Whether the permission to use the property devolvingd upon the property is obtained or not.

It is reasonable to interpret that the fact that the permission for temporary use of the property devolvingd can not be acquired only by the fact that it was occupied by the temporary use permission rather than the regular contract for the property devolvingd can be resolved at any time by the administrative authority.

The election of a representative member of a cultural construction company for a limited partnership company

Secretary Lee Jae-soo, Lee Jae-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellant in charge of Lee Jae-nam-do

Han-il, the incorporated foundation, the chief executive officer of the Dong-ju Private Teaching Institute, and one attorney-at-law in charge of gambling

Daegu High Court Decision 55Ra3 delivered on June 17, 1955

Each of the appeals is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendant, while the part between the plaintiff and the defendant shall be borne by the defendant, and the part between the plaintiff and the defendant shall be borne by the defendant.

The court below's ground of appeal on the ground of appeal on the plaintiff's rejection of the plaintiff's claim is that it was an unlawful administrative disposition against the defendant's rejection of the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the plaintiff's lease of the right of use to the plaintiff without cancellation is an illegal administrative disposition against the defendant's rejection of the contract between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's lease of the right of use to the plaintiff without cancellation of the right of use to the plaintiff. The court below's rejection of the contract between the plaintiff's lease of the plaintiff's property and the plaintiff's lease of the right of use without any unlawful administrative disposition against the plaintiff's lease of the plaintiff's property, because the plaintiff's lease of the right of use to the plaintiff's lease of the right of use to the plaintiff's lease of the plaintiff's right of use without any unlawful administrative disposition against the plaintiff's plaintiff's lease of the plaintiff's property and the plaintiff's lease of the right of use to the plaintiff's lease of the plaintiff's property to the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal by the intervenor are as follows: 1. The most important point of this case's case's ruling is to judge whether the plaintiff has the right to appeal on the site of this case, 2. The court below's ruling that the plaintiff had the right to appeal on the site of this case's 5th anniversary of the fact that the plaintiff had the right to appeal. The court below's ruling that the plaintiff had the right to appeal on the site of this case's 9th anniversary of the fact that the plaintiff had the right to appeal on the land of this case's 5th anniversary of the fact that the plaintiff had the right to appeal. The court below's ruling that the plaintiff had the right to appeal on the site of this case's 9th anniversary of the fact that the plaintiff had the right to appeal on the land of this case's 9th anniversary of the fact that the plaintiff had the right to appeal on the land of this case's 5th anniversary of the fact that the plaintiff had the right to appeal on the land of this case's 3th anniversary of the right to appeal.

According to the original judgment, it is reasonable to interpret that the defendant and the defendant assistant intervenor were entitled to the temporary use of the building site from the defendant on April 14, 1949, which is the telegraph of the Busan District Institute of Commerce, Busan District, with the permission of temporary use of the building site from the defendant, and it is clear that the defendant was forced to use the military even until the original judgment was pronounced, and that the defendant's right to use the building site should not be determined by the previous purport of the party's pleading on the records, as long as it is possible to view that the defendant's temporary use of the building site is not based on the lease contract under the Act on the Disposal of Property belonging to the State, and that the plaintiff's right to use the building site can be decided once every year without the plaintiff's permission. Therefore, the defendant assistant intervenor's right to use the building site after the expiration of the original judgment on the first day of April 1, 1950 cannot be viewed as the plaintiff's right to use the building site after the expiration of the original judgment without the plaintiff's right to use.

Justices Kim Byung-ro (Presiding Justice)