(영문) 서울행정법원 2019.1.18. 선고 2018구합111 판결

In the first place, the defendant's decision to dismiss the application for payment of consolation money, etc. as of March 26, 2015 and October 16, 2015 against the plaintiff is all invalid.

Preliminaryly, on October 16, 2015, the decision to dismiss the application for payment of consolation money, etc. filed by the Defendant against the Plaintiff is revoked.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The plaintiff (BB) is the child of the deceased C (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased").

B. On July 11, 2005, the Plaintiff filed a report of forced mobilization under the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act (hereinafter referred to as "report of damage") on July 11, 2005 with the support committee for forced mobilization of victims, etc. of forced overseas mobilization (the committee continued until June 30, 2015 pursuant to Article 19(1) of the above Act and succeeded to the duties of the defendant after the committee was specially referred; hereinafter referred to as "the committee is referred to as "the committee"; hereinafter referred to as "the defendant without distinguishing between the committee and the defendant") by asserting that "the deceased was forced to have been mobilized to work and forced to work as a worker." The Defendant made a report of forced mobilization under the forced mobilization Investigation Act (hereinafter referred to as "report of damage of this case") from the deceased on February 1, 194 to the victims of forced mobilization under Article 19(1) of the Act on forced mobilization of victims of forced mobilization of labor from February 6, 194.

C. On January 24, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an application with the Defendant for payment of consolation money under Article 27 of the Compulsory Mobilization Act (hereinafter “instant first application”) by asserting that “the deceased constitutes a victim of forced mobilization by force due to forced mobilization by Japanese colonial rule.”

D. On March 26, 2015, the Defendant rendered a disposition to dismiss the first application of the instant case on the ground that “The Defendant was forced by Japan from 1941 to 1942 to a labor force in a mine in a non-identical area located in Japan, and returned to Korea, but there is no ground to recognize the fact of suffering from an injury or disease during the compulsory mobilization period or during the process of returning to Korea” (hereinafter “the first application of the instant case”).

E. On April 20, 2015, the Plaintiff raised an objection to the instant first disposition, and filed an application for reexamination with the Defendant (hereinafter “instant second application”). On October 16, 2015, the Defendant rendered a disposition dismissing the instant second application on the ground that “No reason exists to modify the instant first disposition” (hereinafter “instant second disposition”).

[Basis] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 2, 5, 8, 10, 27, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 5, Eul evidence Nos. 6-1, 2, Eul evidence Nos. 7-1 and 2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Judgment as to the main claim

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The first disposition of this case and the second disposition of this case are null and void since their defects are obvious for the following reasons.

1) Although the Plaintiff could not communicate normally through telephone conversations, the Defendant’s employee who investigated the first application of this case prepared a false deliberation protocol (hereinafter “the first deliberation protocol of this case”) as if he had a normal communication with the Plaintiff through telephone investigation. The Plaintiff’s statement stated in the first deliberation protocol of this case is also inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s statement at the time of investigation pursuant to the report of damage. The first deliberation protocol of this case, which was issued based on the first deliberation protocol of this case, is serious and obvious.

2) At the time of the first application of the instant case, the Defendant’s employees did not conduct a practical investigation, such as immediately suspending the investigation of the Plaintiff’s speech that D might gather the Deceased, while making a telephone investigation with respect to D who guaranteed personal credit at the time of the instant request. The instant first disposition is obvious that its defects are significant.

3) In relation to the second disposition of this case 60 days, which is the 60-day period from the date of the second application of this case under the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act, the defendant asserts as the grounds for the second disposition of this case. According to the above argument, the defendant acknowledged the necessity of correction as to the second application of this case. The defendant did not notify the plaintiff of the correction as to the second application of this case, and even if there was a fact that the notice of correction was made in writing, it is in violation of Article 27 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act. Therefore, the second disposition of this case is obvious that its defect is serious.

