In full view of the individual circumstances as to whether a title trustee is deemed a title trustee, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have proved that he was a title trustee of the instant real estate.

If the parents leave their own properties before their birth to their own consciousness, there is a common sense that the parents still exercise the right to manage and dispose of the properties in question under the cooperation or consent of their own consciousness. Thus, the mere fact that the parents continued to exercise the right to manage and dispose of the properties even after they transferred the name of their own consciousness to their own consciousness, it cannot be readily concluded that the title trust, not the donation, is a title trust.

Article 88 (Definition of Transfer)

Seoul Administrative Court 2017Gudan74507

The right of share shall be given to the Plaintiff, who is the Plaintiff, and the right of share shall be immediately given by the intermediate omission registration method.

D Inasmuch as the registration of ownership transfer can be completed in the future of the plaintiff, the registration of the name of DoD.

A. The mere fact that the Plaintiff was registered under the title trust agreement is the title trustee of the instant co-ownership

It cannot be readily concluded.

B) After the registration of the Plaintiff’s name, the Plaintiff’s mother as the obligor with respect to the instant co-ownership shares

On January 18, 2012, after the registration of the Plaintiff’s name was completed with respect to the co-ownership share of this case, the fact that the registration of the establishment of a mortgage was completed prior to the registration of the establishment of a mortgage of KRW 1,**,743,482 in the name of the Plaintiff in order to secure the obligations of EE, the Plaintiff’s mother was completed in the future of the JapanCC.

However, the Supreme Court, however, decides that "if the parents have transferred their properties to their own consciousness before their birth, they shall:

The parents still have the right to manage and dispose of the property under their own cooperation or consent;

In ordinary cases, since the parents continued to exercise their right to manage and dispose of the property even after transferring the name of the property to their own consciousness, it cannot be readily concluded that it is a title trust rather than a gift (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da22866, Dec. 23, 2010). In light of the above legal principles, the possibility that the Plaintiff consented to water guarantee can not be ruled out considering the circumstances in which the Plaintiff donated the instant co-ownership from the publicB, etc., the presumption that the Plaintiff is the actual owner of the instant co-ownership cannot be deemed to be reversed solely on the ground that the instant co-ownership registration was completed after the Plaintiff’s registration was completed.

C) As to the Plaintiff’s assertion that he had been staying abroad on the date of registration under the Plaintiff’s name.

As seen above, the registration date in the name of the plaintiff was March 18, 2003, and No. 4 was the same as the registration date in the name of the plaintiff.

According to the statement of evidence, some testimony of EE by witnesses, the plaintiff from August 3, 2002 to June 8, 2003.

The fact that he had been staying in Vietnam is recognized.

However, taking into account the following points, the publicB’s co-ownership of this case from AD:

Upon receipt of the ownership’s return, the pertinent co-ownership shares shall be donated to the Plaintiff, and March 2003 shall be donated to the Plaintiff.

18. The legal representative of the 17-year old minor plaintiff (the 19** May 22, 199) at the time, who represents the plaintiff.

(1) If the donee entered into a contract of gift with himself as the donor, the plaintiff as the donee, and then the intermediate omission registration

As soon as possible, the registration of ownership transfer can be completed in the future of the plaintiff from DoD.

The circumstance that the Plaintiff had been staying in Vietnam on the date of the above high-priced ground for registration also does not constitute a ground to reverse the presumption that the Plaintiff was the actual owner of the instant co-ownership.

(1) A gift contract shall, in principle, be concluded only with the unity of intentions between the parties, and special forms.

applicable to an abortion contract that does not require such contract.

(2) "Agent" in the main sentence of Article 124 of the Civil Act means a person himself/herself on behalf of the principal without the consent of

rule that “no party shall act on behalf of either party with respect to a juristic act or identical juristic act.”

The purport of the above provision is that the mandatory is the principal and in office by taking advantage of his status or the acceptance of the case.

Facilitating the interest of himself/herself or a third party by dealing with the transaction, and causing any damage to the principal infinite;

to prevent action, there is only interest to minors subject to parental authority.

In doing so, even if a person becomes a self-contract or acting both as an agent under Article 124 of the Civil Act, it shall be interpreted as valid (see Supreme Court Decision 81Da649, Oct. 13, 1981).

