(a) Where an appeal is filed against the judgment of the court of first instance against which only one of the facts constituting an offense is pronounced guilty because the facts charged and the applicable provisions of Acts are instituted alternatively, the judgment of the court of first instance shall be reversed and self-concept in the appellate trial, the object of the appellate trial

B. The purport of the provision on the principle of no punishment without law under the Constitution

A. In a case where a public prosecution is instituted because the facts charged and the applicable provisions of Acts are written alternatively, if an appeal is filed against the judgment of the court of first instance which was pronounced guilty only one of them, and the appellate court reverses the judgment of the court of first instance and renders a judgment on the whole of the case, if it is deemed that the grounds for appeal exist in the appellate court, and the appellate court reverses the judgment of the court of first instance and renders a judgment on the whole of the case. Thus, other criminal facts except

B. The purport of the provision on the principle of no punishment without prison labor under the Constitution is to stipulate any act as a crime and to impose any kind of punishment on it as a law in advance, and the contents of the criminal law must not be satisfied as a law, and the contents of the criminal law can be specified by the Presidential Decree with specific scope specified.

Defendant 1 and nine others

For the defendant 1, the attorney Kim Jong-su and the defendant 2, for the defendant Kim Jong-su and the defendant 3, the attorney Kim Jong-su and the attorney Kim Jong-su for the defendant 4, the attorney Kim Jong-su and the defendant 5, for the defendant Kim Jong-su and the defendant 7;

Seoul High Court Decision 69No78 delivered on October 6, 1970

All appeals are dismissed.

(1) We examine Defendant 1’s defense counsel’s grounds for appeal of attorney Kim Jong-soo.

(A) On the first ground for appeal

In a case where a public prosecution is instituted because the facts charged and applicable provisions of the indictment are written alternatively, if an appeal is filed against a judgment of the court of first instance which was pronounced guilty on only one of them, the appellate court reverses the judgment of the court of first instance, which recognized the grounds for appeal in the appellate trial, and then decides again on the case itself. As such, other criminal facts than the facts of the first instance which were found guilty in the judgment of the court of first instance are subject to a trial of the appellate court as long as they are not withdrawn, the appellate court may select a new criminal facts other than the facts of the first instance which were found guilty in the first instance, and in such a case, if it is judged a new guilty on one of the facts of the facts of the facts of the first instance, it is sufficient if the appellate court has selected only one of them. Thus, even if the facts were the facts of the first instance which were found guilty as alleged in the arguments in the judgment of the court of first instance, it does not necessarily mean that the judgment has to be judged separately, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles of the scope of the judgment of the appellate court or the defendant's defense.

(B) On the second ground of appeal:

As the defendant asserts, it is clear that he was an executive director in charge of the business of the KNNS corporation at the time of the crime, and even if the facts constituting the elements of the crime of exclusive employment of directors of the stock company under Article 630 (1) of the Commercial Act among the facts charged against the defendant are included, the prosecutor regarded the defendant as a person in charge of another person's business under Article 357 (1) of the Criminal Act, and it is clear in the record that the defendant's so-called the defendant was indicted due to the fact that he was in breach of trust under Article 357 (1) of the Criminal Act. Thus, the court below's action which decided that the defendant's so-called constitutes the elements of the crime under Article 357 (1) of the Criminal Act is just and there

(C) On the third ground of appeal:

Examining the evidence presented by the original judgment in comparison with the records, the court below's decision to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the crime of taking property in breach of trust and taking property in collusion with the defendant or joint defendant 2, and there is no ground to argue that the fact-finding or the crime of taking property in breach of trust, which is the exclusive authority of the fact-finding judge, is attacked by the fact-finding or the preparation of evidence.

(2) Defendant 2’s defense counsel’s maximum leaps, and the grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of the Dong Kim Byung-gun’s disease.

According to the judgment of the court below, it is clear that only the list of evidence is put on the grounds of the judgment against the defendant, and the summary of the evidence is specified. In addition, when examining the original judgment in comparison with the records, the court below's action which recognized each criminal facts against the defendant is just and there is no error of law that recognized facts without legal principles or evidence, and all arguments are without merit.

(3) Defendant 3’s attorney-at-law’s grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the judgment of the court below, even though it is evident that the so-called "competence of breach of trust" in Article 357 (1) of the Criminal Act is applied to the so-called "competence of breach of trust" in the judgment against the defendant, the argument that there is an error of error in the original judgment by erroneously applying Article 129 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes Article 4

(4) We examine Defendant 4’s defense counsel’s grounds of appeal against attorney Kim Sang-hoon.

