(영문) 서울고등법원 2011.10.21. 선고 2011나30859 판결

The judgment of the court of first instance is revoked. The defendant confirmed that the defendant's disciplinary action against the plaintiff on March 23, 199 and February 1, 2000 against the plaintiff is null and void. The defendant, 1139,812,549 won and the amount equivalent to 20% per annum from March 1, 2005 to the date of complete payment, and 2,292,09 won per month from March 1, 2005 to the date of the plaintiff's reinstatement (the judgment of the court of first transmission shall dismiss the claim to nullify the invalidity of the standby Order as of March 23, 199, 201, 201, 2001, 200, 2000 won and 200% per annum from March 1, 2005 to the date of complete payment, 200 won are limited to the portion of the defendant's claim to confirm the invalidity of the standby Order as of February 1, 2019.

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. Ground for the issuance of a standby against the Plaintiff

(1) On November 28, 1988, the Plaintiff had a pressure on the Defendant, and had the audio business department moved to the department, and had the department moved to the company, government offices, research institutes, etc., and had been engaged in the external work of installing, maintaining, and repairing the computer system, which was promoted to the agency on April 23, 1994. From February 1, 1996, the Plaintiff worked at the Gangseo Information Customer Service Team and worked at the computer system customer support team of the computer business department under the Multimedia Services Headquarters as the reorganization of the organization.

(2) On February 2, 199, the Plaintiff was solicited on March 23, 199 to retire from the Defendant’s Human Resources Human Resources Council as of February 23, 1999, after hearing the statement that the Plaintiff was omitted from the head of the team affiliated with the Police Officers, and on the 23th day of the same month from the statement that the Plaintiff was selected as a person subject to recommendation for restructuring at the Defendant’s Human Resources Council by the head of D Office and C Team leader, etc. On the 23th day of the same month. Accordingly, the Plaintiff first sent the intention to retire from office, but immediately reversed the Plaintiff’s intention to retire.

(3) On March 23, 1999, the defendant ordered on March 23, 1999 that the plaintiff be placed in the position of the former office without being assigned to the plaintiff, to change the work in charge, and to move the 12th floor from the 12th floor of the building in which the computer system customer support team moved to the 6th floor of the same building where the head of D and the workers in the customer support room work (hereinafter referred to as the "order of the present case").

(4) After the issuance of the instant waiting order, the Plaintiff continued to cause occupational conflicts and conflicts with D chief office, and the Defendant eventually transferred the Plaintiff to a computer technology support team under the customer support office on November 8, 199.

(5) After that, on January 21, 200, the defendant decided to dismiss the plaintiff on the ground that the disciplinary action was taken as follows. The plaintiff applied for reexamination on the 24th of the same month, but the new disciplinary committee decided not to accept the application for reexamination on the 28th of the same month, but to punish the plaintiff as the court below. Accordingly, the defendant dismissed the plaintiff on the 2000 and February 1, 200 (hereinafter referred to as "the dismissal of this case").

(b) Grounds and grounds for the dismissal of disciplinary action;

(1) Failure to perform official duties and neglecting duties (Article 136 subparag. 6 and No. 12 of the Rules of Employment, Article 6 subparag. 6 and No. 12 of the Criteria for Review of Disciplinary Action by Disciplinary Rules) by a superior officer

(A) Failure to comply with a commercial officer’s official order

1. Failure to comply with orders issued by the Chief of D

On March 23, 1999, the Plaintiff asserted that the change of business after the instant standby order was unreasonable, and did not perform the official order of his superior official, such as formulating a sales plan for customers who had been in charge of the instant standby order, regardless of the fact, even though the Plaintiff received from his commercial office D instructions for research on customer support technology improvement and organizational revitalization measures.

(2) The team leader's failure to comply with orders

On November 8, 1999, the Plaintiff, after being transferred to a computer technology support team in the customer support room, ordered the commercial E-E team leader to submit a report on the "plan to contribute the fund excellence in connection with the sales of business by the 13th day of the same month," but failed to submit a report on the "plan to contribute the fund excellence in connection with the sales of business," but failed to perform the order of legitimate trading officers, such as submitting a one list of reports.

(B) Failure of duty

During working hours, the Plaintiff neglected to perform his/her duties such as consuming daily work hours, such as preparing a written complaint related to violence, a written administration, etc.

(2) An act contrary to the order of service (Article 136 subparag. 7 of the Rules of Employment and Article 7 subparag. 4 and 5 of the Criteria for Review of Discipline by Discipline Regulations).