4) The Defendant’s employee who investigated the instant second application prepared a deliberation protocol as if he conducted a telephone investigation with respect to the personal guarantor E (hereinafter “the second deliberation protocol of this case”). However, “E” is unable to have telephone conversations with a serious incurable patient, and the contents of the statement of “E” are considerably different from those indicated in the letter of personal guarantee. Although the Defendant’s employee did not conduct a telephone investigation with respect to “E”, it is obvious that the two dispositions of this case issued based on this were serious defects.

5) The deceased forced mobilization to the mine located in the French land in Japan, cut off the right bridge and left arms, returned to the Republic of Korea on December 1942 by suffering from the injury from the spawn and returned to the Republic of Korea on January 8, 1943, and died on the ground that the above injury aggravated on January 8, 1943. Therefore, the first and second dispositions of this case taken by the defendant on the ground that "the deceased did not have any grounds to recognize the fact that the deceased suffered from an injury or disease during the forced mobilization period or during the process of returning to the Republic of Korea" was erroneous, and its defect is serious and obvious.

6) In accordance with Article 10(1)5 of the Administrative Appeals Act, the employees involved in the investigation of the first application of this case should be excluded from the investigation of the second application of this case. However, the employees F of the defendant who investigated the second application of this case was engaged in the investigation of the second application of this case. The second disposition of this case is obvious that its defects are significant.

7) According to Article 29(6) of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act, a decision on re-deliberation should be made within 60 days in ordinary cases from the date of application for re-deliberation or within 90 days in case of justifiable grounds. However, the second disposition of this case was conducted for about six months from the date of the second application of this case, and it is obvious that the second disposition of this case was serious.

8) The Defendant recognized that the deceased was damaged by forced mobilization during the Japanese occupation period, but judged that it could not reveal the fact that the deceased was damaged by the injury or disease. Although the Defendant should have made a decision of "unexplosive investigation" pursuant to Article 25 of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act, it is obvious that the defects of the instant dispositions 1 and 2 were significant.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination

1) Determination as to the assertion that the defendant's employee prepared a false protocol of the first deliberation of this case without a telephone investigation against the plaintiff

A) Facts of recognition

The following facts are acknowledged in light of the purport of the whole arguments in the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 12, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, and Eul evidence Nos. 3 and 4:

(1) The first review report of this case contains the following descriptions as to the result of the telephone service conducted against the plaintiff.

[On December 2014, 2014] The applicant stated that “after the deceased’s return to his age of 5 to 6, the deceased was missing from home at 30,000,00. The records of the death report on the register of removed entries are well known.”

(2) The specific answer details of the above telephone survey against the Plaintiff are as follows.

[2] The father of December 2014, 17:22 of 2014] was killed in the Republic of Korea where she died, and the father dieded in the Republic of Korea. However, the father of Japan and the Japanese people in the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the Japanese people in the Republic of Korea), who died in the case where she died in the case where she died in the case where she was breath?) her father, and she went back to the case where she died in the case where she died in the case where she died in the case where she died in the case where she was breath of her father, and she died in the case where she died in the case where she died of 30 days with her father, and she died in the case where she died in the case where she died of her mother?

I am unwe am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am am ? I am am ? I am am ? I am am ? I am ? I am am ? I am am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am ? I am am ? I am ? I am am ? I am we am ? I am we am we am we am ? I am you am you am you am you am you you am you am you am you ? you you am you am you you am you you am you am you you am you you am you we am you we am you you we am you you we we am you we we we we we am you we we we we we am we we am we we we we

(3) At the time of the telephone investigation following the instant report, the Plaintiff made a statement as follows.

[1] On October 18, 2005, the reporter reported the phone investigation at all did not know about the situation at the time. However, the deceased did not live in Japan, and returned to Japan again after having returned to Japan for compulsory requisition, and he did not know about the death of his wife and children. [In the case of having returned to Japan on April 27, 201, 09: telephone investigation head-7, 201, the deceased died at the time when he returned to Japan. He returned to Japan and died. He returned to the Joseon. He returned to the first day, and returned to the Republic of Korea. They returned to the Republic of Korea. They returned to the Republic of Korea. They returned to the Republic of Korea. The deceased was not a disease. A person was not a dead person. There was no co-claimed in the cemetery. There was no evidence to know that the deceased died.