D) As to the Plaintiff’s parents paid taxes and public charges on the instant co-ownership shares

According to the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 12 and 13, and witness E E’s testimony, registration in the name of the plaintiff

After that, most of the Plaintiff’s parents pay the acquisition tax, property tax, etc. on the instant co-ownership shares.

the donor of an immovable property, however, the donor’s performance of the obligation under the contract of gift is complete.

After completion, a donee bears all kinds of taxes, such as acquisition tax, etc. related to real estate for the purpose of donation;

There is no provision of a law that generally prohibits the act of paying an excessive amount (in such a case, the tax contribution division);

The payment of money by proxy constitutes a new gift separate from a real estate donation. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion also does not directly reverse the presumption that the Plaintiff is the actual owner of the instant co-ownership.

E) Even after the registration in the Plaintiff’s name, publicB filed a registration certificate with respect to the instant co-ownership shares

As to the assertion that there was a claim

The fact that a person claiming to be a title truster holds the registration certificate is back to the title trust.

However, it is common that the parent still exercises the right to manage and dispose of the pertinent property as seen above (referring to the Supreme Court Decision 96Da18816 delivered on September 10, 196). Thus, the mere fact that the parent continues to exercise the right to manage and dispose of the relevant property even after he/she transferred the name of the property to his/her own awareness, it cannot be readily concluded that the title trust is not a gift, unless it is a title trust (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da22866 delivered on April 25, 200). The fact that the title trust is recognized is not necessarily a matter of fact-finding if there are any specific evidence or facts as a matter of fact-finding, and it is not necessarily required to recognize or not to recognize the title trust (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da6858 delivered on April 25, 200).

The above legal principles are as follows: (a) the Plaintiff and publicB are subordinate to the Plaintiff; and (b) the Plaintiff’s assertion is based on the Plaintiff’s assertion.

The Plaintiff’s share overseas for a considerable period after the registration of the Plaintiff’s name was completed with respect to the share overseas.

In light of the fact that he was staying in the company, as alleged by the plaintiff, the name of the plaintiff as to the share of this case.

Even after the completion of the registration, even if the publicB had the certificate of registration, such reasons alone.

The presumption of actual owner cannot be deemed to have been reversed.

F) As to the assertion that the publicB was the bad credit standing at the time of the registration of the instant case

According to Gap evidence 15-2, publicB as of January 17, 2018* Asset Management as of January 17, 2018

A fact that the Corporation bears obligations equivalent to the principal amount of KRW 2,140,694,614 may be recognized, however,

GongB is assumed to have been in a bad credit position even at the time of registration in the name of the Plaintiff.

of this case’s co-ownership registration is completed in the name of the principal from DoD as to the co-ownership of this case.

the creditors are subject to compulsory execution from the creditors so that there is no particular benefit, and it is deemed that there is no special benefit.

From the point of view, the opportunity to recover the ownership of the instant co-ownership shares from the point of view

It may not be ruled out that the gift of ownership to the plaintiff who is a part of ownership would be improved.

Therefore, the above circumstances asserted by the Plaintiff also constitute the actual owner of the instant co-ownership shares.

It does not constitute grounds for reversal of presumption.

(iv) comprehensive review;

In this case where both individual circumstances alleged by the Plaintiff and the evidence corresponding thereto are gathered, publicB and publicB in the special circumstances that the Plaintiff is his father and his father, and publicB shared the instant case.

If the registration of ownership transfer is completed in the name of the holder under the name of the holder of shares

The sharing of this case is deemed to have no practical benefit to recover the title of ownership due to compulsory execution.

The Plaintiff, a South-North Korean owner of the instant co-ownership, waives the ownership of the shares.

It can not be ruled out that transferring is desirable.

5) Sub-decisions

Ultimately, it is proved that the Plaintiff was merely a title trustee of the instant co-ownership shares.

In light of the above legal principles, the Plaintiff’s co-ownership of capital gains is deemed to have been attributed to the Plaintiff.

The disposition of this case is lawful.

3. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kang Jae-soo

GongAA

Central and Central Tax Offices*

oly 2018.16

2018.25

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The disposition of imposition KRW 2**,353,220 against the plaintiff on January 11, 201* is revoked. The disposition of imposition of KRW 2*,353,220 shall be revoked.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. As to the co-ownership share of one half of the total area of 1/2 of the forest *,504 square meters in Seocho-gu, Seoul (hereinafter referred to as "the co-ownership share in this case"), the registration of ownership transfer was completed on August 12, 1967, and the registration of ownership transfer was completed on March 30, 1981 on March 28, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "registration under the name of the plaintiff's senior mother"), the registration of ownership transfer was completed on March 28, 1981 on March 19, 200 (hereinafter referred to as "registration under the name of the plaintiff") on March 19, 203.