When examining the original judgment in comparison with the records, the court below's decision that recognized each of the facts of embezzlement and occupational embezzlement as to the defendant by taking account of the evidence that the above judgment was followed is just and there is no violation of the rules of evidence in the lawsuit theory or any violation of the law of misunderstanding the legal principles as to occupational embezzlement. Therefore, all of the arguments are without merit.

(5) Defendant 8’s grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the original judgment, it is clear that the so-called judgment against the defendant is subject to the application of Article 357 (1) or Article 357 (2) of the Criminal Act to the so-called, and therefore, the argument that Article 129 (1) of the Criminal Act is applied to the so-called so-called is not reasonable, and if the original judgment is examined together with the case records, the court below's measures are just and there are no errors of law such as litigation, incomplete deliberation, etc., and there are no other arguments that attack that there is a mistake of facts in the original judgment, and there is no legitimate ground for appeal in this case. Thus, all arguments are without merit.

(6) Defendant 5’s defense counsel’s grounds of appeal and Defendant 9’s grounds of appeal are examined together.

In light of the records of the original judgment and the first instance judgment cited by the court below, all of the facts charged in this case in which the above judgments were stated and the defendant or joint defendant 7 received a bribe in relation to his duties. Thus, the court below's decision which found the defendant guilty is just and there is no violation of the rules of evidence which found the facts erroneous by misunderstanding the relationship with the Korean Electric Power Company and the defendant 7, and confusion between the harbor transport and the general transport operations. As such, even if the defendant et al. did not receive an illegal solicitation from 7 to 7, the establishment of the crime of acceptance of bribe by the defendant et al. is not established, and even if the defendant et al. received an illegal solicitation, there is no complaint, and it is not recognized that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the law regarding the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes in the theory of the original judgment. Therefore, all of the arguments are without merit.

(7) Defendant 7’s defense counsel’s grounds of appeal are examined.

(A) On the first ground for appeal

According to Article 4 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes enacted for the purpose of maintaining sound social order, the executive officers of the government-managed enterprises shall be deemed public officials in the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act. This purport is to regard the executive officers of the government-managed enterprises subject to Article 4 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes as the public officials in relation to the acceptance of bribe and punish them. Thus, among the requirements for the organization of public officials under Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, the above government-managed enterprises' executive officers shall also be deemed to be included in the above government-managed enterprises' employees under Article 133 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, which cited Article 129 of the same Act and Article 129 of the same Act, if there is no error in the law concerning the offering of bribe to the above government-managed enterprises under Article 29 (1) of the same Act and Article 4 of the same Enforcement Decree.

(B) On the second ground of appeal:

Article 4 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes provides that "the scope of government-managed enterprises and executive officers shall be determined by Presidential Decree," and it shall not be interpreted that all of the penal provisions should be satisfied as Acts, and the contents of penal provisions may be delegated to Presidential Decree by specifying the specific scope of the penal provisions." Article 4 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes provides that "the executive officers of government-managed enterprises and executive officers who are subject to Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act shall be deemed public officials," and Article 4 (2) of the same Act provides that "the scope of government-managed enterprises and executive officers shall be determined by Presidential Decree," and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that "the scope of government-managed enterprises" subject to Article 4 (1) of the same Act shall be defined as "the scope of government-managed enterprises" and Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that "the government-managed enterprises shall not be deemed as "the executive officers and executive officers of government-managed enterprises" and shall not be defined as "the executive officers and employees of government-levels".

(C) On the third ground of appeal:

In light of the records, the court below's determination that each criminal facts of the defendant's judgment against the court below were found to be erroneous in finding the evidence without admissibility of the lawsuit as evidence. Therefore, the argument is without merit.

(8) Defendant 6’s defense counsel to determine the grounds of appeal for the attorney Kim-con.

According to the original judgment, it is clear that each case of giving money and valuables to joint defendants 4 and 8 is subject to punishment pursuant to Article 357 (2) and (1) of the Criminal Act. As such, in applying Article 4 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes to so-called, there is no reason to argue that there is an error in the original judgment by applying Article 4 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes to the same, and in examining the original judgment in comparison with the records, each case of giving money and valuables to each of the above defendants 4 and 8, the court below's decision to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the lawsuit.

(9) Defendant 10’s grounds of appeal are examined.

In comparison with the original judgment and the records of the first instance judgment cited by the court below, since the above judgment was based on evidence presented by the above judgment that the defendant acquired each money and valuables from Co-Defendant 6 and Co-Defendant 8 in exchange for an unlawful solicitation in relation to his duties, all facts of violation of trust can be recognized, the above judgment's disposition is just and there is no illegality as pointed out in the arguments, and there is no ground to argue that there is an attack as to fact-finding and evidence preparation, which are the exclusive authority of fact-finding

(10) Therefore, the Defendants’ instant appeal is dismissed on the grounds that it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Seo-gu et al. (Presiding Justice)