(a) Intimidation against employees involved in promotion;

On February 199, the Plaintiff, who was dissatisfied with the decline in promotion, proposed the representative director to make a deposit, and threatened several employees, such as the C head of the C team and D head of the D office, on several occasions.

(b) physical threats to commercial persons;

On November 17, 1999, the Plaintiff filed a false theft report with the E head of E team and C head of C head of C, and caused physical threats to the Company by taking two books of his books into two times.

(c)fix e-mail with a false e-mail;

On May 199, the Plaintiff submitted to the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission and the Defendant by forging a document in which the mail of the name of G agent, a security officer of the team, was written.

(d)a confidential recording of the conversation with that member;

The Plaintiff, by recording the contents of conversation with the club members, violated the privacy of employees by confidential recording the contents of conversation with the club members, and led to the unity in the workplace by leaving the employees to be able to be able to keep mutual confidence.

(3) Company honorary demonstration (Article 136 Subparag. 9 of the Rules of Employment and Article 136 Subparag. 9 of the Disciplinary Rule)

The plaintiff sent to the police upon the above theft report, thereby causing the misunderstanding that the theft accident occurred in the company, leading the company to lose the honor of the company.

C. Litigation concerning the issuance, dismissal, etc. of the instant waiting order

(1) Litigation on the instant standby and the transfer order dated November 8, 1999

The plaintiff asserted that the transfer order of November 8, 1999 was unfair and dismissed on November 9, 199 when the plaintiff filed an application for remedy with the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission under Section 99 Seah 908, which was dismissed on November 9, 199. The National Labor Relations Commission dismissed the plaintiff's application for review on May 8, 200 and the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed the plaintiff's application for cancellation of the unfair transfer remedy case under Section 200716295 with the Seoul Administrative Court. However, the above court dismissed the above part of the waiting order of this case on March 23, 1999 (the plaintiff claimed that the standby order of this case was unfair transfer order of this case, and the plaintiff asserted that the transfer order of this case was unfair transfer order of this case) and dismissed the plaintiff's request with respect to the above part of the order of transfer order of the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission (Seoul High Court Decision 201Nu775752, Feb. 20, 2002).

(2) Litigation as to the dismissal of this case

As to the dismissal of this case, the plaintiff filed an application for remedy against unfair dismissal with Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission No. 286 on August 23, 2000, and the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission recognized the dismissal of this case as unfair dismissal and ordered the restoration to their original position and the payment of wages. However, the National Labor Relations Commission revoked the above initial trial order of the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission on September 12, 2001 and issued a decision on review to the effect that the dismissal of this case would not be unfair dismissal, and the plaintiff filed a lawsuit for cancellation of the adjudication on remedy against unfair dismissal under the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission No. 2001Gu 40141, but the above court dismissed the plaintiff's term "the Seoul Administrative Court" on August 23, 2002, and the plaintiff appealed to Seoul High Court (No. 2002Nu13910) on October 24, 200, and the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed on February 31, 2004 (No. 361).

(d) Provisions pertaining to disciplinary action;

[former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 6507 of Aug. 14, 2001; hereinafter “Labor Standards Act”)

Article 30 【Restriction on Dismissal, etc.】

(1) An employer shall, without justifiable cause, not dismiss, lay off, suspend, transfer a worker, reduce wages, or take other disciplinary measures against a worker.

(2) An employer shall not dismiss a worker during a period of suspension of work for medical treatment of an occupational injury or disease and within thirty days thereafter, and any female worker before and after childbirth shall not be dismissed during a period of suspension of work pursuant to the provisions of this Act and for thirty days thereafter.

[Employment Rules]

Article 136 (Grounds for Disciplinary Action) If a member falls under any of the following subparagraphs, a disciplinary action may be taken against him/her:

(6) is dissatisfied with or neglecting a legitimate official order or personnel order without a justifiable reason; or

(7) violates the corporation's service regulations and disturbs service order or morality; or

(9) When he is indicted under law or by causing other social harm, thereby devoking the honor of the company;

(12) When they perform defective duties;

【Disciplinary Provisions】

Article 4 (Types and Jurisdiction of Disciplinary Committees)

1. The Disciplinary Committee shall be classified into the Accident Disciplinary Committee, the Business Headquarters Disciplinary Committee, and the Factory Disciplinary Committee (Aggravated 2);