B. On January 18, 2012, the Plaintiff’s mother of the instant co-ownership completed the registration of creation of a neighboring mortgage of KRW 1,00*,743,482 in the future of the JapanCC in order to secure EE’s obligations.

C. The instant co-ownership shares were sold to Japan Co., Ltd., Ltd., a mortgagee, at the auction procedure to enforce the above right to collateral security, which was commenced by Seoul Central District Court around 2014**353.

D. The Defendant: (a) acquired the instant co-ownership shares on March 19, 2003; (b) deemed that the Plaintiff transferred the instant co-ownership shares to the JapanCC via the above auction procedure on May 26, 201*; and (c) imposed KRW 410,821,170 on the Plaintiff on January 11, 2017 (hereinafter “pre-reduction disposition”).

E. On February 15, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Commissioner of the National Tax Service on February 15, 2017, and the Plaintiff asserted that special long-term holding deduction should be applied in calculating capital gains even if it is not the subject to whom capital gains from the transfer of the instant co-ownership shares accrue.

F. On February 23, 2017, the Defendant: (a) applied the special long-term holding deduction in relation to the calculation of capital gains on February 23, 2017 in the pending case; (b) reduced tax amount of 131,**,950 won; (c) 279,**,220 won (=410,**,170 won - 131,***,950) remaining after reduction before reduction; and (d) the Commissioner of the National Tax Service dismissed the Plaintiff’s request for examination on September 27, 2017, deeming that the Plaintiff was not proven the title trustee of the instant co-ownership share. The Plaintiff’s request for examination was dismissed on the ground that there was no dispute with the recognition basis; (c) entries in Gap’s 1,4, 10, 111, and Eul’s 1 evidence (including a serial number; hereinafter the same shall apply); and (c) some statements in Gap’s 15-15 evidence; and the purport of the entire pleadings.

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

Since the Plaintiff’s co-ownership shares are only the title trustee of the instant co-ownership, the instant disposition that took place by deeming that the transfer income from the transfer of the instant co-ownership belongs to the Plaintiff is unlawful. In other words, the Plaintiff’s father’s co-ownership was intended to obtain the Plaintiff’s father’s co-ownership from the Plaintiff, and at the time, publicB sought to transfer the instant co-ownership from the Plaintiff’s father, but at the time, publicB was a bad credit relationship, entered into an interim omission title trust agreement with B as the truster, arD as the trustee, and as the donor of the instant co-ownership, titleD as the Plaintiff’s husband’s husband’s husband’s co-ownership, and title trust was made to DoD, who was the husband’s husband’s husband’s co-ownership, before 203 after her blood cancer was diagnosed, and the Plaintiff’s share was registered under the name of the Plaintiff’s co-ownership after her death. However, it was sufficiently recognized that the Plaintiff’s trust was registered under the name of the Plaintiff’s co-ownership.

1) The burden of proving that there is another person who actually acquired income from the transfer of real estate through title trust is a person who asserts such fact (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du14668, Nov. 15, 2012). As such, the Plaintiff must prove that the Plaintiff is a title trustee of the instant co-ownership. 2) As to the various circumstances presented by the Plaintiff as the grounds for supporting the assertion, the Plaintiff should first consider whether the Plaintiff can be deemed a title trustee of the instant co-ownership shares solely on the following grounds: (a) determine whether the Plaintiff can be deemed a title trustee of the instant co-ownership; and (b) based on the individual circumstances, whether the Plaintiff can be deemed a title trustee of the instant co-ownership share.

3) Determination by item

A) As to the assertion that the registration under the title trust agreement was made with respect to the instant co-ownership shares on August 12, 1967 as to the claim that the registration under the title trust agreement was made, the registration of ownership transfer was completed in the name of the Plaintiff on March 30, 1981, and the registration under the Plaintiff’s name was completed on March 19, 193, and the Plaintiff’s name was completed on March 19, 193. According to the witness testimony on the statement of evidence No. 1, 8, and 9, even if the title trust was completed on August 12, 1998 for which the title trust was registered under the title trust agreement, the co-ownership of the instant co-ownership and Seoul ** * 33 Dongdong apartment * 102, the title trust of the Plaintiff’s co-ownership as the maximum debt amount was returned to 30,000,000 won under the title trust agreement.