(영문) 대법원 2020.12.30.선고 2020도9994 판결

1. Article 2 subparag. 26 of the Road Traffic Act provides that the term “driving” refers to the use of a vehicle, horse, or tram in accordance with its original method of use. Of them, in order to make a vehicle used in accordance with its original method of use, it is necessary to operate an engine by laying the engine (see Supreme Court Decisions 98Da30834, Nov. 12, 1999; 2009Da9294, 9300, May 28, 2009).

2. The lower court reversed the judgment of the first instance court that found the Defendant guilty of the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes among the facts charged in the instant case and acquitted the Defendant. 3. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, the following circumstances are revealed.

A. The so-called STP &GO is installed on the instant vehicle, which is the instant vehicle (type 2013). This function basically is the vehicle driving, and the engine is left to the engine if the driver stops while the vehicle stops while the driver continues the bal ped, but the engine is once the driver stops on the bal pedal. However, if the driver stops on the bal pedal, the engine is reworking once again. However, if the driver does not satisfy the re-working condition of the function, the TPPP &GO is removed and the engine is not reworking.

B. As stated in the facts of the crime of the first instance judgment, the Defendant stopped the instant vehicle at the location of the instant accident and opened a door to drive the instant vehicle to the Nonindicted Party (hereinafter the English name omitted), who is the land owner after driving the vehicle, and the Nonindicted Party was on board the vehicle at the seat. The Defendant appears to have completely left the vehicle at the seat due to the cancellation of STOP &G function, and the vehicle operation was entirely turned out. The Nonindicted Party was divided into the starting server without recognizing this fact, but the Dong did not walk, and the vehicle was pushed ahead by operating the brake system. While the Defendant was driving on the seat, the Defendant was also unable to walk at the time, and the Defendant caused the instant towing accident while driving the vehicle.

4. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is difficult to view that the Defendant used the instant vehicle according to its original method of use, as long as the Defendant was in a state where the vehicle was under the influence of operating the instant vehicle by operating the brake system with the intent to drive the instant vehicle.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles regarding "motor vehicle driving" or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules.

5. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.