2. The company disciplinary committee shall deliberate and decide on disciplinary action of at least the head office, and shall be established at the head office;

3. The Committee for Disciplinary Action on Business Headquarters shall deliberate and decide on disciplinary action against office employees in Grade I or lower and guidance employees, and shall be established in each business headquarters;

Article 11 (Decisions of Disciplinary Committee)

3. The disciplinary action against members shall become final and conclusive by deliberation and resolution of the disciplinary committee: Provided, That if necessary, written resolution may be made; and

Article 12 (Statement by Parties) The Disciplinary Committee may, if deemed necessary for investigation of facts, hear documents or oral statements from the parties concerned: Provided, That when the parties concerned fail to make written or oral statements even though they have given the parties an opportunity to make statements, a disciplinary decision may be made without making any statement.

Article 13 (Grounds for Disciplinary Action) Where a member falls under any of the following subparagraphs, disciplinary action may be taken against him/her:

1. Where it falls under Article 136 of the Rules of Employment;

2. Where he/she violates rules or regulations of employment;

3. Where it is deemed necessary to take a disciplinary action.

Article 18 (Request for Review) Any member who has an objection to a disciplinary decision and has an objection to the disciplinary matter, shall prepare the purport and reason for request for review, request for review to the Secretariat of the Disciplinary Committee, and request for review only once, within three days after he receives a written notification of disciplinary action.

Article 19 (Review of Review) Each Secretariat in receipt of a request for review shall notify in advance the disciplinary committee members of the fact of the request for review, reasons for review, date, time and place for review. A disciplinary committee member who is difficult to attend the Review Committee may submit his/her opinion on review in writing. Review of review shall be as follows:

2.The case of review of office staff and technical staff members below the rank of Deputy Director-General shall be decided by the Director-General after hearing the opinions of the Committee for Disciplinary Action of the Company Disciplinary Committee and the opinions of the Secretariat of the Company Disciplinary Committee for consideration of the equality at the level

[Attachment 1 of Disciplinary Provisions) Criteria for Deliberation of Disciplinary Action]

1. Class of the disciplinary action;

A person shall be appointed.

2. Criteria for deliberation on disciplinary action:

A person shall be appointed.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 12, 15 through 27, 52, 64, 114, Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 6, 15, 16, 27, 29, and 69, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the claim for nullification of dismissal

A. Judgment on the Defendant’s main defense

(1) The defendant's assertion

The plaintiff's decision of review was made to dismiss the plaintiff's application for unfair dismissal, and the plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking the cancellation of the above decision of review but the decision was finally final and conclusive, which became final and conclusive. Since the dismissal of this case is not unfair, the lawsuit seeking nullification of the dismissal of this case is unlawful without benefit of lawsuit.

(2) Determination

On the other hand, the Labor Relations Commission’s order for remedy is merely a public law obligation to obey the remedy order to the employer, and does not directly cause or modify any legal relationship between the employee and the employer (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da22100, May 22, 1992). Even if an administrative lawsuit seeking the cancellation of the ruling dismissing the unfair dismissal request was filed and the judgment was rendered against the employee but became final and conclusive after the judgment was rendered against the employee, it is merely a confirmation that the ruling for reexamination was lawful and thus, the employer does not bear any obligation under the public law, or does not cause any change in the legal relationship between the employee and the employer, and therefore, the employee has a benefit to seek the confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal by filing a civil lawsuit separately. Accordingly, the Defendant’s aforementioned defense for safety is

B. Determination of procedural defects

(1) Whether Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act is violated

(A) The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff suspended part of the business due to adaptation disorder, etc. from November 19, 199 to December 4, 199, and from December 5, 200 to February 4, 200. The defendant dismissed the plaintiff on February 1, 200, even though the plaintiff cannot be dismissed for the above period under Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act and for 30 days thereafter, the dismissal of this case violates Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act.

(b) An official group;

The purport of the restriction on dismissal under Article 30(2) of the Labor Standards Act is to protect an employee absolutely from the threat of his/her position during the period in which the employee loses his/her labor force due to an occupational accident and the 30 days thereafter, and thus, it does not constitute the suspension of dismissal under the above Act in cases where the employee goes to work normally without suspending his/her work even if he/she is under treatment due to an occupational disease, etc., or where it is not deemed necessary to suspend his/her work for medical treatment even if he/she suspends his/her work due to an occupational disease, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu321, Aug. 27, 191).

