(영문) 대법원 2011.1.13.선고 2010다28833 판결

1. Of the part of the lower judgment regarding delay damages, the part against the Defendant ordering the Plaintiffs to pay in excess of 5% per annum from February 25, 2010 to January 13, 201, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment. The part of the first instance judgment is revoked, and all of the Plaintiffs’ claims corresponding to that part are dismissed.

2. Of the part concerning damages for delay of the lower judgment, the part against the Defendant ordering the Plaintiffs to pay the amount corresponding to each corresponding amount stated in the separate sheet No. 23 through No. 34 of the attached Table 1 of the lower judgment as to the corresponding amount set forth in the separate sheet No. 3 of the lower judgment as to each corresponding amount set forth in the separate sheet No. 1 of the lower judgment as to the damages for delay, exceeding 5% per annum from February 25, 201 to January 13, 201, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of complete

3. All remaining appeals by the defendant are dismissed.

4. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be divided into two parts, one of which shall be borne by the plaintiffs, and the remainder by the defendant respectively.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Whether the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription of this case constitutes an abuse of rights (the first ground for appeal)

The exercise of the obligor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our civil law. Thus, in special circumstances, such as where the obligor has made it impossible or remarkably difficult for the obligee to exercise the obligee's right or the interruption of prescription prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, or acted to make it unnecessary to take such measures, or the obligee has objectively obstructed the obligee from exercising its right, or the obligor has shown the same attitude that the obligor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the completion of the statute of limitations, or where the obligor has made the right holder trust as such, or the obligor has shown the same attitude that the obligor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the completion of the statute of limitations, or where other creditors under the same conditions receive the repayment of the obligation, etc., it is remarkably improper or unfair to allow the obligor to claim the completion of the statute of limitations as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (Supreme Court Decisions 2002Da

5. 29. See, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da33469 Decided 29.

원심판결 이유에 의하면 원심은, 피고 소속 공무원들이 원고 박◆◆ 등을 불법구금 고문하여 허위의 자백을 받아내는 등의 방법으로 증거를 조작함으로써 이들이 추후 구속 기소되어 국가보안법 위반, 반공법 위반, 계엄법 위반 또는 집회 및 시위에 관한 법률 위반의 범죄사실에 대한 유죄판결을 받고 그 형집행을 당하도록 하였을 뿐만 아니라 허위 사실을 공표하여 이들의 명예를 훼손하고, 석방된 이후에도 지속적인 감시와 탄압을 가하는 등 일련의 행위를 통하여 원고들에 대하여 불법행위를 저질렀는바, 피고는 그 소속 공무원들의 불법행위로 인하여 원고들이 입은 비재산적 손해에 대하여 국가배상법에 따른 위자료 배상책임이 있다고 판단한 다음, ' 피고를 상대로 국가배상을 구하는 이 사건 소는 원고 박◆◆ 등에 대한 위 유죄판결이 모두 확정된 날인 1983 .

6. Inasmuch as a claim was filed on November 7, 2007 after the five-year extinctive prescription has already expired from 14.14., the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages of this case expired by prescription, rejected the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription as constituting abuse of rights for the following reasons.

즉 ① 원고 박◆◆ 등은 재판과정에서 공소사실을 부인하고 자신들은 수사기관의 고문 등으로 인하여 허위 자백하게 된 것이라며 인권의 최후 보루인 법원에 호소하였으나 법원까지도 피고인들의 주장을 모두 배척하고 조작된 공소사실 전부를 유죄로 인정하였던 점이나, 과거에 오판을 했던 법원에 재심을 신청하여 그 판결의 기초가 된 자백 등이 불법적인 고문에 의한 것임을 주장하기만 하면, 그것이 쉽게 받아들여져 과거 잘못된 판결을 취소하는 재심판결을 선고받으리라고 기대하기 어려운 상황에서, 가해자인 국가를 상대로 손해배상을 구하는 소를 제기한다는 것은 합리적으로 기대하기 어려운 점 등에 비추어, 과거의 유죄판결이 고문 등으로 조작된 증거에 기초하여 내려진 잘못된 판결이라는 것을 밝히는 재심 판결이 확정되기 전까지는 그 피해자이자 채권자인 원고들이 이 사건 손해배상청구권을 행사할 수 없는 객관적인 장애사유가 있었다 .

고 보아야만 할 것이고, ② 나아가 교사, 대학생, 대학교 강사, 새마을금고 직원, 경찰공무원, 검찰공무원 등 우리 사회에서 평범한 일상을 살아가던 무고한 시민들인 원고 박◆◆ 등이 민족통일의 염원과 민주주의에 대한 갈망으로 용기있게 광주민주화항쟁에 관한 진실을 알리는 등 신군부세력의 헌정질서 파괴범행을 저지하거나 반대함으로써 헌법의 존립과 헌정질서를 수호하기 위한 반독재민주화 운동을 펼쳤고, 이들과 같은 소수의 용기있는 시민들의 민주화에 대한 열망과 노력이 다름 아닌 나라의 민주화에 큰 밑거름이 되었음에도 불구하고, 그 과정에서 이들은 불법체포, 구금되어 극심한 고문을 당한 끝에 유죄판결을 선고받고 수년간 복역하였을 뿐만 아니라 출소한 이후로도 오랜 기간 억울한 누명을 쓰고 신체적, 정신적, 경제적인 어려움, 사회적 고립과 냉대를 겪어야 했으며, 그 가족인 나머지 원고들 역시 이들의 위와 같은 고통과 멍에를 함께 짊 어져야 했던 점 등에 비추어, 이 사건에서 피해를 당한 원고들을 보호할 필요성은 심대한 반면 피고의 위자료채무에 대한 이행거절을 인정하는 것은 현저히 부당하고 불공평하다 할 것이므로, 결국 피고의 이 사건 소멸시효 완성 항변은 신의성실의 원칙에 반하는 권리남용으로서 허용될 수 없다는 것이다 .

