beta
Main Issues
The case holding that a woman's duty of care has an occupational duty to prepare blood for blood transfusion in advance to women and doctors who perform emergency scopic operations, as a countermeasure against the abortion of women in childbed.
Summary of Judgment
The case holding that in a case where a woman in childbed and a doctor decided to perform an emergency scopic operation as a countermeasure against a woman in childbed's attitude, they should have a duty of care to prepare blood in advance due to the decision to conduct a scopic operation at least in such a case and the special circumstances anticipated that it is necessary to give blood to a woman in childbed.
[Reference Provisions]
Article 268 of the Criminal Act
Reference Cases
[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant
Defendant
Appellant
Defendant
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul District Court Decision 98No5880 delivered on July 28, 1999
Text
The appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
In light of the evidence stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, if the defendant tried to give birth to the victim who was hospitalized in the military hospital (Seoul, 1960) on June 30, 195, by using the first-class medical treatment of the victim's disease and the first-class medical treatment of the victim at least 10 percent of the day on which he/she appears to have been infected with the first-class medical treatment of the victim, and the first-class medical treatment of the victim was conducted on the day after the first-class medical treatment of the victim's 14th day after the first-class medical treatment of the victim's disease, and the first-class medical treatment of the victim was conducted on the first-class medical treatment of the victim's 14th day after the first-class medical treatment of the victim's disease and the first-class medical treatment of the victim's 1st day after the first-class medical treatment of the victim's disease and the second-class medical treatment of the victim's 14th day after the first-class medical treatment of the death.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.
Justices Cho Cho-Un (Presiding Justice)