2010Do14037(a) Defamation by publications

(b) Violation of Information and Communications Network Promotion Act;

(Defamation)

(c) Contempt;

1.(a) A

2.(a)(c) B

3.(a)(b) C.

4.(a)D

Defendants

Law Firm G (For the defendant)

Attorney BB, H, and BC

Seoul High Court Decision 2010496 Decided September 30, 2010

2013, 2,28.

All appeals are dismissed.

The Defendants’ grounds of appeal are also examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court maintained the first instance judgment recognizing the Defendants’ criminal intent and the falsity of the alleged fact that the Defendants committed J, K, and M through newspapers, Internet newspapers, brochuress, etc. and the first instance judgment recognizing the Defendants’ criminal intent.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, the aforementioned measures are justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the establishment of defamation, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine.

2. Regarding the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3, "the purpose of slandering a person" as provided in Article 61(2) of the former Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. (amended by Act No. 8778, Dec. 21, 2007; hereinafter the same shall apply) or Article 309(2) of the Criminal Act requires the intention or purpose of deception. The issue of whether a person is the purpose of slandering a person is determined by comparing and determining the degree of infringement of reputation that may be damaged or damaged by the expression, taking into account all the circumstances such as the content and nature of the relevant alleged fact, the scope of the other party to whom the relevant fact was published, the method of expression, etc. In addition, when the defendant contests subjective elements of a crime, the determination of the establishment of the crime should be made by legitimately pointing out the legal principles as to the victim’s experience and status, duties, and other individual circumstances that the defendant had specifically been aware at the time of engaging in the expressive act, or by pointing out the aforementioned legal principles and reasons.

In addition, Article 310 of the Criminal Act concerning defamation or false or false defamation through an information and communications network, the purpose of which is recognized as defamation, cannot be applied to such defamation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Do601, 2003Do9, May 16, 2003). In light of the records, the defendants believed the contents of the notices to be true or there is no justifiable reason to believe them.

In this case, the judgment of the court below that the defendants cannot apply Article 310 of the Criminal Act to each defamation act against the victims is just and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to Article 310 of the Criminal Act.

3. As to the fourth ground for appeal

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s determination that each of the Defendants’ defamation constituted a justifiable act that does not contravene social norms is justifiable and thus, is justifiable to have rejected this part of the Defendants’ assertion. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on legitimate acts or social rules under

4. As to the ground of appeal No. 5, performance refers to the state in which many, unspecified or unspecified persons can recognize the elements of defamation, and even if one person expresses a fact to one person, if there is a possibility of spreading it to an unspecified or unspecified person, the requirement of performance is satisfied (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Do340, Apr. 9, 2004)

The lower court determined that Defendant B’s performance is recognized without the need to examine whether there is a possibility to spread the victim’s reputation because the other party to the act of impairing and insulting the victim’s reputation falls under a majority of the other parties.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors of misapprehending the legal principles as to the public performance in the crime of defamation and insult.

5. Regarding ground of appeal No. 6

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the court below is just in finding the Defendant B guilty of insult on the grounds as stated in its holding. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the law of logic and experience and exceeding the bounds of the free evaluation of evidence, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to

6. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jae-young

Justices Shin Young-young

Justices Park Sang-hoon

Justices Kim Yong-deok