Considering the overall purport of evidence Nos. 11-1, 2, 22, 26, and Eul evidence Nos. 4 and 5, the plaintiff was discharged on December 4, 199 under the title of the state in which he was hospitalized in the spirit of the H hospital located in Gangnam-gu, Seoul, after being diagnosed with the adaptation disorder on Nov. 18, 199, and was hospitalized in the hospital. The plaintiff can be acknowledged the fact that he was receiving a commuting treatment from Dec. 6, 1999 to Feb. 4, 200 while he worked normally in the defendant company. In light of the above recognized facts and the legal principles of the restriction on dismissal, the plaintiff cannot be deemed to fall under the period for which it is deemed necessary to suspend the business for medical treatment from Dec. 6, 1999 to Dec. 6, 199. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion that the dismissal was in violation of Article 200 and Article 30 (1) of the Labor Standards Act.

(2) Whether there is a defect in the initial trial or disciplinary procedure

(A) The plaintiff's main prize

The plaintiff is notified of the opening of the disciplinary committee prior to the opening of the meeting, and the member of the disciplinary committee requested the regular director who was the member of the disciplinary committee to postpone the meeting and prepare and submit a written request for postponement at his/her own direction and trust that the disciplinary committee will be postponed. The defendant's compulsory conduct of the disciplinary procedure by depriving the plaintiff of the plaintiff's opportunity to attend the meeting and right to defense is contrary to the principle of good faith. The defendant deprived the plaintiff of his/her opportunity to explain his/her failure to inform the plaintiff of his/her disciplinary action before the resolution was made on the ground that he/she did not go against his/her duty of care, e-mail forgery, and confidential recording of the contents of conversation with the member of the disciplinary committee (violation of Article 12 of the Discipline Regulations). However, the disciplinary committee's notice of disciplinary action only stated only the result of the disciplinary action and the applicable provisions, but does not present any specific grounds for disciplinary action.

(B) Determination

(6) Article 12 of the Defendant’s Disciplinary Rules provides that “If it is deemed necessary to conduct fact-finding, the Disciplinary Committee may hear documents or oral statements from the party concerned; provided that “if the party concerned fails to make written or oral statements, it may make disciplinary decisions without any oral statement,” the party concerned may be allowed to make disciplinary decisions in the disciplinary proceedings; ② the Defendant is expected to hold disciplinary proceedings against the Plaintiff on January 14, 200 on the 21st of the same month as the Plaintiff’s address, and the Defendant appears to have presented written request to the Plaintiff for explanation of disciplinary reasons, which would be difficult to acknowledge that the Plaintiff would have been given the opportunity to present the above written request to the Plaintiff for explanation of disciplinary reasons, based on the following circumstances:

(3) Whether the procedure for general retrial is defective

(A) The plaintiff's assertion

Although the convening of the Review Disciplinary Committee is a mandatory provision, the defendant only made a written resolution without convening or holding the Review Disciplinary Committee, and did not notify the grounds for the request for reexamination to the disciplinary committee members prior to the decision of reexamination (violation of Article 19 of the Disciplinary Rule).

(B) Determination

According to Gap evidence Nos. 12, Eul evidence Nos. 4, 5, 28-1 to 10, and 29, the plaintiff filed a request for reexamination on Jan. 24, 200 as to disciplinary resolution of the disciplinary committee on Jan. 21, 200. J division, who is the practice of the disciplinary committee, sent the opinion of the disciplinary committee's request for reexamination to K division, who is the executive secretary of the disciplinary committee, and the K division sent all the disciplinary committee's request for reexamination to all the disciplinary committee members in order to ensure more reliable. According to the above evidence Nos. 12, 13, including the chairperson, the remaining disciplinary committee members except the I, who are the executive secretary in charge of management support, were allowed to request reexamination on the e-mail of the defendant's 13 disciplinary committee's e-mail or the 20th new disciplinary committee's opinion, and the 16th new disciplinary committee's opinion on the disciplinary action of the plaintiff 2, the 16th executive secretary of the disciplinary committee's.

