[1] The meaning of "driving" under Article 2 subparagraph 26 of the Road Traffic Act

[2] The case holding that in a case where the defendant was prosecuted for violating the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bodily Injury resulting from Dangerous Driving) because he did not go through the movement and operated the brake system, and caused drilling accidents while driving the brake, the motor vehicle cannot be deemed to have been used according to its original method of use in a case where the starting operation of the motor vehicle was not used

[1] Article 2 subparag. 26 of the Road Traffic Act provides that the term “driving” refers to the use of a vehicle, horse, or tram in accordance with its original method of use. Of them, in order to make a vehicle used in accordance with its original method of use, it is necessary to start the engine operation and drive the engine.

[2] In a case where the defendant was indicted for violating the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bodily Injury resulting from Dangerous Driving), since he operated the brake system with the intention to drive the vehicle, even though he did not turn on it, he could not be deemed to have used the vehicle in accordance with the original use of the vehicle, so long as he did not use it, the court affirmed the judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant, since he could not be seen as having used it in accordance with the original use of the vehicle

[1] Article 2 subparagraph 26 of the Road Traffic Act / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 26 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 98Da30834 Decided November 12, 1999 (Gong1999Ha, 2477) Supreme Court Decision 2009Da9294, 9300 Decided May 28, 2009

Defendant (English name 1 omitted)

Prosecutor

Law Firm Long River, Attorneys Kim Jong-hwan et al.

Seoul Western District Court Decision 2020No172 decided July 13, 2020

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 2 subparag. 26 of the Road Traffic Act provides that the term “driving” means using a vehicle or tram in accordance with the original method of use. Of them, in order to make a vehicle used in accordance with the original method of use, an engine operation must be conducted (see Supreme Court Decisions 98Da30834 delivered on Nov. 12, 199; 2009Da9294, 9300 delivered on May 28, 2009).

2. The court below reversed the judgment of the court of first instance which convicted the Defendant of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bodily Injury resulting from Dangerous Driving) and sentenced the Defendant not guilty.

3. The reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court reveal the following.

A. The so-called STPP&GO functions are installed on the instant vehicle, which is the instant vehicle (type 2013). The function is basically that the vehicle stops and the driver stops while the vehicle stops while the engine remains in operation. However, when the driver stops on the Br ped ped ped ped ped ped, the engine is once the engine is resumed if the driver turns out on the Br ped ped ped ped ped ped ped ped ped ped. However, if the driver fails to satisfy the re-working condition of the TPPP&G functions, the engine is discharged and the engine is not reworking.

B. As criminal facts of the judgment of the court of first instance, the Defendant stopped the instant vehicle at the location of the instant accident and opened a door to drive the instant vehicle to the Nonindicted Party (Korean name 2 omitted), who is the seat after driving the vehicle, and the Nonindicted Party was on board the vehicle at the seat. The Defendant appears to have completely turned down the vehicle at the driver’s seat due to the cancellation of STP&GO function. While the Nonindicted Party without recognizing this fact, the vehicle was divided into the Simbur, but the Dong did not take place, but rather the vehicle was pushed back by operating the brake system. While the Defendant was driving on the driver’s seat, the Defendant was also unable to walk at the time, and the Defendant caused the instant drilling accident.

4. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is difficult to view that the Defendant used the vehicle in accordance with the original method of use, even though the Defendant operated the brake system with the intent to drive the instant vehicle, and did not turn down the vehicle behind. Therefore, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding “driving” of the vehicle, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules.

5. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)