(4) The second deliberation protocol of this case contains the following descriptions as to the result of the telephone review of the Plaintiff and E who guaranteed personal interest at the time of the second application of this case:

[2] On May 2015, 2015, the Plaintiff made a statement to the effect that “the deceased was aware that he/she was forced to be mobilized. He/she returned to her after having been mobilized, and that he/she died 10 days before her returned to her. He/she is aware of the name, specific causes of death and after having returned to her. He/she may not be aware of the name of sick, specific causes of death and aftermath, nor may he/she go through child birth.” [The telephone investigation against E, 2015] and E made a statement to the effect that “the person who was forced to be mobilized is aware of the fact that he/she was mobilized. Where he/she was forced to be mobilized, he/she would be well aware of how much after she returned

(5) On June 15, 2018, the Plaintiff was diagnosed by the H Medical Center as follows.

【Welopic Schopic NOS (the content of the treatment and the opinion on the future treatment) of the Escopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Recopic Discopic Discopic Recopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopic Discopicition 60dB, left-hand 80dB.As a result of the Escopic Discopic Disc

B) Specific determination

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged as a whole in light of the purport of the entire pleadings, it does not appear that the Defendant’s employee voluntarily prepared the first deliberation protocol of this case, which served as the basis for the first disposition of this case, even though he did not have a telephone call with the Plaintiff. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’

(1) Although the Defendant’s employee did not conduct a telephone investigation with respect to the Plaintiff, who is the applicant, while investigating the instant petition, there is no special circumstance to make a false report of the instant first instance protocol as if he had conducted a telephone investigation. The result of the telephone investigation with respect to the Plaintiff listed in the instant first instance protocol is summary of the Plaintiff’s specific answer, its identity is recognized, and there is no ground to deem that the content of the said answer was falsely prepared.

(2) The first written deliberation of the instant case shall be drafted by the first investigator, and after the approval of the head of the first review team and the chief of the second review division, the possibility that the content was prepared falsely is significantly low in light of the content of the official document provided as the result of the determination to the Defendant after the approval of the head of the review team and the chief of the review division.

(3) Although the contents of the Plaintiff’s statement in the first review report of this case are somewhat different in comparison with the Plaintiff’s statement at the time of the instant report on damage, the time of return to the deceased’s Republic of Korea, the time of death, or the cause of death, etc. However, regarding the deceased’s death as long as they were returned to the Republic of Korea, the content of the report is mutually consistent. It is difficult to readily conclude that the content of the Plaintiff and E’s statement in the investigation following the second application of this case is inconsistent with the content of the Plaintiff’s statement. Therefore, even if considering the specific contents, the first

(4) On June 15, 2018, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with the Ethical Distress, but in light of the calendar level confirmed as a result of the cerebral Power Inspection and the Ethical Listening Inspection, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff has any difficulty in having telephone conversations to the extent that the Plaintiff could not have telephone conversations. On the first application of the instant case, the investigation telephone was conducted three years and six months prior to the date of the said diagnosis. Considering the Plaintiff’s age, the possibility that the Plaintiff’s difficulties have deteriorated after the said telephone investigation may not be ruled out. The Plaintiff appears to have understood and responded properly at the time of the telephone investigation in accordance with the instant report on damage reported in 205 and 2011.

2) Determination as to the Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant’s employee did not conduct a substantive investigation as to D who guaranteed personal interest at the time of the instant first application

A) Facts of recognition

The following facts are acknowledged in light of the overall purport of the arguments in Gap evidence 20-1, 2, 27, and 3.

(1) At the time of the first application of this case, D submitted a letter of credit guarantee, and the letter of credit guarantee does not fully state the details of confirmation on the deceased, evidence is not attached, and only state that “the confirmation column is the same as the content of the report of damage” (D and G jointly make a letter of credit guarantee).

(2) The first deliberation protocol of this case contains the following descriptions as to the result of the telephone service as to D:

[12. 2014. 12. 2014. 201. 12. 3. 3. 3. 4. 1.

