Main Issues
[1] The elements for the establishment of joint tort and the meaning of aiding and abetting joint tort
[2] Whether a person who intentionally committed a tort by using the victim's care can immediately assert the offsetting of negligence on the ground of the victim's care (negative)
[3] In the case of joint tort liability where one of the tortfeasors is minor in the degree of processing of the tort compared to other tortfeasors, whether the scope of the tortfeasor's liability can be limited in relation to the victim (negative)
Summary of Judgment
[1] In the case of a joint tort under Article 760 of the Civil Code which causes damage to another person jointly, the joint tort does not require not only a conspiracy among actors, but also a common perception. However, if the joint tort is objectively related to the joint tort, it is sufficient if the joint tort is involved, and the joint tort is established which is liable for damages caused by the joint tort. Aid and abetting in the joint tort refers to all direct and indirect acts that facilitate the tort.
[2] It is not permissible for a person who intentionally committed a tort by taking advantage of the victim's care to claim a reduction of his/her responsibility on the ground of the victim's care.
[3] Joint tort liability is not individually seeking damages from each individual act of the perpetrator, but to pursue liability for the joint tort jointly committed by the perpetrator. As such, the scope of liability for damages from joint tort is determined by comprehensively evaluating all the acts of the tortfeasor in relation to the victim. The amount of liability for damages is borne by each tortfeasor. Even though the degree of liability of the tortfeasor is minor compared to other tortfeasors, the scope of liability of the tortfeasor cannot be limited as part of the amount of compensation as set forth above in relation to the victim.
[Reference Provisions]
[1] Article 760 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 396 and 763 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 396, 760, and 763 of the Civil Act
Reference Cases
[1] Supreme Court Decision 96Da55631 delivered on June 12, 1998 (Gong1998Ha, 1858), Supreme Court Decision 98Da31264 delivered on December 23, 1998 (Gong1999Sang, 222) Supreme Court Decision 9Da41749 delivered on April 11, 200 (Gong2000Sang, 1172) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 87Da637 delivered on July 21, 198 (Gong1987, 138), Supreme Court Decision 95Da30352 delivered on November 14, 195 (Gong196, 2011) / [209Da308989 delivered on September 29, 205] Supreme Court Decision 2009Da308989 delivered on September 36, 2095
Plaintiff, Appellee
Korea Development Bank (Attorney Lee Jae-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant, Appellant
Defendant (Attorney Lee Yong-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellee)
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 99Na35036 delivered on January 26, 2000
Text
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed) are examined as follows.
1. On the first ground for appeal
A. In the case of a joint tort under Article 760 of the Civil Code which multiple persons jointly inflict damage on another person, it does not require a common perception as well as a conspiracy among actors. However, if the joint tort is objectively related to the joint tort, it is sufficient if the joint tort is objectively established, and the joint tort is established that is liable for damages caused by the joint tort. Aiding and abetting in a joint tort refers to all direct and indirect acts that facilitate the tort (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 98Da31264, Dec. 23, 1998; 9Da41749, Apr. 11, 2000).
B. According to the records, the defendant and the co-defendant 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the court of first instance together with the co-defendant 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the court of first instance. As stated in the judgment below, the defendant and the co-defendant 3 of the court of first instance, as well as the deposit holders, received a high interest rate of interest other than the bank agreement from co-defendant 1 of the court of first instance, and did not find a certain period of deposit, and they again withdrawn after a certain period of time after receiving separate interest payment from co-defendant 1 of the court of first instance other than the bank agreement, and the co-defendant 4 of the branch of the plaintiff bank, the director of the branch of the court of first instance, obtained a cash card without knowledge of the deposit amount, used it to illegally withdraw the deposit and let the deposit holders use it or remitted it to co-defendant 1 of the court of first instance to use it.
If the facts are identical, it is possible for the Defendant to continuously and unlawfully withdraw the deposit by attracting the deposit in a way that is sufficiently known that the deposit would be withdrawn and used in an unlawful manner, and it constitutes an aiding and abetting act by intention. In addition, the Defendant’s aiding and abetting act constitutes an act of aiding and abetting and abetting another bank, and the act of illegally withdrawing the deposit is objectively related to the Defendant’s aiding and abetting act, and as long as the Plaintiff’s damage was inflicted on the Plaintiff’s bank through the relevant joint act, and the Defendant and the joint Defendant 1 and 4 of the first instance court were not jointly liable to compensate for the damage as indicated in the reasoning of the lower judgment, and the Defendant cannot jointly and severally be held liable to compensate the Plaintiff, including the joint Defendant 1 and 4 of the first instance court, as long as the Plaintiff’s damage was incurred by the relevant joint act as indicated in the reasoning of the lower court.
In the same purport, the fact-finding and decision of the court below that ordered the defendant to compensate for the whole amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff on the ground that the above act by the defendant constitutes aiding and abetting the joint defendants of the first instance court, such as co-defendant 1 and co-defendant 1 of the first instance court, constitutes a tort of aiding and abetting the illegal acts of the co-defendant 1 of the first instance court, is just, and there is no error of law such as misconception of facts against the rules
2. On the second ground for appeal
A. It is not permissible for a person who intentionally committed a tort by taking advantage of the victim's care to claim that the person who intentionally committed the tort be held liable for the negligence of the victim (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Meu637, Jul. 21, 1987; 95Da30352, Nov. 14, 1995). In addition, the joint tort liability does not seek damages from each individual act of the tortfeasor, but imposes liability on each tortfeasor for the joint tort jointly committed by the perpetrator. As such, the scope of the liability for damages caused by the joint tort is determined by comprehensively assessing and assessing all the acts committed by the tortfeasor in relation to the victim. The amount of the compensation for damages shall be borne by each tortfeasor. Even if the degree of processing the tort compared to other tortfeasor is insignificant, the scope of the tortfeasor's liability cannot be limited as part of the amount of compensation as above in relation to the victim (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da3161, Oct. 20, 1998).
B. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, insofar as female employees in charge of issuing the cash card at the Sungnam Branch of the plaintiff bank did not dissipe the intention of illegal withdrawal of deposits using the cash card issued by the plaintiff bank's co-defendant 4 at the court of first instance, and issued the cash card to the co-defendant 4 at the request of the co-defendant 4 of the court of first instance without confirming the intent of the plaintiff bank's own, and deliver it to the plaintiff bank's co-defendant 4 of the first instance court's negligence, as well as the co-defendants of the first instance court's first instance court's first instance court's co-defendant 4, who are intentional tort, and the defendant's co-defendant 4, who is jointly responsible for such joint tort, also did not know the negligence of the female employees in charge of issuing the bank's cash card in the name of the plaintiff bank's bank's name and used it in the unlawful withdrawal of deposits, it is not allowed to admit the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff bank's negligence is limited to the defendant's liability.
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Jin-hun (Presiding Justice)