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and there is no error of misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. As to the starting date of the damages for delay to the consolation money of this case (as to the second ground of appeal)

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the principal amount of consolation money recognized to the plaintiffs is liable to pay damages for delay from October 12, 1982 or June 14, 1983, for which the judgment of conviction was finalized as claimed by the plaintiffs, on the ground that the starting date of the damages for delay is not excessive compensation even if it was at the time of tort, since it was calculated by considering the difference between the current monetary value at the time of the tort and the current monetary value at the time of the tort in this case where serious illegal acts, such as illegal confinement and adviser, were committed by investigators, even though there was no separate notice of performance, in light of the concept of fairness.

However, this part of the judgment of the court below is hard to accept for the following reasons.

Of course, inasmuch as the victim could have continuously enjoyed the legal interests suffered by tort if there was no tort, in principle, liability for damages arising from tort should be deemed to have occurred at the same time as the claim was made in light of the concept of fairness, even if there was no separate peremptory notice of performance. However, in calculating consolation money, all circumstances that occurred at the time of the closing of arguments at fact-finding trials, as well as the national income level or monetary value, etc., which is the basis for calculating consolation money, should be reflected at the time of closing of arguments. However, in cases where the amount of consolation money is determined at the time of the establishment of tort without any special change in monetary value, etc. at the time of the occurrence of the tort, damage for delay should occur even if there was no special problem even if damages for delay occur at the time of the establishment of the tort. However, in cases where it is deemed that there was a considerable change compared to the monetary value at the time of closing of arguments at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the tort and where

왜냐하면, 이때에는 위와 같이 변동된 통화가치 등을 추가로 참작하여 위자료의 수액을 재산정해야 하는데, 이러한 사정은 불법행위가 행하여진 무렵의 위자료 산정의 기초되는 기존의 제반 사정과는 명백히 구별되는 것이고, 변론종결의 시점에서야 전적으로 새롭게 고려되는 사정으로서 어찌 보면 변론종결시에 비로소 발생한 사정이라고도 할 수 있어, 이처럼 위자료 산정의 기준되는 통화가치 등의 요인이 변론종결시에 변동된 사정을 참작하여 위자료가 증액된 부분에 대하여 불법행위시로부터 지연손해금을 붙일 수 있는 근거는 전혀 없다고 할 것이기 때문이다. 더구나 이 사건과 같이 피고 소속 공무원들에 의하여 원고 박◆◆ 등에 대한 불법구금이 개시된 1981. 7. 경으로부터 원심의 변론종결일인 2010. 2. 25. 까지 28년 이상의 오랜 세월이 경과하여 그 사이에 우리나라의 물가와 국민소득수준 등이 몇 곱절 상승함으로 말미암아 이를 반영하여 증액된 위자료에 대하여 이 사건 불법행위가 저질러진 시기와 가까운 때인 1982년이나 1983년 무렵부터 지연손해금이 발생한다고 보는 경우에는, 합리적인 이유 없이 현저하게 과잉된 지연배상을 허용하는 결과가 된다고 하겠다. 따라서 이처럼 불법행위시와 변론종결시 사이에 장기간의 세월이 경과되어 위자료를 산정함에 있어 반드시 참작해야 할 변론종결시의 통화가치 등에 불법행위시와 비교하여 상당한 변동이 생긴 때에는, 예외적으로라도 불법행위로 인한 위자료 배상 채무의 지연손해금은 그 위자료 산정의 기준시인 사실심 변론종결 당일로부터 발생한다고 보아야만 할 것이다 .

In the end, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the initial date of the damages for delay due to tort, and it is clear that such violation affected the judgment. The defendant's second ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

Meanwhile, in exceptional cases where damages for delay due to tort shall be deemed to have occurred from the date of the closing of argument at the court of fact-finding, which is the basis for calculating consolation money, the damages for delay shall not be added to the damages for delay before the closing of argument at the time of the conclusion of argument at the court of fact-finding, and as a result, unlike the case where damages for delay shall be imposed from the time of the establishment of consolation money to the time of the conclusion of argument, it is necessary to calculate the original amount of consolation money at the time of the conclusion of argument in consideration of the circumstance where compensation is delayed from the time of the tort to the time of the closing of argument. In addition to these circumstances, in full view of all the circumstances, including the contents and degree of the act of human rights violations committed by public officials in this case, the contents and period of the damage suffered by the victim and his family members, and the necessity to prevent the recurrence of similar cases, the court below calculated consolation money on the premise that damages for delay will be added from the time of tort to the time of the closing of argument at the court of fact-finding, which the court below lost the plaintiffs.

3. Therefore, part of the part against the defendant as to delay damages of the judgment of the court below is reversed, and this part is sufficient for this court to directly judge pursuant to Article 437 of the Civil Procedure Act. First, the part as to delay damages of the judgment of the court below against the defendant ordering payment exceeding 5% per annum from February 25, 2010 to January 13, 201, which is the date of closing the argument of the court below, and 20% per annum from January 13, 201, which is the date of this judgment, from January 25, 2011. The part as to delay damages of the court below against the defendant ordering payment exceeding the above 20% per annum from the next day of the judgment of the court below to the date of full payment. The part as to delay damages of the judgment of the court below is dismissed, and all of the part as to the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed from the judgment of the court below to the date of full payment of 3% per annum from the next day of the judgment below to 2130% per annum.

As above, the part concerning delay damages in the defendant's appeal is partially reasonable, and it is so decided as above. The remaining appeals are dismissed as it is without merit. One half of the total costs of the lawsuit is to be borne by the plaintiffs and the remainder is to be borne by the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.