(영문) 서울고등법원 2017.3.29. 선고 2016누58798 판결

The reasoning for this court's explanation is as follows: (a) No. 19 of the 19th sentence of the judgment of the court of first instance "for any objection, even in the case of any objection, i.e., e., e., e., s., e., s., e., s., s. 5); and (b) other than adding the following s. 3, i.e., the part

2. Parts to be dried;

“Around November 10, 2014, the preceding day, the Plaintiff filed a report with H’s office telephone number to visit the Dotsan-gun Office without permission. In light of the overall purport of each of the entries and arguments in Dot, No. 56 (Statement of Currency Records), and No. 76 (Statement of Currency Records), the Plaintiff may recognize the fact that the Plaintiff made a contact with H’s office telephone number around 14:55 on November 10, 2014.”

3. The addition;

A. Subsequent to “each description of the evidence No. 1 and No. 15” of the first instance judgment No. 16, “each statement of the evidence No. 1 and No. 15,” each of the testimony AC and AF will be added.

B. The following judgments are added subsequent to the 13th sentence of the first instance judgment.

With respect to L fishing places, the Plaintiff did not have any connection with the Plaintiff’s solicitation, nor asked that the permission for occupation and use of public waters itself be promptly delivered. However, with respect to the calculation of charges for occupation and use of public waters, the Plaintiff merely tried to examine whether the method of calculating charges for occupation and use of public waters can be applied on the basis of roads actually used within the extent of statutes, and did not demand discount fees, and the occupation and use fees have not been reduced at all. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have engaged in this right in violation of Article 10(1) of the Code of Conduct of Public Officials of the Board of Audit and Inspection or arranged and mediated in violation of Article 11(1) of the said Code of Conduct. ② In relation to the permission for a fishing place business, the Plaintiff did not point out the illegality and unfairness of the order for removal of convenience facilities and did not comply with the order for removal of convenience facilities to the extent that it did not interfere with the Plaintiff’s fair order for reclamation of the above portion of the fishing place business, or that it did not interfere with the Plaintiff’s unlawful order for removal of convenience facilities and removal.

[A evidence Nos. 37-3, 15, and 16 (Evidence No. 37-15, 16 of the evidence No. 37)] claims that credibility is nonexistent in light of the contents of the evidence No. 74.

First of all, the above argument is closely related to the calculation of the occupancy and use permit of public waters, and the method to calculate the occupancy and use fee of public waters can be applied on the basis of the road actually used by the plaintiff, which is the current status of land use. The request is ultimately made by the public official in charge to allow discount on occupancy and use fee of public waters. Article 10(1) of the Code of Conduct for Public Officials of the Board of Audit and Inspection prohibits a public official from using his/her position to obtain unjust benefits or obtaining unjust benefits from another person. Article 11 of the Code of Conduct for Public Officials of the Board of Audit and Inspection prohibits a public official from taking advantage of his/her position. Article 10(1) of the Code of Conduct prohibits a public official from taking advantage of his/her position or hindering the fair performance of his/her duties for his/her own or other public official, and it does not necessarily violate the above prohibition, since the plaintiff's request for occupancy and use fee of public waters is not completely reduced.

② In full view of the arguments as to ③ the testimony of the witness of the trial court and the statement of the business trip name (Evidence No. 37-3, 15, 16 of the evidence No. 37-2) above, U.S. as a public official in charge of permission for occupation and use of public waters prepared a business trip name statement to the effect that the construction has been completed in accordance with the implementation plan for permission for occupation and use of public waters on August 13, 2014, and AG, as a public official in charge of permission for fishing place business, obtained permission for occupation and use of public waters on August 14, 2014, completed the construction of temporary buildings, completed the construction of facilities necessary for safety and convenience, so it is reasonable to grant permission. However, U.S.’s testimony to the effect that it was most intended to restore the portion of the order to the original state even if the illegally reclaimed portion was not restored to the original state, and it is difficult to deem that U.S.’s removal of convenience facilities and its purport are consistent with the purport of the removal.

C. The following judgments shall be added after the 15th sentence of the first instance judgment.

In relation to the fishing place, the Plaintiff asserts that, as soon as possible after the call with the Plaintiff, E promptly delivered the order of removal to C fishing place, the Plaintiff’s telephone did not have any influence on the above order of removal, and from the standpoint of E, it can be known that the Plaintiff did not force the Plaintiff’s telephone. Thus, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have opened an interest coupon in violation of Article 10(1) of the Code of Conduct for Public Officials of the Board of Audit and Inspection or arranged and mediated in violation of Article 11(1) of the said Code of Conduct.

However, as seen earlier, there must be a result of obtaining unjust profits, but it does not constitute a violation of Articles 10(1) and 11 of the Code of Conduct. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s above assertion is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim shall be dismissed as it is without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is justifiable with this conclusion. Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.