1. The Plaintiff:

A. Defendant Republic of Korea is the Suwon District Court with respect to land Nos. 1 and 2 in the attached list.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The land survey division prepared during the Japanese occupation point period is written by D having the address in C with respect to the total sum of 128 square meters in Suwon-gun B.

B. The above land was subdivided into the land listed in the annexed list 1 and 2 after conversion by area and change of administrative district.

(hereinafter referred to as “instant land Nos. 1 and 2” in the attached list (hereinafter referred to as “instant land”).

Around February 29, 1934, D, the Plaintiff’s fleet, had his permanent domicile in the Gyeonggiwon-gun C, and died on February 29, 193 and succeeded to E’s property. E died on January 23, 1943 and succeeded to F’s property. The F died on June 23, 1973 and succeeded to G, H, I, J, K, L, and M. The above I died on June 18, 1995, and jointly succeeded to F’s property, N, childO, and P including the Plaintiff.

On the other hand, the defendant Republic of Korea ordered the land Nos. 1 and 2 of this case.

Upon completion of registration of preservation of ownership, such as entry in paragraph (1), the defendant Korea Land and Housing Corporation has ordered the land of this case No. 1-B.

It completes the registration of ownership transfer such as the entry in paragraph.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 5 (including each number), fact-finding results of this court's Q dismissal, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination

A. The presumption of preservation of ownership is reversed if, in the absence of counter-proofs such as the change of the situation by the adjudication, the person registered as the owner in the land investigation register for the cause of the claim is presumed to be the owner of the land, and the circumstance is presumed to have become final and conclusive. The presumption of preservation of ownership is reversed if it is found that a person other than the title holder of the preservation registration was the situation of the relevant land (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da4654, 46661, May 23, 197). According to the above findings of recognition, D, the circumstance of the instant land Nos. 1 and 2, and D, the Plaintiff’s preference, are the same person in light of the Chinese name, address, permanent domicile, etc., and thus, the land Nos. 1 and 2