(4) Whether a company disciplinary committee (special review) was held

(A) The plaintiff's assertion

On March 16, 200, when the Plaintiff plans to hold a regular meeting on unfair dismissal on the day when the general meeting of shareholders of the Defendant was held, the Defendant held the Accident Disciplinary Committee on the condition that the Plaintiff’s opportunity to vindicate was insufficient, and prepared a written agreement on the reinstatement to provide the Plaintiff with sufficient opportunity to vindicate the decision of the previous Disciplinary Committee after going through special reexamination and to provide the Plaintiff with sufficient opportunity to vindicate the dismissal of the instant case. However, the Defendant unilaterally reversed the contents of the aforementioned written agreement on reinstatement after the end of the above general meeting of shareholders and did not hold the Accident Disciplinary Committee (Special

(B) Determination

The plaintiff's testimony No. 13, No. 4, 30, and 31 were stated in the plaintiff's testimony, Gap evidence No. 53 and 54, comprehensively taking account of the whole purport of arguments and arguments that the defendant's regular general meeting of shareholders was scheduled to be held on March 17, 200, and the defendant's regular director did not appear before the Disciplinary Committee on March 16, 200 and requested the Disciplinary Committee to grant the plaintiff a special opportunity for further review based on the decision of the Disciplinary Committee on Jan. 28, 200. Further, the defendant did not provide sufficient opportunity for further explanation to the plaintiff, and thus, the defendant's request for further review should be respected. The defendant's explanation that the defendant's request for further review was not made in accordance with the defendant's request for further review, and the defendant's request for further review was not made in accordance with the defendant's special provision on review and the defendant's request for further review (the defendant's request for further review).

C. Determination as to the existence of grounds for disciplinary action and the conduct of the racing

(1) The plaintiff's assertion

On November 1, 1996, the plaintiff received unfavorable personnel charges and points of promotion from the division chief due to the corruption report, and thereafter points out this issue continuously. The defendant continued to point out this issue, considering that it was omitted from the promotion of the division chief, the defendant forced the plaintiff to voluntarily retire, while he forced the plaintiff to be retired from outside office, and then ordered the members of the same department to systematically comply with the plaintiff without giving any duties to the plaintiff to be removed from the company, and after collecting office equipment, such as personal computers and equipment, and e-mail in-house e-mail, from the company, without giving any duties to the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted a petition to urge the correction of this problem to the defendant representative director, and the defendant unilaterally issued a transfer order to another division, and the defendant unilaterally issued a transfer order to the plaintiff, and the defendant did not perform the dismissal of this case. In this series of process, the plaintiff's act is not only a kind of act that could constitute the ground for dismissal of this case, but also a reason that the plaintiff's act was unfairly dismissed from the defendant's disciplinary action.

(2) Determination as to the existence of grounds for disciplinary action

(A) Failure to perform official duties and neglect of duties by a superior officer;

(i) Failure to comply with official orders of the superior officer;

1. Failure to comply with orders issued by the Chief of D

In light of the above facts and evidence Nos. 1, 3-1 to 10, 5, 7, 8-1, 63, 72, 91, 107, and 11 of the witness evidence Nos. 4 and the witness Nos. 9-1 to the plaintiff, the defendant was selected as the subject of restructuring recommendation through the head of D office on February 23, 1999, and the plaintiff did not immediately reverse the plaintiff's motion to retire on 9-1 to the plaintiff on 19-1, 4, 5, 5, 8-1, 63, 7, 72, 91, and 11, and 0-11, the defendant did not request the plaintiff to retire from office on 9-1, 4, and the defendant did not request the plaintiff to retire from office on 9-1, 199, and did not request the plaintiff to retire from office on 9-1, 199.

Comprehensively taking account of the above facts of recognition, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have received occupational instructions from the head of the D office on the improvement of customer support technology and the research on the scheme for the revitalization of organization, or even if such instructions were received, it is not deemed that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the causes attributable to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the grounds for

(2) The team leader's failure to comply with orders

According to Gap evidence Nos. 4 and 9-1, Eul evidence Nos. 32, 33, 50, and 52, the plaintiff was ordered to submit a report on "F performance evaluation report" by the team leader of the E team, who was transferred to a computer technology support team in the customer support room on Nov. 8, 1999, and was ordered to submit a report on "measures to contribute the F excellence in connection with the business sales" until the 10th of the same month, but did not submit the report until then. Upon the expiration of the deadline for submission again on the 13th of the same month, the plaintiff prepared and submitted one false report using the above reference material. However, prior to the issuance of the waiting order of this case, the plaintiff was ordered to work as a non-permanent employee for the 10-year period, and the plaintiff failed to submit the above report on the 10-year period, considering that the plaintiff's ability to receive the personal computer was not intentionally fulfilled or neglected to submit the report.

Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have failed or neglected to comply with the order issued by the team leader. Therefore, the grounds for disciplinary action on this part are not recognized (other than the grounds for disciplinary action on November 8, 1999 that the Plaintiff refused to comply with the order issued by the team leader as of November 8, 199, does not constitute grounds for disciplinary action in this case, and the Plaintiff’s request for remedy and filing administrative litigation are merely using the procedure guaranteed by the Act, and thus, it cannot be deemed the grounds for disciplinary action

2) Neglecting duties

B. According to the reasoning of the evidence No. 45 and the purport of the oral argument No. 45, the Plaintiff may recognize the fact that the representative director or executives of the Defendant company have prepared or submitted a written complaint or a written complaint to the investigation agency over 16 times after the issuance of the atmosphere. However, the Plaintiff did not have been negligent in performing his/her duties for the reason that the Plaintiff failed to submit the written evidence No. 8-2, No. 10, No. 11-1, No. 52, No. 62, No. 67, No. 68-1 through No. 68-1, No. 90, No. 106, No. 112, and No. 1999, No. 97, Dec. 23, 1999.

Therefore, this part of the grounds for disciplinary action is not recognized since the plaintiff could not be deemed to have neglected to perform his/her duties by consuming daily hours as private day.

(b) Disturbing the order of service in violation of the service regulations;

(i) intimidation to the master officers related to promotion;

Considering the overall purport of the statements and arguments in Gap evidence 1-1, 2, 4, 49, 62, 63 evidence, Eul evidence Nos. 4, 5, and 36 and the overall purport of the arguments, the plaintiff argued that he/she had been informed of the fact that he/she was not subject to promotion due to the fact that he/she had been informed of the fact that he/she had been informed of the fact that he/she was not subject to promotion due to the fact that he/she had been informed of the fact that he/she had been subject to promotion since 1996 to 14 out of 1998, but he/she had been informed of the fact that he/she was not subject to promotion due to the fact that he/she had been informed of the fact that he/she had been informed of the fact that he/she was not subject to promotion due to the fact that he/she had been informed of his/her disadvantage at the time of his/her interview.

Although it cannot be evaluated that the Plaintiff’s act threatened his superior officer, it is judged that the Plaintiff’s act constitutes an act that disturbs the order of service by improper means in that it intended to promote his promotion by means of pressure to submit a letter of commitment to the representative director. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s grounds for disciplinary action on this part are recognized.

(ii) physical threats to commercial persons;

In full view of the statements and the purport of Gap evidence Nos. 28 and 29, the plaintiff argued that the police officers called to the defendant company's office on Nov. 17, 1999 upon his theft report that he stolen the plaintiff's diskettes and opened his bookbook. In this case, the head of C knew that the plaintiff was not responsible for the plaintiff's theft, he would open a book book book, and the plaintiff would take two books of the book bookbook of C and E deputy head, and the plaintiff damaged it on the floor. After which the plaintiff was charged with the harm, the defendant could be found to have concealed the defendant's business by concealing it on the floor, and the defendant's appeal was dismissed by the Seoul Central District Court on Feb. 23, 2007, which became final and conclusive by the prosecutor's appeal No. 360,000 won.

According to this, even if the Plaintiff actually lost its diskettes, it is determined that the Plaintiff violated the order of service of the Defendant Company by causing physical threats to his company by taking advantage of the book-to-spathn, without justifiable grounds. Therefore, this part of the grounds for disciplinary action is recognized.

(iii)fix e-mail with a false e-mail;

According to the evidence Nos. 6-1, 2, 28, and 29, G is expected to collect only 10,000 members of the computer system team except the plaintiff on May 27, 1999. The defendant 2 was sentenced to the above 0-1, 2, 28, and 29 of the evidence No. 6, but the defendant 2 was released from the Seoul District Court on the 12th floor team so that the defendant 1 could not use A's PC. The defendant 2's e-mail will not be subject to the defendant 1's e-mail provision, but the defendant 2's e-mail provision was not subject to the request of the Seoul District Court for 0.1's e-mail provision, and the defendant 1's e-mails provision was not subject to the defendant 4's e-mail provision, and the defendant 2's e-mail will not be subject to the defendant 1's e-mail provision.

According to the foregoing, the phrase inserted by the Plaintiff in the e-mail of G is intended to clarify the source of the e-mail citing him/her, and it is difficult to deem that the said e-mail produced by G was identical due to the inserted phrase, or that the Plaintiff had an intent to commit a crime under the above Article. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have forged the document in the name of G. Therefore, this part of the grounds for disciplinary action is not recognized.

