(a) the revocation of disposition of vested property and administrative litigation after January 1, 1965;

(b) Conclusion and grounds for disqualification of a sales contract for vested property;

A. Even if there is a grave for shipbuilding and the grave is protected, the fact alone does not have the right to construct the forest where the grave is located.

B. The approval of the Labor Relations Commission on the payment of allowances during the period of suspension or the reexamination of the National Labor Relations Commission’s revocation of such approval is an administrative disposition.

Article 9 of the Reversion Property Disposal Act

Supreme Court Decision 66Nu157 Decided December 27, 1966, Supreme Court Decision 196Nu123, 124 Decided December 6, 1966

Plaintiff 1 and one other

Head of Seodaemun Tax Office

Intervenor joining the Defendant

Seoul High Court Decision 66Gu104 delivered on July 14, 1966

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal by the defendant among the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant. The costs of appeal by the defendant joining the defendant are assessed against the defendant joining the defendant.

(1) Defendant 1’s ground of appeal No. 1 and Defendant 1’s assistant intervenor’s ground of appeal No. 4 as to Defendant 1’s assistant intervenor’s ground of appeal

According to the facts duly established by the court below, since the forest land, which was the property devolving upon it, was leased to Hanyang, which was the property devolving upon it, by the defendant on April 28, 1962 to the non-party foundation, the sales contract was concluded between the plaintiff 1, who was the highest bidder to waive the preferential right to purchase, and the plaintiff 1 paid the purchase price in full and completed the registration of ownership transfer under the same name as the plaintiff 1 on June 1964. The defendant notified the same plaintiff 1 on January 6, 1965. Thus, since the court below notified the cancellation to the plaintiff 1 on the fact, it is just to determine that the cancellation was effective against the plaintiff 1, who was the property devolving upon it, and since this was no longer established after January 1, 1965, the decision of the court below to revoke the above disposition of ownership transfer under the provisions of Article 5 of the Addenda of the Act on Special Measures for the Disposal of Property to which it belongs, it is not proper to revoke the above administrative disposition of 162.

(2) Defendant 2’s ground of appeal Nos. 2 and 1,2, and 3 of the Defendant’s Intervenor’s Intervenor’s grounds of appeal Nos. 1,2, and 3 of the Intervenor’s Intervenor’s grounds of appeal No. 1,2, and 3;

According to the facts duly admitted by the court below, since the defendant assistant intervenor entered into a lease contract on the forest of this case or did not manage the forest of this case after he was appointed as a manager, the defendant assistant intervenor's grave exists within the forest of this case, such as family theory, and even if the assistant intervenor was able to do so, he cannot be viewed as having so-called "right" under the Act on the Disposal of Property to Which he belongs, and even if it is assumed that the assistant intervenor had a right similar to superficies, such as theory, as a result of the construction of the grave of this part of this case, the assistant intervenor cannot have so-called "right" under the Act on the Disposal of Property to Which he belongs to the whole forest of this case, and even if the contract for the lease on the property to which he belongs, the plaintiff's ground for disqualification was not established, the plaintiff's right of disqualification and the plaintiff's right of disqualification was not vested in the previous contract for the purchase of the forest of this case. Thus, the court below's decision which held that the plaintiff's disqualification and the plaintiff's right of this case was not vested.

Therefore, this case's ground of appeal is no longer acceptable or acceptable. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Supreme Court Judge Lee Young-su (Presiding Judge) (Presiding Judge) and Lee Dong-dong Gyeong-dong