(3) The specific questions and answers to D are as follows.

[On December 9, 2014, 17:45 Ph. 17:45) C (the deceased) is a person between Japan and Japan at the time of the Japanese colonial era, and it is necessary to know that when the Japanese colonial rule takes place in the village, it is necessary to see the name of the sub-person who knows at the time of the Japanese colonial rule.

B) Specific determination

D At the time of the first application of this case, although the letter of personal guarantee was written only as the content of specific guarantee is not stated in the letter of personal guarantee, and as the content of the report of damage is stated. D also confirmed the additional facts through a telephone investigation, and it seems to be difficult for the defendant's employee to confirm the additional facts through a telephone investigation on D and at the early stage of the investigation. Thus, it cannot be said that the above judgment is remarkably unreasonable, or that there was a deviation or abuse of discretionary power, and there is no substantial investigation on D.

Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

3) The determination as to the allegation that the defect in the second disposition of this case was material and obvious since the Defendant did not notify the Plaintiff of the correction in writing regarding the second application of this case

With respect to the second disposition of this case, 60 days from the date of the application, the defendant argued that the application for reexamination received before 2011 was 120 cases and 113 cases where the application for reexamination received before 2012 first handles the case in 2011 as the order of application, the receipt period of 2012 would be over the processing period. On June 7, 2012, the defendant argued that the committee decided to extend the period for decision-making on the case with legitimate grounds which cannot be determined within the period pursuant to Article 29(6) proviso 4 of the Force Mobilization Investigation Act (the defendant's preparatory document as of October 5, 2018), and that the defendant did not request the correction of the second application of this case as to the second disposition of this case. The defendant did not appear to have any reason that the above provision of Article 27 (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Force Mobilization Act was unlawful, or that the defendant did not request the correction of the second amendment of this case as one of the above arguments stated by the above defendant.

4) The judgment on the assertion that the Defendant’s employee, at the time of the instant secondary application, arbitrarily prepared the second written deliberation protocol of this case without conducting a substantial investigation on E with respect to which the Defendant’s employee guaranteed personal interests.

A) Facts of recognition

The following facts are acknowledged in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings in the descriptions of Gap evidence 13, 14, 22, 28, Eul evidence 4, Eul evidence 6-2, and Eul evidence 6-2:

(1) At the time of the instant secondary application, E submitted a letter of well-known guarantee as follows:

0 확인내용1932. 10. 9.부터 1961년까지 경북 의성군 I에 거주하여 망인이 일제 강제동원되어 소재불상의 광산에서 노무자로 근무하다가 노역중 몹쓸 병을 얻어 그 곳에서 도저히 치료가 되지 않아 이곳 고향으로 돌아왔으나 10여일이 못 되어서 그 병으로 사망하였음을 본인이 그당시 이웃집에 살고 있으므로 이 사실을 확인한 자임(마을 어른들에게 들은 사실이 있음)

(2) The second review report of this case is written as shown in Section 2.c. (1)(A)(4) as to the result of the telephone review of E.

(3) Specific questions and answers to E are as follows.

[5. 7. 14:00 Telephone 14:0 on May 7, 2015] 6 degrees of relationship between the Deceased and Marson Mason Madson Madson Madson Madson Madson ?)

문) 망인이 강제동원되어 갈 때 봤어요?답) 못 봤어요.문) 그럼 징용갔다가 돌아오실 때는 봤어요?답) 못 봤어요.문) 그럼 징용갔다 온 것은 어떻게 아세요?답) 한 동네 살아서 들어서.문) 귀환 후에 동네서 만나봤어요?답) 못 만났어요.문) 그럼 망인이 징용갔다와서 어디 아프다고 하는 이야기 들어보셨어요?답) 모르겠어요.문) 그럼 어디 아파서 누워있다거나?답) 아팠는지 어땠는지 몰라요.문) 어르신 원고 아시죠?답) 예.문) 원고의 아버님이 누구에요?답) C(망인).

