Whether the expressive representation system applies by analogy where a legal act is done as if he/she was the principal without indicating the act of representation.

Where a juristic act has been done under the personal name of the principal, with respect to an act without the power of representation to protect a bona fide third person, it may be applied by analogy in light of the purport of the expression representation system which recognizes the principal's responsibility within a given limit

Article 126 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff

Defendant

Gwangju High Court Decision 75Na503 delivered on July 27, 1977

The appeal shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's grounds of appeal are examined (the supplementary grounds of appeal are examined to the extent of supplement because they are subsequent to the submission period of the appellate brief).

With regard to the first ground for appeal, in light of the general transactional concept, it is reasonable to assume that the representative's wrong belief of himself was unreasonable in the specific circumstances at the time, and for the other party in good faith who believed to be the principal's own act, the principal's liability should be determined as to the act of the representative himself/herself on his/her own for the other party in good faith who believed to be the principal's act. This is also a matter of view in light of the purport of the expression agency system that recognizes the principal's liability within a certain limit as to the act without the power of representation in order to protect the third party in good faith in the transaction (in protecting the third party in good faith, there is no reason to deem that the application of the expression agency system is unreasonable). Therefore, it is difficult to accept the argument because the court below is justified that the non-party 1 is the plaintiff himself/herself, and that the measures that recognized the principal's liability to the plaintiff in accordance

As to the second ground, the court below acknowledged the fact that the non-party 1 is the plaintiff himself using a certificate of personal right (No. 1-2 through 5) returned by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's certificate of personal seal impression and the seal received from the plaintiff, and the non-party 2, the defendant's husband, also believed the above non-party as the plaintiff himself, and completed the provisional registration under the name of the defendant with relevant documents prepared in the name of the plaintiff (it can be seen that the non-party 2, the defendant's husband, seems to have represented the provisional registration of this case). The non-party 1-2, as a sale certificate for the real estate which the plaintiff received from the former owner, was not the one affixed with the seal or seal of the plaintiff, and it is hard to find that the non-party 1-2 was the one who is the owner of the above real estate and the other is the one who is the owner's own right or seal affixed to the above real estate, and it is hard to say that the above real estate was the one's own right or seal affixed to the above registration certificate.

If so, even if the record is kept, it is difficult for the defendant to view that the above documents and the plaintiff's person holding the above documents and the plaintiff's person holding the plaintiff's person and the person who intends to borrow the above money can believe that the plaintiff is the owner of this case's land under the above circumstances, and that the court below's measure rejecting the plaintiff's claim is unreasonable. We cannot accept the argument.

As to the third ground of appeal, even if the defendant changed its argument to the court below, and the defendant refused to comply with the order to submit documentary evidence withdrawn from the court of first instance as pointed out in the paper of appeal, the judgment of the court below cannot be deemed to be unjustifiable, and the judgment of the court below cannot be deemed to be unlawful on the ground of other reasons pointed out in the paper of appeal. Thus, the argument is not acceptable

Therefore, this appeal is without merit, and therefore dismissed in accordance with the provisions of Articles 400, 395, and 384(1) of the Civil Procedure Act. The burden of litigation costs is governed by Articles 95 and 89 of the same Act, and is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Min Jae-chul (Presiding Justice)