(a) Application of presumption provisions on the possessor's autonomous possession;

(b) the binding force of the judgment of remand is limited to that on the ground of reversal;

The legal provision regarding possession as an undefectable possession does not apply to cases where the possessor is deemed to have no intention to own the possessor due to the nature of the source of authority.

New Hong Fungi

Hybalum

Seoul High Court Decision 62Na134 delivered on March 12, 1963

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney are as shown in the attached Table.

(1) The first main point of the grounds of appeal is that all the possessor in good faith and is presumed to possess as a possessor in good faith. Thus, this presumption is not necessary to prove that the possessor in good faith and openly occupies as his own will, unless there is any evidence to oppose, and therefore, the plaintiff's bad faith is presumed to have been possession with no defects in this case's land. However, even though the original judgment is presumed to have been an independent possession after the successful bid, there is no special circumstance that the possession after the successful bid of this case's land can be an independent possession, it is not applicable to the case where the possessor in title is deemed to have no intention to own the land in light of the nature of the source of right, and according to the facts established lawfully by the original judgment, the legal provision that presumed possession as an independent possession without defects is not applicable to the case where the original owner's intention to own the land and the registration of transfer of ownership pursuant to this case's original owner's previous possession cannot be viewed as possession with no special reason in view of the nature of the source of right, and thus, it cannot be interpreted that the above provision has not been applied to the aforementioned independent possession.

(2) The second summary of the grounds of appeal is that the court below recognized the Plaintiff’s deceased father’s possession of other owner while recognizing the fact that the Plaintiff reported the farmland as one of his own farmland and reported it as one of his own farmland and reported it as one of his own farmland to the effect that the possession was illegal, or that the Plaintiff reported it as one of his own farmland, and thus, it cannot be readily concluded that the possession of other owner was already changed as one of his own possession due to the fact that the owner was aware of the auction and the transfer registration of ownership was made before the fact of the report. Therefore, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the burden of argument or the distribution of burden of proof, and that the report as one of his own farmland was made as one of his own farmland. The reasoning explanation of the judgment below, as stated in the judgment of the court below, is identical to the theory of lawsuit, but this does not affect the conclusion of the judgment,

(3) The third summary of the grounds of appeal is as follows: since the plaintiff proved the land acquisition tax in the year 1960, 1961, 1962 with Gap evidence Nos. 6 and the payment of land improvement cooperative expenses in the year 1962, as long as the plaintiff proved the payment of the land acquisition tax in the year 1960, 1962 and the year 1962 without the defendant's proof, the original judgment determined otherwise is illegal; however, the original judgment did not err in the misapprehension of the legal theory based on the premise that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the payment of the theory of lawsuit asserted by the plaintiff, since the nominal owner on the register is not the plaintiff's network, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the payment of the land acquisition tax or the payment of the land improvement cooperative expenses in the year 1960, 1962.

(4) The fourth point of the grounds of appeal is that the judgment of the court below is limited to disregarding the binding force of the judgment of remanding, or that the binding force of the judgment of remanding is limited to the grounds for reversal, and the reasons for reversal of the judgment of remanding is clear in the records, and it cannot be viewed that the possession of the Plaintiff’s net part of the farmland in question is not the sole possession at the time when the successful bid or the ownership transfer registration pursuant thereto was made, and there is a special circumstance that the possession of the farmland in question would be converted into possession at the time when the possession is not the sole possession, but the possession at the time when the autonomous possession begins, and the reason for reversal, which is a de facto decision with speed, refers to only the fact recognized in the decision of the court of final appeal in violation of the procedure, as it refers to a defense theory, which is an explanation of the argument in the merits, and therefore, it cannot be concluded that the judgment of the court of final appeal disregards the factual or legal judgment on the grounds for reversal of the judgment of the court of final appeal.

(5) The gist of other arguments in the grounds of appeal is to criticize the fact that the Plaintiff lost possession was the possession of the Plaintiff at the time of the successful bid in the end, and to criticize the fact that a lawful decision was made based on the original judgment on the time when the possession was changed by the autonomous possession thereafter, and it cannot be adopted, and there is a relationship between the original owner and the successful bidder, and therefore there is a special circumstance that the possession of the original owner after the successful bid and the registration of transfer of ownership should be regarded as the possession independently. All arguments are without merit.

Therefore, by applying Article 400 of the Civil Procedure Act prior to the amendment, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

[Judgment of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Na-Jap (Presiding Judge) Dog-Jak and Mag-Jak, the maximum Magman Mag-ri