[1] Whether the trademark "Shrist" and "Christian Daliel are similar to the cited trademark "Christian Dior" written in two parts (negative)

[2] Whether the trademark of this case and the cited trademark of this case written in double parallels with the trademark of this case is similar to the cited trademark of this case (negative) and whether the trademark of this case constitutes a trademark of this case only for consumers (negative)

[1] The term " CDA" and "Christian Daliel" of the trademark "Christian Daliel" consisting of two parts of the trademark "Christ" and "Christian Dior" refer to the cited trademark "Christian Dior" and they are often used, so there is a lack of distinctiveness as a mark distinguishing the source of goods, and the latter part's name is considerably different from "Dai L" and "dalar". Accordingly, even if the appearance and concept of the trademark are seen as similar, it is difficult to view that the trademark and the cited trademark as a whole are similar so as to cause misconception and confusion about the source of goods.

[2] The term "ROM" is merely a simple and ordinary mark because it is merely a simple and common mark, and therefore, without distinctiveness, it cannot be deemed as identical or similar to the name of the cited trademark, which is composed of two parts of the trademark and the cited trademark, which is composed of two parts of the trademark and the "Chriian Dior," and it cannot be deemed as similar to each other even in comparison with the other, and it cannot be deemed as having been known enough to be perceived as the trademark of the cited trademark right holder at the time of the decision to register the trademark.

[1] Article 7 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act / [2] Article 7 (1) 11 of the Trademark Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 2001Hu1808 decided Dec. 14, 2001 (2002Sang, 321) Supreme Court Decision 2001Hu3132 decided Oct. 22, 2002 (2002Ha, 2904)

Plaintiff (Patent Attorney Aju-ju, Patent Attorney Lee Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

CHRITSDD COURE (Attorneys Yang Young-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Patent Court Decision 2001Heo4807 delivered on January 25, 2002

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Patent Court.

1. The judgment of the court below

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, since the trademark of this case, which is identical to the trademark of this case, "hriel" and the trademark of this case, which is identical to the trademark of this case, is "hrijun" and the cited trademark 1, which is "Chriian Dior", are identical to the trademark of this case, and the two trademarks are identical to the two trademarks of this case, and the two trademarks are identical to the two trademarks of this case, and the two trademarks are identical to the two trademarks of this case, which are identical to the two trademarks of this case, and the two trademarks of this case, which are identical to the four trademarks of this case, are identical to those of this case, if they are identical to the four trademarks of this case, and are identical to those of this case, they are identical to those of this case, and if they are identical to those of this case, they are identical to the three trademarks of this case, the trademark of this case, which are identical to the four trademarks of this case, and they are identical to the three trademarks of this case, the trademark of this case, "the trademark of this case," which is identical to the two trademarks of this case,".

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

However, 'Chrihoe', the title of the trademark of this case, and 'Chrihoe', the title of the cited trademark 1, are often used as a term referring to Korean ordinary consumers or traders in Korea, so it lacks distinguishability as a mark distinguishing the source of goods, and the latter part is considerably different from 'Darael' and 'diar'. Accordingly, the trademark 1 of this case and the cited trademark 1 of this case are likely to be similar, and even if the external appearance and concept are interpreted, it is difficult to view that both trademarks are similar to the extent that the overall trademark is likely to cause mistake or confusion as to the source of goods.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the similarity of trademarks under Article 7 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, since the court below determined that the registration of this case should be invalidated, as a whole, similar to the cited trademark 1, as a whole, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the similarity of trademarks under Article 7

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

The court below held that the trademark 3 and 4 of the registered trademark of this case and the cited trademark 3 and 4 of this case are identical in the name of "chlod," and that the overall name was similar even in the case of the remaining parts only by the word, but since they merely merely merely have two English letters, they constitute a simple and ordinary mark (see Supreme Court Decisions 2001Hu1808, Dec. 14, 2001; 2001Hu3132, Oct. 22, 2002, etc.) and thus, they cannot be deemed as identical or similar with both trademarks under this part, and even in comparison with the remaining parts, it is difficult to view that the trademark of this case was identical or similar as seen in the above ground of appeal No. 1. In addition, the court below held that the trademark of this case was known to the whole general consumers or consumers of the CD at the time of registration decision on the trademark of this case, but it can not be seen as being known to the whole general consumers or consumers of the trademark of this case.

Nevertheless, the court below held that the registered trademark of this case is likely to deceive consumers if both trademarks exist, as a whole similar to the cited trademark 3 and 4, is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to trademarks only by consumers under Article 7 (1) 11 of the Trademark Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the ground of appeal No. 2 of this case is justified.

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Son Ji-yol (Presiding Justice)