In case where the title of registration is transferred to a third party after the completion of the prescription period, whether the possessor may claim the completion of the prescription by deeming the time of the transfer registration as the starting point for the new starting point for the acquisition by prescription (affirmative)

Although the party cannot arbitrarily choose the starting point for the acquisition by prescription, if the original possessor continuously occupies the real estate even after the acquisition by prescription is completed, even if the name of the third party is changed in the future, if the acquisition by the name of the third party as the starting point for new acquisition by counting the acquisition by the name of the third party from the acquisition by the new starting point for the acquisition by prescription, the possessor may claim the completion of the acquisition by deeming the third party as the starting point for new acquisition by taking the acquisition by ownership (registration of transfer)

Article 245 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 82Da565 delivered on November 9, 1982 (Dissenting) (Article 245(32) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Korea), Article 245(32) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Korea, No. 696-84 delivered on July 20, 1961, 134(a)779 delivered on July 20, 1961 (No. 157 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Korea)

Borrower; and

Song-in et al. and nine others

Busan District Court Decision 85Na227,3226 delivered on July 4, 1986

The appeal by the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) is dismissed.

Expenses for appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant).

본소:원고(반소피고)에게, (1) 부산 부산진구 연지동 247의 1대 413평방미터 지상 별지도면(1) 표시 , , , , , , , 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, , 의 각 점을 순차로 연결하는 선내의 목조 및 블록조 기와지붕과 스레트 지붕 평가건주택 81.4평방미터 중, 피고(반소원고) 송분이는 위 도면표시 , , , , , , 의 각 점을 순차로 연결하는 선내의 ㉮부분 26.0평방미터를, 피고 이성식은 같은 도면표시 , , , 1, 1, 1, 의 각 점을 순차로 연결하는 선내의 ㉱부분 11.8평방미터를, (2) 위 지상 블록조 스레트지붕 평가건 22.8평방미터 중, 피고 신학악은 같은 도면표시 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1의 각 점을 순차로 연결하는 선내의 ㉴부분 12.3평방미터를, 피고 이 시우는 같은 도면표시 1, 1, 1, 1, 1의 각 점을 순차로 연결하는 선내의 ㉵부분 10.5평방미터를 (3) 피고 추무봉은 위 지상 블록조 스레트 지붕 평가건 중 같은 도면표시 2, 2, 2, 2, 2의 각 점을 순차로 연결하는 선내의 ㉶부분 16.7평방미터를, (4) 피고 김영도, 박말원, 김영조, 김영자, 김영순은 위 지상 블록조 스레트 지붕 평가건 중 같은 도면표시 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2의 각 점을 순차로 연결하는 선내의 ㉳부분 건평 28평방미터를 각 철거하고 그 대지를 인도하라.

The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendants and a declaration of provisional execution.

Counterclaim: The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) et al. makes to the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff) the completion of the prescription on December 23, 1984 with respect to the portion of the ship's 261 square meters connected in sequence to the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff)'s 1 to 413 square meters in Busan-dong 247-1 to 413 square meters in Busan-dong, Busan-dong, on the basis of the completion of the prescription on December 23, 1984.

The procedure for the registration of ownership transfer is implemented.

Litigation costs shall be borne by the plaintiff, etc.

The original judgment shall be revoked, and both judgments and litigation costs, such as entries in the purport of the principal lawsuit, shall be borne by the defendant in the first and second instances.

The judgment that the defendant-Counterclaim plaintiff's counterclaim is dismissed and the provisional execution is ordered.

1. A public document is presumed to be established because it is between the plaintiff and the defendant Lee Jong-si. According to Gap's certificate No. 1 without dispute between the plaintiff and the remaining defendants, the ownership transfer registration is made for sale on January 9, 1965 for the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant; hereinafter the plaintiff only) 1 to 413 square meters (hereinafter the land in this case) of Busan Jin-dong 247, Busan-dong 247, and the ownership transfer registration is made for sale on the 8th of the same month in the future. On December 13, 1979 with respect to the share of 2947/4130 of the land in this case, the ownership transfer registration is made for donation on the 12th of the same month, in order to this end, on the 195th of the same month, with respect to the share of 4130 727/130 of the land in this case, and it can be acknowledged that the above part of the land in this case was owned by the plaintiff 1 and the plaintiff 5th of this case.

