(영문) 대법원 2016.12.15. 선고 2016도2252 판결

1. According to Articles 2 and 20 of the former Installation, Maintenance, and Safety Control of Fire-Fighting Systems Act (amended by Act No. 12207, Jan. 7, 2014; hereinafter referred to as the “Fire-Fighting Systems Act”), Articles 5 and 22 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Installation, Maintenance, and Safety Control of Fire-Fighting Systems Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24864, Nov. 20, 2013; hereinafter referred to as the “Enforcement Decree of the Fire-Fighting Systems Act”), Article 14 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Fire-Fighting Systems Act (amended by Ordinance No. 1130, Jan. 9, 2015); Article 2 of the Framework Act on Fire-Fighting Services (amended by Ordinance No. 1130, Jan. 7, 2014; hereinafter referred to as “related persons of a building, etc. falling under a specific fire-fighting object”) and Article 28 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Fire-Fighting Systems Act, the owner, manager or occupant of a fire-fighting system shall be separately responsible (see Article 20.

2. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted reveals the following facts.

A. The instant building constitutes a specific fire-fighting object stipulated under Article 20(2) of the Fire-Fighting Systems Act, Article 22(1)3 (b) of the Enforcement Decree of the Fire-Fighting Systems Act, which is one story above the ground and three story above the ground, and a total floor area of 632.93

B. The instant building originally owned one-half shares of E and F. However, the Defendant purchased the shares in the voluntary auction procedure conducted with respect to one-half shares owned by E and completed the registration of transfer of shares in the Defendant’s future on October 9, 2012.

C. E voluntarily performed the duties of fire safety controller of the instant building, but did not perform the duties of fire safety controller as seen above, and was subject to a disposition of business suspension on May 1, 2013 due to the failure to undergo the fire safety controller training. D. The Daejeon District Fire Safety Manager notified F and the Defendant to appoint the fire safety controller from around that time, but the Defendant and F did not appoint the fire safety controller.

E. Meanwhile, around 2000, G leased part of the first floor of the instant building from E and operated a printing office at that place.

F. Of the instant building, the remainder, excluding the parts used by G to operate the printing center, is used as inn and for the house. However, since around 7-8 years ago, inn businesses have been suspended, and all residents have left away and used without leaving.

G. From October 2012, G paid the Defendant the amount corresponding to 1/2 of the rent of KRW 500,000 per month from around several months, and thereafter paid the full rent thereafter.

3. Examining the following circumstances revealed in such factual basis in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant constitutes a co-owner of the instant building, which is a specific fire-fighting object, and there is no person who occupies or uses the entire building of this case, and, in reality, there is no other person who occupies or uses the entire building of this case,

A. The Defendant is a co-owner who owns 1/2 shares of the instant building, and is a “related person,” and thus, the Defendant is obligated to appoint a fire-fighting safety manager, unless there is another person who occupies and uses the instant building.

B. G, a lessee, is merely a leased and used part of the first floor of the instant building, and thus, is in principle responsible for fire safety control only for the occupied and used part. However, there are circumstances in which G had kept the keys to access to the said part of the said 203rd floor, as stated in the reasoning of the lower judgment, it cannot be deemed that G manages the entire building of this case solely on the ground that, when rainwater was found in the 203rd floor, it was designed to prevent water from leaking out by its printing office, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the entire building of this case was managed solely for such reasons. There is no other evidence to deem that G was performing the fire safety control of the entire building, including the leased part through consultation with the owner of the building. Even according to the reasoning of the lower judgment, even if G used as a house, the remaining part of the instant building, excluding the part in which the printing office was operated, was suspended, and the residents were left alone for about seven to eight years after leaving the building. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, there is no reason to manage the building of this case.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined that it is difficult to view that it constitutes “related person of the instant building” in which the Defendant is obliged to appoint a fire safety controller, on the grounds as stated in its reasoning. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the status and appointment of a fire safety controller, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.