1. The defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff)'s appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff.

purport, purport, and.

1. The reasons why the court of first instance should explain this case are as follows: “The court of first instance” of the first instance shall be “the court of first instance”; “this judgment” shall be “the court of first instance” of the second instance shall be “the court of first instance”; “the court of second instance shall not be “the same,” and “the same side from “the same side” of the 6th instance shall not be “the same 17th instance court”;” respectively, “The court of first instance shall be the same as “the court of first instance,” and it shall be accepted pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, except adding the judgment at the court of first instance like the following paragraph (2). In full view of the result of appraisal by an appraiser on July 21, 2017, the fact-finding results of the appraiser and the purport of the entire pleadings, it is reasonable to deem that the period necessary to complete the remaining construction among the construction of the construction of this case is the total number of days of 149 days (see preparatory document No. 2, June 19, 20200, 136).

A person shall be appointed.

2. As seen in the above cited part of the judgment added, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff liquidated damages and the total number of days with delay liability is 149 days (1) (149 days, as seen in Section 1 of the above paragraph, only there are differences in the calculation method or grounds, and the total number of days recognized by the court is 149 days, as in the first instance trial, and the total number of days recognized by the court is also 149 days, as in the first instance trial, and it cannot be deemed unfair in the conclusion that the recognition of the total number of days of the first instance pursuant to the method calculated by multiplying the total construction period under the contract by the high-speed rate, and it is reasonable to limit the penalty for delay to 70% and that there was an agreement on additional construction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. This is also the same as the Defendant’s assertion on the grounds for appeal on a different premise.