2. First of all, we judge the defendant's counterclaim such as the plaintiff et al.'s claim for the main lawsuit against the plaintiff et al. (the plaintiff et al., the plaintiff et al.).

The plaintiff et al., without any title, sought removal of the building and delivery of the site from the ownership of the site on the land of this case on the ground that the defendant owned the part of the site indicated in paragraph (1) of this claim on the land of this case without any title by the same defendant, and occupied the site. The defendant Song Division filed a claim against the plaintiff et al. for the execution of the transfer registration procedure on the ownership transfer registration procedure on December 23, 1984 with respect to the part of the land of this case, including the part of the above part of the above part of the land of this case, by occupying the 261 square meters in the attached drawing (hereinafter the site of this case) from December 12, 1964 as the one who occupied the above part of the above part of the land of this case in peace and openly and openly and openly from the intention of the plaintiff on December 23, 1984.

성립에 다툼이 없는 을 제4호증(제적등본), 을 제5, 6호증(각 가옥대장등본), 을 제22호증(폐쇄등기부등본), 원심증인 홍중길, 김한기, 추수만의 각 증언에 의하여 진정성립이 인정되는 을 제1, 2호증(각 매도증서), 을 제3호증(위임장)의 각 기재, 위 증인들 및 원심증인 박경호, 당심증인 홍재홍의 각 증언, 원심법원의 현장 검증결과(1985.9.23.자)와 원심감정인 류한준의 감정결과(1985.10.7.자)에 변론의 전취지를 종합하면, 이 사건 토지는 원래 부산 연지리 247번지 대 170평에서 분할된 토지로서 피고 송분이의 고모부인 소외 망 홍봉관의 소유이었는데 위 피고의 시아버지인 소외 망 추종식이 1930년경 위 토지의 일부인 이 사건 문제의 대지 79평(261평방미터)을 당시의 돈 30원에 매수하여 그시경 그위에 별지도면 (1)의 ㉮ 및 ㉶ 표시의 각 건물(당시는 목조초가이었음)을 짓고 살면서 위 문제의 대지를 점유해 왔고 피고 송분이는 1933.5.19. 위 추 종식의 장남인 소외 망 추수영에게 시집을 와 그 이후 위 집에서 살아왔는데 위 추 종식은 84세의 노령에 이른 1964년경 병이 들어 기동을 못하게 되자 위 문제의 대지와 그 지상 가옥을 아들인 위 망 추수영에게 증여하고, 위 망 추수영도 곧 병석에 눕게 되자 같은 해 12월경 그의 처인 피고 송분이에게 이를 다시 증여하였으며 위 망 추수영은 그 이듬해인 1965.4.경 위 추종식은 다시 그 이듬해인 1966.8.경에 각 사망하고 피고 송분이는 그 이후로도 지금까지 계속하여 위 가옥에 거주하면서 이 사건 문제의 대지를 점유하여온 사실을 인정할 수 있고 달리 반증이 없으며, 갑 제8호증의 1 내지 4, 갑 제9호증의 1 내지 3, 갑 제10호증의 기재는 위 인정에 방해가 되지 아니하므로 (위 증인 김한기와 추수만의 증언이 일부 불일치하는 부분은 있으나 그것은 50여년전의 일에 대한 것이라 다소의 착오가 있을 수 있는 것이고 또 그 불일치가 결정적인 중요성을 갖는 것도 아니며, 앞서 본 을 제2,3호증인 매도증서와 위임장에 날짜와 주소의 기재 및 정정인 등이 누락되어 있는 등 형식에 다소 불실한 점이 있으나 그 당시 거래당사자들의 등기제도에 대한 인식이나 법률지식에 비추어 그러한 사정만으로 이를 믿을 수 없다고 배척할 수는 없다) 피고 송 분이는 적어도 1964.12.경부터는 위 대지를 소유의 의사로써 평온·공연하게 점유하여 온 것으로 추정된다.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff purchased the land of this case from the Plaintiff on January 9, 1965 that the Plaintiff was unable to purchase or rent the above part of the Defendant’s possession. As such, the Plaintiff’s notification was sent to the Defendant on October 31, 1979 that demanded the removal of the above ground building, and the Defendant also asked the Plaintiff to rent the land again on November 26 of the same year. However, it cannot be deemed that the above Defendant had occupied the land as its owner’s own intention because it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff had purchased the above land at the time, and that it was difficult to conclude that the Plaintiff had purchased the above land at the time, and that it was difficult for the Plaintiff to purchase or rent the above portion of the land at the time, and that it was difficult to say that the Plaintiff had no intention to purchase the land at the time, and that the Plaintiff had no intention to purchase the land at the time, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff had no intention to purchase the land at the time of sale at the time of the Plaintiff’s request.