(4) On July 19, 2018, E was diagnosed by J Hospital as follows:

[Name of Disease (Clinical Presumption)] Ethropical Nancy (The content of treatment and the content of treatment in the future and the result that both sides of the examination equipment do not respond to the maximum sound of the examination equipment for both sides of the examination;

B) Specific determination

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged as a whole in light of the overall purport of oral arguments, the defendant's employee did not seem to have falsely stated the result of the telephone review on E in the second written deliberation report of this case. Therefore, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

(1) There is no special circumstance that the Defendant’s employee prepared the second deliberation protocol of this case, and falsely recorded the result of the telephone survey on E, a personal guarantor. The telephone survey report on E listed in the second deliberation protocol of this case is a summary of the specific question and answer with E, and the same is recognized, and there is no special contradiction with the content of the letter of personal guarantee prepared by E (including the content from village).

(2) The first investigator shall draft the second written deliberation of this case, and thereafter, the public document provided as the judgment data to the defendant after obtaining approval from the head of the first review team and the chief of the second review division, and the possibility that the content was prepared falsely is significantly low in light of the content of the document, its preparation purpose, the process of approval, and the form of preparation.

(3) Although E was diagnosed by the E with the Ethical nephism on June 15, 2018, the investigating phone upon the instant secondary application was conducted three years and one month prior to the aforementioned diagnosis date. Considering the age of E, it cannot be ruled out that E would have deteriorated after the aforementioned telephone investigation. According to the Defendant’s employees’ and E’s specific questions and answers, E appears to have accurately understood and responded at the time of the telephone investigation.

5) Determination as to the assertion that the first and second dispositions of this case are null and void, since it is recognized that the deceased suffered disability during the forced mobilization period.

A) Facts of recognition

The following facts are acknowledged in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings in Gap evidence 16, 27, and Eul evidence 1.

(1) On July 11, 2005, the Plaintiff reported the damage of this case to the Defendant and entered the content of the damage of the Deceased in the report as follows.

On May 1, 1938: The details of damage to ○○ on June 1, 1941: around 1938, the details of forced labor being mobilized under the Japanese system and forced labor being forced to be forced to become a labor being, and the age of each disease was severely returned to the country.

(2) At the time of the instant report, K, which guaranteed the personal interest, stated in the investigation on October 12, 2005 as follows.

As the Deceased live in a village with K and a day-friendly relationship, he/she is aware that he/she was married in Japan before he/she was forced to use his/her family in the year 1941 to 1942, and he/she was aware that he/she was born from home to home. There is no motive, situation at home, etc.

(3) In filing the first application of this case, the Plaintiff did not state specific injury or disability suffered by the Deceased in the application form.

(4) At the time of the instant first application, the result of the telephone investigation with respect to G, which had guaranteed personal interest with D, is as follows.

[12. 2014. 12. 201] The Ba Bag G stated the name of "I know the deceased, and the name of L, M, etc. for compulsory use in the village at the time."

B) Specific determination

Article 2 subparag. 3 (a) of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act provides that during the period from April 1, 1938 to August 15, 1945, a person killed or missing, or a person suffering from an injury prescribed by Presidential Decree and determined as a victim of compulsory mobilization overseas under Article 8 subparag. 6 shall be the victim of the compulsory mobilization overseas, and Article 2 subparag. 3 (a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act provides that the person who was subject to the decision as a victim of the mobilization overseas under Article 8 subparag. 6 shall be the injury to the extent that the injury prescribed by Presidential Decree would cause permanent loss or reduction of labor force and the disease recognized by the subcommittee for the determination of disability grades under Article 7 (1) subparag. 4.

