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(영문) 대법원 1999. 8. 20. 선고 99도2029 판결
[폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반·강제추행][공1999.9.15.(90),1920]
Main Issues

[1] Whether an examination of an arrested suspect under Article 201-2 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act constitutes the discretionary matters of a judge in charge of warrant (affirmative)

[2] The time limit where the declaration of consent to evidence can be revoked or withdrawn (=the time the examination of evidence is completed)

[3] In a case where the defendant did not immediately raise an objection to the defendant's consent to the use of evidence as evidence, whether it is admissible (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] Article 201-2 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a judge in receipt of a request for a warrant of detention for an arrested suspect shall examine the suspect at the request of the suspect, and shall determine the judge's discretion as to whether to examine the suspect in issuing the warrant. Thus, the judge in charge of the warrant who determined that it is unnecessary to examine the suspect has issued the warrant without examining the suspect, and there is no violation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act concerning the issuance of the warrant.

[2] Although the declaration of consent to evidence under Article 318 of the Criminal Procedure Act may be revoked or withdrawn before the examination of evidence is completed, the consent of the first instance court cannot be revoked in the second instance because it is not recognized after the examination of evidence is completed. On the other hand, even if the declaration of consent to evidence is revoked or withdrawn after the examination of evidence is completed, the admissibility of evidence already acquired before such revocation or withdrawal shall not be lost.

[3] Although the subject of consent to the admissibility of evidence is the party who is the subject of the lawsuit, the defense counsel may act on behalf of the defendant unless it is against the express will of the defendant, and the defense counsel may agree to the admissibility of evidence for documents or articles except where the defendant explicitly expresses his/her intention that he/she does not consent to the admissibility of evidence. In such cases, where the defendant does not immediately raise his/her objection to the consent of the defense counsel, unless the consent of the defense counsel is approved by the consent of the defense counsel and the consent before the completion

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 201-2 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 318 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act / [3] Article 318 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

Reference Cases

[2] [3] Supreme Court Decision 88Do1628 delivered on November 8, 198 (Gong1988, 1556), Supreme Court Decision 93Do955 delivered on July 29, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2245) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 83Do267 delivered on April 26, 1983 (Gong1983, 936), Supreme Court Decision 96Do2507 delivered on December 10, 1996 (Gong197Sang, 454), Supreme Court Decision 97Do1230 delivered on September 30, 197 (Gong197Ha, 3356)

Defendant

Defendant

Appellant

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul District Court Decision 99No893 delivered on April 28, 1999

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. As to the assertion that there is an error in issuing a warrant without questioning the defendant

Article 201-2 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a judge in receipt of a request for a warrant of detention for an arrested suspect shall examine the suspect at the request of the suspect, by prescribing that the suspect may be examined at the request of the suspect, and whether or not the suspect shall be examined in issuing the warrant. Thus, in this case, the judge in charge of the warrant issued the warrant without examining the defendant, which judged that it is unnecessary to examine the defendant in this case does not constitute an unlawful act of violating the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act concerning the issuance of the warrant. Accordingly, even if the investigation was conducted under detention of the defendant and the trial was conducted, the defendant's ground of appeal on this issue cannot be accepted.

2. As to the admissibility of an injury diagnosis certificate

Although the declaration of consent to evidence under Article 318 of the Criminal Procedure Act may be withdrawn or withdrawn before the examination of evidence is completed, since the consent of the court of first instance cannot be revoked or withdrawn after the examination of evidence is completed, and once the declaration of consent to evidence is revoked or withdrawn after the examination of evidence is completed (see Supreme Court Decision 96Do2507, Dec. 10, 1996). In addition, the consent to the admissibility of evidence shall not be lost even if the declaration of consent is revoked or withdrawn after the examination of evidence is completed (see Supreme Court Decision 96Do2507, Dec. 18, 198).

According to the evidence list which forms part of the trial records of this case, with regard to the injury diagnosis report of the preparation of a doctor's steel strawing, which is used as evidence as evidence for the injury and degree of injury of the victim, it is stated that the defendant and defense counsel stated that they did not have any separate opinion as to the result of the examination of evidence, and that they consented to the second trial date after the second trial date of the court of first instance, reversed it and reversed it. According to the fourth trial records of the court of first instance, the court stated that the defendant and defense counsel did not have any separate opinion as to the result of the examination of evidence. After that, there is no trace that the declaration of intention as to

As such, if it is difficult to conclude that the consent of the defense counsel on the above injury diagnosis report at the fourth trial of the first instance trial is the result of unilateral declaration of intention, and if the defendant did not cancel or withdraw it on the grounds that the above consent of the defense counsel is merely a unilateral declaration of intention of counsel, even if the court below asserted that the above injury diagnosis document is disputed, the admissibility which has already been lawfully granted is not lost, so the court below used the above injury diagnosis document as evidence, and there is no error in law.

3. As to the assertion of mistake of facts against the rules of evidence

Examining the adopted evidence by the court of first instance as cited by the court below in light of the records, it can sufficiently recognize the defendant's criminal facts in violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and indecent acts by compulsion, and it cannot be deemed that the court below erred by violating the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, as otherwise alleged in the

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Chang-hoon (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울지방법원 1999.4.28.선고 99노893