Therefore, the acquisition by transfer was completed as of the last day of December 1964 at least 20 years from December 1964, which began to occupy the site of this case as the owner's intention. Thus, it is against the principle of good faith to seek removal of the building and transfer of the site to the above defendant who has the plaintiff, etc. who acquired the ownership of the land before that end, claims removal of the building and transfer of the site due to the completion of acquisition by transfer of ownership are contrary to the principle of good faith. Thus, the plaintiff's claim against the above defendant on the premise that the above defendant without title possessed part of the land of this case without title is without merit. The plaintiff et al.'s claim against the above defendant seeking the implementation of the procedure for transfer registration of ownership of the site of this case for the completion of acquisition by transfer of ownership on the ground of the above completion of acquisition by transfer is justified (the above defendant asserted on December 23, 1984 as the date of the completion of acquisition by transfer, but the starting point or expiration point of acquisition by transfer can be admitted freely by evidentiary evidence, not be asserted by the defendant).

3. We examine the plaintiff et al.'s claims against the plaintiff et al. for removal and removal of the building site on the land of this case as stated in the main claim without any title. Since the above defendants sought removal and removal of the building site on the land of this case on the ground that the plaintiff et al. used each building as stated in the main claim without any title, the plaintiff et al.'s claim for removal and removal of the building site can be demanded only by the owner or at least the person who has de facto rights to dispose of the building site. As the above defendants occupied each building site as alleged in the plaintiff et al., but there is no evidence to acknowledge that the above defendants possessed ownership or de facto rights to dispose of the building site as alleged in the plaintiff et al., but there is no evidence to prove that the above defendants had ownership or de facto rights to dispose of the building site, and the above defendants' claim for removal and removal of the building site of this case can not be asserted separately from the plaintiff et al.'s claim for removal and removal of the building site of this case.

4. We examine the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Kim Young-do, Park Jong-do, Kim Young-young, Kim Young-young, and Kim Young-young (the litigation taking over the deceased Kimchi) by the Plaintiff, etc.

피고 김영도, 박말원, 김영조, 김영자, 김영순이 원심피고였던 망 김치수의 상속인들로서 그들이 점유하고 있는 본소청구 취지 기재와 같은 별지도면(1)의 ㉳표시부분 건물이 원래 원심피고 망 김치수(이하 위 망인이라 한다)의 소유인 사실은 당사자 사이에 다툼이 없는 바, 원고등은 이 사건 대지의 소유권에 기하여 위 피고들에게 위 건물의 철거와 그 대지부분의 인도를 구함에 대하여 위 피고들은 위 망인이 1935.3월경 위 건물의 대지를 포함한 13평 8홉의 땅을 당시의 소유자인 소외 망 홍 봉관으로부터 그 당시의 돈으로 현금 20원과 보리쌀 1가마니를 주고 매수하여 그 위에 건물을 짓고 지금까지 평온·공연하게 점유하여 왔으므로 1955.3월경에 취득시효가 완성하였고, 더구나 원고가 위 대지를 매수한 1965.1.9.부터 기산하여도 이 사건 소제기일인 1985.1.28. 이전에 20년의 시효기간이 지났으므로 역시 취득시효가 완성되었다고 항변하므로 살피건대, 공문서이므로 전정성립이 추정되는 갑 제13호증의 1(제적등본), 2, 4(각 호적등본), 3(주민등록등본), 원심증인 김영곤의 증언에 의하여 진정성립이 인정되는 갑 제2호증의2, 4(각 통고서), 변론의 전취지에 의하여 진정성립이 인정되는 을 제24호증(인우보증서)의 각 기재에 변론의 전취지를 종합하면, 위 망인이 1935.3월경 당시의 소유자인 소외 망 홍봉관으로부터 위 대지를 매수하여 위 망인이 사망한 1987.5.21.까지 이를 점유하여온 사실 및 위 망인의 사망후에는 그의 처인 피고 박말원, 호주상속인 겸 아들인 피고 김영도, 차남인 아들 피고 김영조, 딸 피고 김영순, 김영자가 위 망인의 재산을 상속하여 지금까지 위 대지를 점유하여 오고 있는 사실 등을 인정 할 수 있고 달리 반증없으며, 한편 위 망인과 피고들은 위 대지를 소유의 의사로 평온, 공연하게 점유하여 온 것으로 추정되므로 위 망인이 위 대지에 대한 점유를 개시한 이래 20년이 경과한 1955.3.경 일응 취득시효가 완성되었다고 할 것이나, 위 망인이 취득시효의 완성을 원인으로 하는 소유권이전등기를 경료하기 전에 앞서 본 바와 같이 위 대지에 대하여 원고등 명의로 소유권이전등기가 경료된 이상 위 피고들은 위 취득시효의 완성으로써는 원고들에게 대항할 수 없다고 할 것이다.

