Article 74(1)3 of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., and Article 44-7(1)3 of the same Act, mean that “the act of repeatedly delivering words causing fear or apprehension to the other party,” and “the act of making the other party reach the other party,” which are punished under Article 74(1)3 and Article 44-7(1)3 of the same Act, mean that “the act of repeatedly delivering words causing fear or apprehensions to the other party,” and “the act of sending text messages that arouses fear or apprehensions to the other party’s mobile phone, thereby leading to a situation in which the other party can immediately contact text messages without any restriction.” (affirmative)

Article 74 (1) 3 and Article 44-7 (1) 3 of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. are punished for the acts of repeatedly reaching other persons with signs, words, sound, image, or motion pictures that cause fears or apprehensions through information and communications networks.

Whether “the act of repeatedly reaching another person” constitutes “the act of repeatedly sending a text message that arouses fear or apprehension” ought to be determined by comprehensively taking into account the content and method of expression sent by the Defendant to the other party, its meaning, relationship between the Defendant and the other party, the process and frequency of sending the text message, circumstances before and after, and circumstances faced by the other party.” The phrase “an act of making the other party feel fear or apprehension, etc.” refers to not only where the other party directly deals with the text message that arouses fear or apprehension, etc., but also where the other party objectively recognizable it. Therefore, if the Defendant sent text message that arouses fear or apprehension to the mobile phone of the other party, thereby making it possible for the other party to immediately contact the text message without any restriction, such act meets the elements of a crime that may cause fear or apprehension, and is irrelevant to whether the other party actually confirmed the text message.

Articles 44-7 (1) 3 and 74 (1) 3 of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc.

Supreme Court Decision 2013Do7761 Decided December 12, 2013

Defendant

Defendant

Seoul Northern District Court Decision 2018No664 decided August 30, 2018

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Violation of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc.;

A. Article 74(1)3 and Article 44-7(1)3 of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. (hereinafter “Information and Communications Network Act”) punish the act of repeatedly reaching other parties any codes, words, sound, image, or motion picture that arouses fear or apprehension through an information and communications network.

Whether “the act of repeatedly reaching another person” constitutes “the act of repeatedly sending a text message causing fear or apprehensions” refers to “the act of making the other party objectively recognizable it as well as directly contact with the other party’s words causing fear or apprehensions,” and it should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the contents, method of expression, and meaning of the text sent by the Defendant to the other party; relationship between the Defendant and the other party; the process and frequency of sending the text message; circumstances before and after sending it; and circumstances faced by the other party” (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Do761, Dec. 12, 2013). Therefore, if the Defendant sent a text message causing fear or apprehensions to the mobile phone of the other party, thereby satisfying the elements of the act that the other party can immediately contact the text message without any restriction, and whether the other party actually confirmed the text message.

B. The lower court found the Defendant guilty of this part of the facts charged on the following grounds. In other words, considering the content, background, period, frequency, etc. of text messages sent by the Defendant to the victim’s cell phone, it constitutes a literal text that may cause fear or apprehensions in light of the victim’s text messages. Although the text messages were stored in the printeds of the victim’s cell phone by blocking the receipt of text messages, it constitutes a case where the victim was in a situation that the victim could immediately confirm the said text messages, and thus, the victim’s “compon

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on “constition and apprehension,” “competence,” “competence,” and “competence,” as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. The defendant's assertion that the crime of this case was caused by a naval investigation is not a legitimate ground of appeal, which is alleged in the ground of appeal by the defendant, or by the court below that it was not subject to a judgment ex officio.

2. Violation of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act;

The lower court found that this part of the facts charged was guilty. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in

3. Conclusion

The Defendant’s appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)