(a) Whether the de facto mother's parental authority has been lost due to custom of the Gu;

B. Whether it is necessary for the court to determine whether the prescriptive acquisition has been completed including the registration period of the former occupant in case where the person claiming the acquisition by prescription on the register claims only his registration period

(a) Even if the mother is actually remarried in custom, he/she shall not lose parental authority over a minor's child in the same family register;

B. In a case where a party asserts the acquisition of ownership under Article 245(2) of the Civil Act, whether only the period he/she has registered as a real estate owner should be claimed, or whether a former occupant should make such assertion together with the period registered as a real estate owner should be selected by the party asserting the acquisition of ownership under Article 245(2) of the same Act. Thus, in a case where the party claims the acquisition of ownership solely with the period when he/she has registered as a real estate owner, the court should determine only that party’s assertion. However, on the ground that such assertion is not recognized, it is unnecessary to determine whether the period of acquiring ownership of real estate due

A. Article 909(5)(b) of the former Civil Act (amended by Act No. 4199, Jan. 13, 1990)

A. Supreme Court Decision 68Da2374 decided Feb. 18, 1969 (No. 17 ① 202)

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and 2 Defendants, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Suwon District Court Decision 90Na5693 delivered on July 6, 1993

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

1. Judgment on the Defendants’ legal representative’ ground of appeal No. 1

The court below found that the above real estate was originally owned by Nonparty 1, 2, and 3, as indicated in the separate list No. 1, 3 (hereinafter referred to as the above real estate No. 1, 3) and the ownership transfer registration was completed in its name on March 31, 194, and that the plaintiff was inherited as his 2, as he died on March 31, 194, and that Nonparty 2, who was the plaintiff's mother, was removed from the plaintiff 3 and brought up again the plaintiff 5, and that the plaintiff 4, who was the assistant of the plaintiff, was born at 9 years old, 7 years old, 16 years old, and 16 years old, and that the defendant did not sell the above real estate under the above title No. 1, 197, and was found to have been married to the non-party 1, 5 years old, 6 years old, and 16 years old (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da168, Jan. 16, 1970).

If the facts are duly determined by the court below, the judgment of the court below which held that each registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the defendants is null and void is just, and it cannot be deemed that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles on the false guarantee certificate which is the ground for reversal of the presumption of registration, as shown in the theory of lawsuit, and without exercising the right of explanation, which is the ground for reversal of the presumption of registration, and the old custom pointing out in the theory of lawsuit is not applied to this case where the wife was not legally remarried but actually remarried only after the death of the wife, and it cannot be deemed that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the loss of parental authority in the old custom, such as the theory

2. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2

In a case where a party asserts the acquisition of ownership under Article 245(2) of the Civil Act, the period of his/her registration as the owner of real estate and the period of his/her registration as the owner of the real estate can be claimed together by the former possessor as well as the period of his/her registration as the owner of the real estate. However, in such a case, if the former possessor claims the acquisition of ownership only by the period of his/her registration as the owner of the real estate or by the period of his/her registration as the owner of the real estate, it should be selected by the party who asserts the acquisition of ownership under Article 245(2) of the Civil Act. Thus, in a case where the party claims the acquisition of ownership only by the period of his/her registration as the owner of the real estate, the court should determine only the party's assertion, and there is no need to determine whether the period of acquisition of ownership of real estate has expired, including by the period of his/her registration as the owner of the real estate.

According to the records, in the fact-finding court, if Defendant 3 and Defendant 2 included the period registered as the owner of real estate, it is apparent that the period for acquiring the ownership of real estate due to possession of the real estate No. 1, 2, and 3 has expired. Thus, the court below’s decision that did not ex officio determine whether the period for acquiring the ownership of real estate due to possession of the real estate No. 1, 2, and 3 has expired when adding up the period registered as the owner of the real estate by Defendant 3 and Defendant 2 to the sum up the period registered as the owner of the real

3. Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants who have lost them. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)