(iv)record the contents of conversation with that member;

Considering the overall purport of the statements and arguments stated in Gap evidence 4, 5, and 8-2, 75, 98, Eul evidence 5, 36, and 51-3, and 4, the plaintiff recorded the conversation with the Dong fee or his superior in the office from the time of the dismissal of the case to the time of the dismissal of the case, and at least three recorded tapes a large amount of recorded tape, and the plaintiff sent the recorded tape to the defendant personnel planning team as supporting materials for his argument after submitting a written application to the defendant representative director on July 29, 199. Thus, this can be deemed as an act that undermines the order of service by impairing the privacy of the employees and encouraging their mutual confidence among the employees, barring any special circumstance. Therefore, the grounds for the disciplinary action in this part is recognized.

The facts that the police officers called the Defendant company by filing a report on the theft of diskettes on November 17, 1999 are as follows. However, it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff’s theftation itself led to the Defendant company’s honor. Therefore, the grounds for the disciplinary action on this part are not recognized.

(3) Determination of disciplinary action

(A) Relevant legal principles

Dismissal is justified in cases where there are grounds for an employee’s responsibility to the extent that the employee’s employment relationship can not continue. Whether the employee’s employment relationship has reached the extent that the employee’s employment relationship could not continue is considered as consideration materials when taking disciplinary action, such as the employer’s business purpose and nature, workplace’s status and duty, motive and background of the employee’s misconduct, influence of the employee’s deceptive scheme on the part of the employee, etc. In a case where there are several facts of suspicions of disciplinary action against the employee, it shall be determined in light of the overall reasons, not only one of such grounds, but also one of such grounds, and all of them shall be determined in light of the overall reasons (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Nu15742, Sept. 20, 196; 95Nu15781, May 28, 2002; 2005Du18581, May 28, 2002).

(B) Specific review

In light of the above facts and the overall purport of oral argument, the following circumstances revealed that ① the Plaintiff was deprived of promotion from the position of the lower court, i.e., Defendant 2’s act of assaulting the Defendant’s physical treatment within the company, i.e., Defendant 2’s act of assaulting the Defendant’s office and obstruction of the Defendant’s business during the period of time and of time after 20 months following the issuance of the waiting notice, and the Plaintiff’s act of assaulting the Defendant’s physical treatment after 3 or more times during which the Plaintiff was undermining the order of service within the company, by exercising pressure to the representative director with respect to personnel disadvantage caused by corruption. ② The Plaintiff’s act of assaulting the Defendant’s physical treatment within the company after the issuance of the waiting notice, and thus, was likely to interfere with the Defendant’s act of assaulting the Defendant’s office during the period of time and time after 20 months after 20 months ago, and thus, the Plaintiff’s act of assaulting the Defendant’s duty of care to the Defendant.

D. Sub-determination

Therefore, the dismissal of this case cannot be deemed as an unlawful defect in the process of the dismissal of this case, and the dismissal of this case is justified as follows: (a) the dismissal of this case made unfair speech and behavior to the employees in relation to promotion; (b) the dismissal of this case made physical threats to the employees; and (c) the dismissal of this case caused interference with the order of service by recording the conversation with the relevant employees, and the rest of the disciplinary grounds are not recognized; and (d) the dismissal of the plaintiff on the ground of the above acts of the plaintiff is limited to the scope of the reasonable discretion of disciplinary action; and (e) the dismissal of this case is justified.

3. Determination on the claim for payment of wages

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The dismissal of this case, as alleged by the plaintiff, is erroneous in its procedure and is null and void as it was conducted without any justifiable reason. Thus, the labor relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant company shall continue to exist. Thus, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff the amount of money stated in the claim.

B. Determination

On the other hand, the dismissal of this case cannot be deemed as an unlawful defect in quality. Among the grounds for dismissal of this case, the above ①, ②, and ③ grounds are recognized as grounds for disciplinary action. The dismissal of the plaintiff on the ground of the above acts by the defendant is limited within the scope of legitimate discretion of disciplinary action. Thus, the dismissal of this case is justified as seen earlier. Thus, the plaintiff's above assertion based on the premise that the dismissal of this case is null and void is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim to confirm the invalidity of dismissal and the claim to pay wages are all dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.