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(영문) 청주지방법원 2021.6.3. 선고 2020노497 판결
개인정보보호법위반
Cases

2020No497 Violation of the Personal Information Protection Act

Defendant

A

Residence

Reference domicile

Appellant

Defendant

Prosecutor

Kim Jong-hun (prosecution) and a new support (public trial)

Defense Counsel

Attorney Gangwon-ho (Korean National Assembly)

The judgment below

Cheongju District Court Decision 2020 High Court Decision 169 Decided May 15, 2020

Imposition of Judgment

on June 3, 2021

Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The defendant shall be innocent.

The summary of the judgment of innocence is publicly announced.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Error of mistake

The Defendant did not obtain personal information of union members by photographing a list of union members kept in the office of the instant association B (hereinafter referred to as the “instant association”). The Defendant stated to the effect that he/she acquired personal information by photographing a list of union members at an investigative agency is false. It was a false statement, and that he/she opened a group Kax by using the list of union members or contact information that he/she came to know through the group activity.

B. Legal principles

The Defendant’s act was aimed at informing the situation of the instant association, which was operated in a non- democratic manner at the time of the instant case, and the Defendant’s act was not for the Defendant’s private interest but for the public interest of the said members, and thus, the illegality of the act constitutes a justifiable act.

2. Ex officio determination

We examine ex officio prior to the judgment on the grounds for appeal by the defendant.

A. Judgment on Amendments to Bill of Indictment

In the first instance trial, the prosecutor applied for amendments to the indictment with the content of the facts charged in the instant case as stated in the facts charged (the reasons for the judgment in multiple times) as stated in the part of the facts charged, and since this court permitted it, the subject of the judgment was changed, the judgment of the court below was no longer maintained.

C. Determination as to whether the defendant is a person who manages or was managing personal information

1) Relevant legal principles

The purpose of the Personal Information Protection Act is to prevent harm caused by infringement of personal information by a person other than a personal information manager and to achieve the legislative purpose of the Personal Information Protection Act, such as the protection of privacy, while regulating personal information manager as a person who manages or processed the personal information as a person in compliance with the regulations in general, while Article 59 is separately set out in Chapter 9 of the General Rule, as well as the person who manages or handled the personal information as a person subject to the obligation under Article 72 subparagraph 2 of the Personal Information Protection Act. In this context, the "person who manages or processed the personal information as a person subject to the obligation under Article 59 subparagraph 1 of the Personal Information Protection Act" includes not only the person who processes or processes the personal information directly or through another person for the purpose of his/her duties, but also the person who processes or processes the personal information in accordance with Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Personal Information Protection Act as a person subject to the obligation under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the same Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Do7686, Mar. 7, 2016).

In light of the fact that ① an interpretation of a penal provision should be strict and excessively expanded or analogical interpretation of the meaning of a penal provision to the disadvantage of the defendant is in violation of the principle of no punishment without law (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2017Do7687, Sept. 21, 2017). ② Article 28 of the above Act defines a person who manages personal information under the direction and supervision of a personal information manager, such as an executive officer or employee, temporary agency worker, part-time worker, etc., as an "personal information handler", and imposes an obligation to manage and supervise such personal information appropriately, and the penal provision does not provide a separate provision for punishing the infringement of personal information by a "personal information handler" as an "person who manages or has managed such personal information without the direction and supervision of the person who manages or has managed such personal information," but it appears that the "person who manages or has managed such information without the direction and supervision of the person who has been subject to no punishment without the direction and supervision of the person who manages such information."

2) Specific determination

According to the evidence duly adopted by the court below, in particular, the Kakakao Stockholm dialogue between the defendant and C (Evidence No. 7, 8, and 200 members of the D Office), and the defendant, who is a member of the D Office, stored the list within the D Committee to inform other members of the operation status of the D Committee (Evidence No. 7, 8, and 200 members of the D Office), and stored the list as they are, and without the consent, the thickness of the complainants would be hick. The defendant, a member of the D Committee (AC) of the instant union, taken the list within the D Committee for the purpose of informing other members of the operation status of the association, and obtained personal information, such as the name and telephone number of the union members of the D Committee.

However, the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is that the "Personal Information Manager" or "Personal Information Manager" or "Personal Information Manager" was anyone, and in any way, it cannot be known that the defendant managed and processed the personal information of the union members, and it is insufficient to recognize that the defendant was in charge of the management of the personal information of the union members when he was in charge of certain duties in the union of this case beyond the mere status of the union members or the D Committee members. There is no evidence

- Furthermore, in criminal-related laws and regulations, the term “work” refers to work or business that is ordinarily engaged in occupation or continuously, and the term “work” or “business” does not merely mean economic activities, but also means all the social activities that a person continuously performs in such social status (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do4166, Nov. 19, 2009). In the instant case, even if it can be recognized that the Defendant had been engaged in the said activities as a member or a member of the said association and carried out access to and access to the office of the association or carried out meetings several times, it is difficult to accept that the legislative intent as seen earlier is likely to disappear because the scope of punishment would be excessively expanded.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the court below's judgment is reversed in accordance with Article 364 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act without examining the defendant's assertion of misunderstanding of facts and misunderstanding of legal principles, and it is again decided as follows through pleading.

【Grounds for the Judgment of the Supreme Court】

1. Summary of the facts charged

A person who processes (referring to collection, creation, linkage, linkage, recording, storage, holding, processing, editing, searching, output, correction, recovery, use, provision, disclosure, destruction, or other similar act) or has processed personal information shall not acquire personal information by fraud or other improper means.

Nevertheless, the Defendant, on June 18, 2018, taken a cell phone screen with the name, address, and contact details of 101 persons listed in the attached crime list among the list of union members of the above union, which had been kept in a crepit of the crepit of the executives of the above union ********) around 18, 2018. At around that time, the Defendant prepared a file of personal information, the name of the above union members, the cell phone number of union members, and the list of union members with the aforementioned photographic file, using the computer screen program, and then opened a Kakao group hosting room including the above union members at that time.

Accordingly, the defendant acquired and processed personal information by improper means.

2. Determination

As examined in Article 58(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the facts charged in this case constitute a case where there is no proof of crime, and thus, a not-guilty verdict is rendered pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and a summary of this judgment is publicly announced pursuant to Article 58(2)

Judges

The presiding judge's error

Judges Kim Tae-tae

For the purpose of judge support

Note tin

1) Criminal facts in the judgment of the court below are stated as 'B Association office', but according to the above evidence, it is reasonable to view the place where the defendant photographs the list of union members as 'D office', and the 'B office' in the judgment of the court below is judged as 'D office'.

2) Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the former Personal Information Protection Act (amended by Act No. 16930, Feb. 4, 2020) provides that "personal information" is information about a living person, which can be identified through name, resident registration number, image, etc. (including information alone, which can be identified through simple combination with other information, but which could not be identified through simple combination with other information). In the past, the facts charged were specified as part of the data subject and the Kakaoo Akaooooooodi, etc., and the specific personal information was not indicated in the revised facts charged, but it is difficult to view that it was an unspecified part of the facts charged because it could be identified through "Kakaooodi" information.

3) The prosecutor stated the place of the instant crime as “B office” in the facts charged, but it is judged as a clerical error in the D office as seen earlier, and thus ex officio correct it.

Attached Form

A person shall be appointed.

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