The part of the judgment of the court below concerning the claim for damages and the claim for restitution of unjust enrichment shall be reversed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Determination on the grounds of appeal by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendant”)

A. On the grounds in a written judgment, a judgment on a party’s assertion and other means of offence and defense shall be indicated to the extent that it is possible to recognize that the text is justifiable, and no judgment on all parties’ allegation and means of offence and defense shall be required

(Article 208 of the Civil Procedure Act). Therefore, even if a court’s ruling does not state a direct judgment on the matters alleged by the parties, if it is possible to find out that the parties have cited or rejected such assertion in light of the overall purport of the reasons for the judgment, it cannot be deemed an omission of judgment. Even if a court’s ruling was not yet made, if it is obvious that such assertion would be rejected, it cannot be said that there

(Supreme Court Decision 2011Da87174 Decided April 26, 2012, and Supreme Court Decision 2011Da98426 Decided October 31, 2013, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da98426, Oct. 31,

The lower court: (1) on March 30, 1998, the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”) leased the instant land to the Defendant with a lease deposit of KRW 1 million and KRW 1.4 million monthly rent (hereinafter “instant lease contract”); (2) the Defendant did not pay the instant lease contract after November 14, 2009; and (3) on November 22, 201, E, who represented the Plaintiff, terminated the instant lease contract on the ground of overdue rent; (4) sent the content-certified mail demanding the transfer of the instant land; and (3) the Defendant sent the instant land to the Defendant at that time; (4) on the other hand, the Defendant discontinued the transport service on or after April 2005 as a garage operated by the Defendant; and (4) on the other hand, the Defendant did not use the instant land any more from the time to the point of time to the point of time; and (4) on the part of the instant land from February 20 to the point of time to the point of time.