In light of the following facts and circumstances acknowledged by the Defendant comprehensively taking into account the following facts and the details of the Plaintiff and the U.S. guarantor’s detailed statement, the personal guarantee document submitted by the U.S. guarantor, the details of the Plaintiff and U.S. guarantor’s specific statement in the investigation conducted pursuant to the second application of this case, which were conducted in accordance with the facts of the recognition as above, and the investigation conducted pursuant to the first application of this case, the Defendant returned to the Defendant: Provided, That it is recognized that “the deceased was forced to be mobilized by the Japanese system, and forced to be mobilized from a non-commercial mine located in Japan from around 1941 to 1942, and forced to be mobilized from the non-commercial mine located in Japan, but there is no ground to recognize the fact that the Plaintiff suffered from injury or disease during the compulsory mobilization period or in the course of returning to Korea, and thus, it is lawful to take the first and second dispositions to dismiss the application for payment of consolation

(1) The Plaintiff asserted that the deceased were mobilized by force to the mine located in the French French land in Japan, cut off the right bridge and left arms, and returned to the Republic of Korea after suffering from the injury from the spawn. However, at the time of the instant report on damage before the instant lawsuit and the instant 1 and 2 applications, there was no such assertion. The Plaintiff stated in the report on damage in this case only to the effect that “the deceased had returned to the Republic of Korea due to severe spawnosis.” In the first application of this case, the Plaintiff did not state the fact that the deceased suffered from the disability as alleged above. In addition, from the investigation following the report on damage in this case to the second application of this case, the Plaintiff made a statement to the effect that the deceased were forced to be mobilized and forced to return to the Republic of Korea, and did not state specific illness or obstacles, and in the investigation upon the second application of this case, it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff was forced to mobilization the deceased’s statement to the effect that “the telephone name, the causes of death and the death.”

(2) The injury report of this case and the letter of personal guarantee submitted at the time of the second and second applications do not contain specific descriptions as to the deceased’s disability. The personal guarantor stated that he was aware of the deceased at the time of telephone investigation or that he was not aware of the specific name, etc., and it is difficult to believe that the personal guarantor’s written confirmation, etc. submitted in the lawsuit of this case, such as evidence Nos. 3 and 11, was written and there is no other evidence to acknowledge the Plaintiff’s assertion.

6) Determination as to the assertion that the defect of the second disposition in the instant case is obvious since an employee who shall be excluded from the investigation of the instant second application was involved

Article 29(5) of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act provides that "a person who is served with a written decision on a request for payment of consolation money may file a written request for review with the Committee within 60 days from the date he/she receives the written decision if he/she has an objection thereto." Thus, in order to achieve the legislative purpose of the compulsory mobilization Investigation Act, which provides for the victims of mobilization by force abroad and their bereaved family members, with consolation money, etc. at a humanitarian level, to relieve their suffering and contribute to national unity by providing them with consolation money, etc., the procedures for review under the above provision are faithfully efforts to confirm the fact by allowing the Committee, who is a disposition agency, to proceed with the next review process. On the other hand, strengthening the guarantee of deliberation procedures for victims and their bereaved family members of overseas compulsory mobilization, which is not a disposition agency, and the purpose and procedural stage are different from the administrative appeal procedure that determines the illegality of a disposition after the administrative appeals commission, and therefore, Article 10(1) of the Administrative Appeals Act that excludes those who participated in the disposition from the members of the administrative appeals committee, which is unlawful.

7) The second disposition of this case was made after the lapse of the period of disposition stipulated by the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act, and thus, the determination as to the assertion that the defect is serious.

On April 20, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the instant secondary application with the Defendant seeking a retrial against the instant primary disposition; and on October 16, 2015, when six months have elapsed since the date of the instant secondary application, the Defendant issued the instant secondary disposition on October 16, 2015, as seen earlier.

Article 29(6) of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act provides that "the decision to review shall be made within 60 days: Provided, That if there is a justifiable reason to make a decision within the said period, the decision of the Committee may be extended only once by up to 30 days." The above provision is reasonable to determine early payment of consolation benefits through the prompt review decision, thereby stabilizing the legal status of the applicant for review, and providing official orders for efficient work process, and it cannot be viewed as a mandatory provision. Thus, it cannot be deemed null and void on the ground that the review decision was made after the lapse of the processing period prescribed by the above provision. Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion in this part is without merit (as a whole, considering the purport of arguments in subparagraphs 1 and 2-1 and 2-1, it is difficult to treat the defendant's application for reexamination within the period prescribed by the above provision as the defendant's request for reexamination within 23 cases as of May 16, 2012 (the defendant's request for reexamination received within 2012.

