[1] Whether permission from the competent authority to dispose of the temple property before the enforcement of the Buddhist Property Management Act after the abolition of the old inspection order (negative)

[2] Whether the previous owner's possession is naturally converted into an independent possession due to the abolition of the previous inspection order (negative)

[1] The old Order of Inspection was repealed as of January 20, 1962, and the Buddhist Property Management Act was enforced as of May 31, 1962, and during the period between them, it does not affect the validity of the disposal of the temple property without permission from the competent authority.

[2] The abolition of the old inspection order cannot be viewed as a matter of course from the time the previous owner's possession cannot be viewed as a matter of course from that time, and the existence of the ownership shall be determined by what the nature of the source of authority to commence the possession of the real estate is.

[1] Article 5 of the former Order of Buddhist Temples (repealed by Order No. 7 of June 3, 191, and January 20, 1962), Article 11 of the former Order of Buddhist Temples (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Korean Traditional Temples Preservation Act (Act No. 3974 of November 28, 1987) / [2] Article 245 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 80Da478, 479 decided Jul. 8, 1980 (Gong1980, 1297) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da12868 decided Feb. 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 1013) Supreme Court Decision 96Da19857 decided Oct. 11, 1996 (Gong196Ha, 3316)

Geum-gu Busan Metropolitan Government (Arju General Law Firm, Attorney Yellow-il, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Coiner (Cheongyang Law Firm, Attorneys Lee Jae-hun, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Supreme Court Decision 94Da53341 delivered on November 24, 1995

Busan High Court Decision 96Na136 delivered on June 13, 1996

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the presumption of the Plaintiff’s autonomous possession of the land of this case was reversed, since it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff transferred the land of this case to the Plaintiff according to the facts acknowledged by the employment evidence, and the Plaintiff clearly made it clear that the Plaintiff did not intend to use the land of this case temporarily only on the part of the Defendant, and the Plaintiff did not intend to use the land of this case on the part of the Defendant for a temporary basis, and thus, the presumption of the Plaintiff’s autonomous possession of the land of this case was reversed.

In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and among the above judgments, since the plaintiff acquired the land of this case under a conditional gift contract under the condition of suspension on condition that the disposition permission of the supervisory authority should be corrected later, it shall be deemed that the plaintiff's possession is included in the purport of rejecting the argument that the plaintiff's possession should be viewed as an independent possession. Thus, there is no error of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to the reversal of the presumption

2. The term "the previous inspection order was repealed as of January 20, 1962, and the Buddhist Property Management Act was enforced as of May 31, 1962, and it does not affect the validity of the disposal of the inspection property even if there is no permission from the competent authority for the disposal of the inspection property during the period between them as of May 31, 1962," is the same as the theory of lawsuit (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da478, 479 delivered on July 8, 1980). It cannot be viewed that the previous possession of another owner is automatically converted into possession from that time, and even in that case, the existence of ownership should be determined by what is the nature of the title, for which the possession of the real property was commenced.

In this regard, the court below is just in holding that, since the plaintiff cannot be deemed to have occupied the land of this case as the owner's intention, even if the competent authority's permission on temporary disposal of the temple property is no longer required due to the abolition of the old inspection order, the plaintiff's possession of the other owner shall not be converted to the possession directly, and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit. All arguments are without merit.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)