However, the reason for deeming that the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition cannot be arbitrarily selected is different depending on whether the third party acquires the title of registration before the expiration of the prescriptive period, so if the party can arbitrarily choose the starting point of the prescriptive period, the party who asserts the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition can be deemed to have acquired the title of registration after the completion of the prescriptive period before the expiration of the prescriptive period, and ultimately, the party who claims the completion of the prescriptive period can at all times claim the corresponding relation of rights such as claiming the completion of the prescriptive period and claiming the registration of ownership transfer against the third party without registration, thereby undermining the function of the registration system and undermining the safety of the transaction of real estate. In addition, even in the purport of the current civil law, it cannot be reasonable in view of the fact that the original possessor continues to occupy the real estate even after the prescriptive acquisition period has expired, it is difficult to respect the third party's acquisition of the title as the starting point of the new prescriptive acquisition period when the title of registration has been changed in the future, and it is rather unreasonable to protect the original purpose of the prescriptive acquisition system more than to protect the safety of evidence.

Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret that the possessor may claim the completion of the acquisition by deeming the third party as the starting point of the new acquisition by starting the acquisition by transfer as the starting point of the acquisition by transfer. As seen earlier, in this case where the deceased, the possessor, completed the acquisition by transfer of ownership on the above site, but did not complete the registration of ownership transfer for this reason, the above Defendants, who acquired the Plaintiff’s ownership on January 9, 1965, and completed the registration of ownership transfer on January 8, 1985, 200 years after deeming the acquisition by the Plaintiff as the starting point of the acquisition by transfer of a new acquisition by transfer from the Plaintiff, as well as the Plaintiff, was completed on January 8, 1985, and the completion of the new acquisition by transfer from the Plaintiff as well as on January 12, 1979, should be interpreted that the said new acquisition by transfer can be asserted by the completion of a new acquisition by transfer from the donation or sale. Therefore, the aforementioned Defendants’ defense on this point is reasonable

Accordingly, the plaintiff et al. asserted that the above defendants, the heir of the above deceased, were the same as the defense against the prescriptive acquisition of the defendant Song Division as to the defense against the defense against the defense against the claim against the above transmission. However, the above assertion by the plaintiff et al. cannot be accepted on the grounds that it was determined in the claim against the above transmission portion.

Thus, the above Defendants shall be deemed to have completed the prescription period for acquisition of ownership on January 8, 1985, which is apparent before January 28, 1985, the filing date of the lawsuit of this case by the Plaintiff et al. for the above Defendants, thereby seeking removal of the above building and delivery of the site to the above Defendants who acquired the right to claim ownership transfer registration is contrary to the good faith principle.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the claims by the plaintiff et al. against the defendants are dismissed without merit. Meanwhile, the plaintiff et al. is obligated to implement the registration procedure for transfer of ownership based on the completion of the acquisition by prescription on December 31, 1984 with respect to the land in this case as stated in Paragraph (2) of this Article. Thus, the plaintiff et al. is obligated to perform the registration procedure for transfer of ownership based on the completion of the acquisition by prescription on December 31, 1984. Thus, the plaintiff's counterclaim is justified in conclusion and the judgment of the court below is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed

Judge Cho Soo-soo (Presiding Judge)