8) The determination as to the allegation that the Defendant’s dismissal of the first and second applications of this case was unlawful, even though the Defendant had rendered the “non-investigationable” decision

A) Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act provides that "damage caused by compulsory mobilization during the period from the Pacific War to the Pacific War refers to damage to life, body, property, etc. inflicted upon a person who was forced to work as a victim of forced mobilization of a military personnel, civilian military employee, worker, or member of a military camp, etc. by force on a daily basis." Article 2 subparag. 2 provides that "victim means a person who was damaged by compulsory mobilization during the period referred to in subparagraph 1 and is determined as a victim pursuant to Article 8 subparag. 3." Article 3 provides that "from April 1, 1938 to August 15, 1945, a soldier, civilian military employee, worker, or a person who was killed or missing, or a person who was affected by an injury determined by Presidential Decree during or during the period of mobilization to the Republic of Korea shall be classified into "voluntary mobilization of a victim of a foreign force" and "voluntary mobilization of a victim of a foreign force."

In addition, Article 4 provides for the payment of consolation money to victims of compulsory mobilization or their bereaved family members, while Article 8 does not provide for the payment of consolation money to victims of compulsory mobilization abroad, and Article 8 provides that "matters concerning the fact-finding of damage caused by compulsory mobilization and decision-making of damage", "matters concerning the examination and decision-making of victims and their bereaved family members", "matters concerning whether victims of compulsory mobilization and their bereaved family members or their bereaved family members are victims and their bereaved family members," "matters concerning the determination of disability caused by injury to victims of compulsory mobilization by overseas force", "matters concerning the payment of consolation money, etc.", and "matters concerning the payment of consolation money, etc." under subparagraph 8 and subparagraph 9 are clearly divided into the fact-finding investigation into damage caused by compulsory mobilization by overseas force during the period of compulsory mobilization by overseas dispute and the judgment of victims of compulsory mobilization by overseas force.

On the other hand, Article 25 of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act provides that "Where the truth of the forced mobilization damage is not clearly disclosed or cannot be disclosed, the Committee shall make a decision stating the impossibility of investigation and the reasons therefor" in paragraph (1) of the same Article, and "in case the victim and his relatives reported damage, the Committee may make a decision stating the impossibility of investigation and the reasons therefor where the truth of the damage cannot be clearly disclosed or clarified." Thus, it provides that "In case the victim and his relatives reported damage, the Committee may make a decision stating the impossibility of investigation and the reasons therefor."

In addition, Article 27 of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act provides for the procedure, period, etc. of applying for the payment of consolation money, etc., and Article 28(1) of the Act provides that "the Committee shall deliberate and determine whether to provide support and the amount thereof within six months from the date of receipt of the application for payment of consolation money, etc.: Provided, That if there is any justifiable reason not to decide within that period, the Committee's decision may extend the period of deliberation and decision only once by up to 90 days, and where an investigation is being conducted with respect to a victim and his/her bereaved family, the period of deliberation

B) On the other hand, the Act on the Compulsory Mobilization separates between the victim and the victim of the overseas compulsory mobilization, and separates the Commission’s investigation into the victim and his/her bereaved family members, and grants benefits of consolation money to the victim and his/her bereaved family members from overseas compulsory mobilization. In full view of the specific contents, structure and form of the relevant provisions of the Act on the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation, the term “decision on impossibility of investigation and decision on impossibility of damage” under Article 25 of the Act on the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation is not stipulated as a disposition that the Commission may make it possible to apply for the payment of consolation money paid to the victim of the overseas mobilization and his/her bereaved family members, but is defined as a disposition that can be made by the Commission at the time of the actual investigation

As seen earlier, the Defendant decided on June 2, 201 as a victim of compulsory mobilization of the deceased on the ground that the first and second applications of this case were made by the deceased as a victim of compulsory mobilization abroad, and thus, sought consolation money. The commission cannot make a decision on the impossibility of investigation or damage under Article 25 of the Compulsory Mobilization Investigation Act, and can make a decision on whether to pay consolation money. Thus, the first and second applications of this case are without merit.

