 1981; 79Da425, Oct. 30, 1979).

However, in the case of this case, even if the facts established by the court below are based on the facts confirmed by the court below, the plaintiff borrowed 100,000,000 won between the non-party 2 who is a bond broker on February 26, 1990 at an interest rate of 5% per month. It shall be agreed to deduct 4,00,000 won from the total amount in advance as well as 2,50,000 won with a prior interest rate of 1% per month, and it shall be decided to set up a right of collateral and a right of lease on the real estate owned by the plaintiff and deliver the relevant security documents to the non-party 2. The non-party safety level of 0,00,000 won representing the defendants to the above 00,000 won as well as 10,000,000 won with a prior interest rate of 25% per annum and 200,000,000 won as well as 10,000,00 won for the above real estate.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the conclusion of the loan loan of this case or the contract to establish a security interest contract of this case between the plaintiff and the defendants could not be made formally because the non-party 2 agreed to receive the refund of KRW 80,000,000 which was already paid as part of the above loan from the non-party 2, the plaintiff's agent, during the process of arranging the loan of this case. Thus, it cannot be said that there was a misunderstanding of the legal principles as to the establishment of the loan for consumption contract, etc. by the arrangement of the bond broker.

In addition, the court below did not accept the judgment of the court below that the non-party 2, a corporate bond broker, returned KRW 80,000,000 which was already paid as part of the loan as above to the above person's agent, and agreed to cancel the registration of creation of mortgage in the name of the defendants, which was already established for the purpose of security, was agreed to cancel the loan agreement or the security right contract already established as the representative of the defendants, and thus, the above security registration cancellation agreement was effective against the defendants.

This is because, in general, the power of representation granted by a juristic act is extinguished by the termination of the underlying legal relationship, barring any special circumstance, it cannot be deemed that the agent granted the authority to conclude a loan for consumption or a contract to establish a security right therefor on behalf of the principal has the right of representation to rescind the original contractual relationship. Therefore, even if Nonparty 2, a bond broker, introduced a loan for consumption or a contract to establish a security right therefor on behalf of the principal, and concluded a loan for consumption, etc. on behalf of the Defendants, it cannot be deemed that he immediately had the authority to receive all disposition, such as rescission of the contract under the above loan for consumption, and the intention of the other party, on behalf of the Defendants (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Da7364, Feb. 12, 1991; 85Meu971, Apr. 28, 1987).

Ultimately, the court below did not properly consider whether Nonparty 2 obtained the power of representation to conclude a specific agreement on the cancellation of the instant loan agreement or the cancellation of the registration of the establishment of a mortgage on the instant collateral object from the Defendants, and did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of the right of representation, or in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of the right of representation.

3. Therefore, the appeal pointing this out is with merit, and the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.