A. The claim for medical expenses damages is a claim that reaches the due date, and thus the interim interest cannot be deducted.

B. It is determined that the defendant's application should be made for damages caused by the return of goods by a declaration of provisional execution pursuant to Article 201 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act or damages for obtaining the exemption of provisional execution.

In the case of the return of the object of payment due to the declaration of provisional execution under Paragraph 2 of this article, and the compensation for the damage caused by provisional execution, or the damage to be exempted from it, the defendant must make a request.

Article 750 of the Civil Act, Article 201 of the Civil Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 67Da1388 delivered on November 25, 1967

Plaintiff

Korea

Seoul High Court Decision 64Na1649 delivered on June 25, 1965, Seoul High Court Decision 64Na1649 delivered on June 25, 1965

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendant.

Defendant Kim Sung-jin's ground of appeal is examined.

No. 1. (1) The scope of compensation for damages in tort is limited to ordinary damages related to considerable person, and in this case, sexual surgery after image completion is merely a surgery for the restoration to the original state of the parts of the body by image and the restoration to the original state of the parts of the body by image, and it cannot be viewed as beyond the scope of the above damage emergency. Therefore, there is no argument about this issue.

(2) The original judgment is recognized as requiring 486,450 won as a form of sexual surgery and subsequent hospitalization fees for the chest ples in front of the image. In light of the written appraisal by the Nonparty of the first instance trial, it can be known that the above appraiser divided the Plaintiff’s chest into 13 parts and calculated separate treatment days and necessary expenses, and then received the original judgment as it is, unless there is any extreme reason to the contrary, the sum of the above images’ chests cannot be carried out in a lump sum, unless there is any reason to the contrary. Therefore, it is obvious by the above written appraisal that the lower judgment cannot be seen as having adopted the contents of the written appraisal as evidence, and therefore, it cannot be seen that there is no error of law that the lower judgment adopted the contents of the written appraisal as evidence.

Article 1-1 (3)

Since medical expenses in damages are claims that have been determined at the time of tort and that have reached the due date, it is reasonable that the intermediate interest should not be deducted from the party members' case (Supreme Court Decision 67Da1388 delivered on September 19, 1967, Supreme Court Decision 69Da1518 delivered on November 25, 1969, and Supreme Court Decision 69Da1518 delivered on January 25, 196), it is reasonable that the original judgment calculated the amount of damages without deducting the intermediate interest from the medical expenses in accordance with the above opinion, and there

Point 2

In recognizing facts, the selection of evidence is the exclusive authority of the court below, which is the fact-finding court, and the court below rejected the application for resumption of argument for the defendant's new method of evidence and adopted the testimony of other witnesses, and it is not recognized that there was an error in violation of the rules of evidence in the original judgment, and it is not accepted as an independent opinion, which is the argument about this issue

Point 3

According to Article 201 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act, in a case where a judgment on the merits is modified, the court shall, upon request of the defendant, order the plaintiff to return the payment due to the declaration of provisional execution, damage caused by provisional execution, or damage to be exempted therefrom. However, even if the records are examined in detail, it is evident that the judgment of the court below recognized the reduction of KRW 96,481, more than the amount recognized by the judgment of the court of first instance which rendered a declaration of provisional execution, it is legitimate that the original judgment did not make any decision on this point in this case where the defendant's return of the payment of the above money or the trace in which the defendant applied for compensation for damage does not peep. Thus, the argument on this point is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges, and the costs of the lawsuit are unfair by the losing party and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judge Do-dong (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court