D. Sub-committee

Therefore, the plaintiff's primary claim is without merit.

3. Judgment on the conjunctive claim

A. The defendant's main defense

The second disposition of this case was made on October 10, 2015, and the lawsuit of this case was filed one year after the date of the above disposition, and the part of the conjunctive claim seeking revocation of the second disposition of this case is unlawful.

B. Determination

The revocation lawsuit cannot be instituted after one year from the date of the disposition (Article 20(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act), and the facts that the defendant made the second disposition on October 16, 2015 are as shown in the circumstances of the disposition as seen earlier. The purport of the claim seeking the cancellation of the second disposition in this case and the facts that the plaintiff submitted to this court are apparent in the record (the plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking the payment of the first consolation money on January 5, 2018, but amended the purport of the claim during the lawsuit). As such, the part of the conjunctive claim seeking the cancellation of the second disposition in this case among the lawsuit in this case is unlawful since it was filed with the lapse of the filing period.

In regard to this, the Plaintiff’s receipt of the instant secondary disposition is not known at all, and the Defendant’s employee was well aware of such fact and delivered the instant secondary disposition to the Plaintiff by registered mail without any effort to deliver the details of the instant secondary disposition to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was unaware of the fact that the instant secondary disposition was issued, and the Plaintiff was aware of the fact that he received the instant secondary disposition with the help of a person on November 2017. Thus, the Plaintiff asserted that there was a justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period of filing the lawsuit.

In full view of the results of the fact-finding conducted by the Office of Education of Gyeong-do, this Court held that there was no information about the Plaintiff at elementary, middle, and high schools, and that there was no record passed by the Plaintiff in the examination and public notice. Meanwhile, the following facts or circumstances acknowledged by considering the overall purport of the arguments in the items in subparagraphs 7-1 and 2, i.e., the Plaintiff received the first disposition of this case by registered mail on April 6, 2015, and filed an objection against the Defendant on April 20, 2015, and directly received the second disposition of this case by registered mail against the Defendant on November 2, 2015, the Plaintiff did not have any special difficulty in filing a lawsuit seeking revocation of the second disposition of this case, and the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the conjunctive claim in the lawsuit of this case is unlawful and dismissed, and the main claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

The presiding judge, the rank of the judge;

Judge Kim Gin-hun

Judges Kim Gin-jin

Note tin

(i) Article 27 (Procedures, etc. for Application for Retrial)

(1) A person who intends to apply for reexamination pursuant to Article 29 (5) of the Act shall submit an application for reexamination in attached Form 11 to the Committee, along with evidential materials proving the grounds for such application.

(2) Where the Committee deems it necessary to revise the details or procedures of the application for reexamination under paragraph (1), it shall request the applicant for reexamination to make an amendment in writing stating the following matters. In such cases, the period required for supplementation shall not be included in the processing period of the application for reexamination prescribed in Article 29 (6) of the Act

1. Matters to be corrected;

2. Reasons for requesting the correction;

3. Supplement period; and

4. Other matters deemed necessary by the Committee.

(ii) Article 10 (Exclusion, Challenge, and Abstention of Members);

(1) Where a member of the Committee falls under any of the following, he/she shall be excluded from the deliberation and resolution of the relevant case. In such cases, the decision of exclusion shall be made by the chairperson of the Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “chairperson”) ex officio or upon

5. Where he/she has participated in a disposition or omission that is the object of the case.

(iii) Article 29 (Service of Written Decision and Review)

(5) A person who is dissatisfied with a written decision under paragraphs (1) and (3) may file an objection with the Committee in writing within 60 days from the date he/she receives the written decision.

(6) A decision on review by the Committee under paragraph (5) shall be made within 60 days: Provided, That the period for decision on review may be extended only once by up to 30 days, if there is a justifiable reason not to make a decision within such period.

(iv) Article 29 (Service of Written Decision and Review)