(a) Where the first premium has been paid as a date check, the time when the insurer bears responsibility for paying the insurance money; and

B. Whether an individual consent of the insured is obtained when the representative of the organization concludes a life insurance contract with its constituent members as the insured (affirmative)

A. In most cases, the pre-date check shall be deemed to be settled according to the presentation within the period of presentation after the date of issuance. Thus, the effect of the pre-date check may not be deemed to arise on the date of issuance of the first insurance premium. Thus, in a case where the insurer is liable for the payment of the insurance premium from the policyholder who expressed his/her intent to subscribe for the first insurance premium to receive the first insurance premium before the insurer gives his/her consent to apply for the first insurance premium, the first pre-date check shall not be deemed to be the date of receipt of the first insurance premium, which becomes the time of the insurer’s liability, even if the insurance solicitor issued the first date check from the policyholder who expressed his/her intent to subscribe for the first insurance premium, and even if he/she has harmed the receipt of the pre-date check,

B. Article 731(1) of the Commercial Act that an insurance contract which covers the death of another person as an insured event shall be considered as a mandatory law that requires the consent of the insured, so the consent of the insured is a requisite to take effect of the pertinent insurance contract, regardless of how the method is needed. The legislative intent of the insurance is to eliminate the risk of infringement of public order and good morals, as well as the risk of murder of the insured, by taking the death of another person as a requirement for the so-called speculative contract without the consent of the victim. Therefore, in the case of a large-scale group security insurance, it is reasonable to deem that the representative of the organization or the user of the organization enters into an insurance contract collectively with its members as the insured, and only on the ground that there is no risk of gambling insurance or murder of the insured.

(a) Article 28(2) of the Check Act, Article 656(b) of the Commercial Act, Article 731(1);

Plaintiff

[Defendant-Appellant] Korea Education Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for defendant-appellant

Busan High Court Decision 88Na1370 delivered on November 17, 1988

The case shall be remanded to Busan High Court by destroying the part against the defendant among the original judgment.

As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 3:

In general, it is reasonable to interpret that a pre-date check is issued by the addressee or transferee prior to the date of issuance of the check, even without any special agreement between the issuer and the addressee. Therefore, in most cases, the pre-date check is paid according to the presentation within the period of presentation after the date of issuance in question. Of course, since the pre-date check does not essentially lose sight, if a pre-date check is presented for payment prior to the date of issuance in question, it is clear in accordance with Article 28 (2) of the Check Act that it would be paid on that date and at the same time there is the same aspect as compelling the issuer to bear risk (such as default, minor fine, etc.), however, it cannot be said that the pre-date check has the effect of paying face value on the date of issuance.

In this case, in a case where the insurer receives the first insurance premium and then consents to the subscription for the insurance before the insurer receives the first insurance premium, if the insurer is liable to pay the insurance premium retroactively from the time of receiving the first insurance premium, the insurer shall be held liable to receive the first insurance premium from the policyholder who has expressed his/her intent to subscribe to his/her solicitation, such as this case, and if the insurance solicitor receives the first insurance premium after receiving the first insurance premium from the policyholder who has expressed his/her intent to subscribe to his/her solicitation, it shall not be denied the existence of the right to receive the first insurance premium in light of the circumstances of today's insurance business, even though the insurance solicitor is an employee of the insurer based on a delegation contract where the employment contract or contract elements with the insurer to which he/she belongs and is merely a broker without the right to represent or notify the insurance contract.

The court below determined that an insurance solicitor is liable for the payment of insurance proceeds, even if the plaintiff issued the first day check and the first day check and the first day check were also issued and delivered as insurance premiums in this case. Since the insurance solicitor suspended the payment of insurance proceeds by the date of the first day check to the plaintiff as the insurance solicitor, and at the same time, the defendant paid the total amount of the above insurance premiums to the plaintiff as the insurance solicitor and refused to pay the checks, etc., the defendant company was also responsible for the occurrence of the insurance accident before the payment of insurance premiums. Thus, the court below determined that the defendant is liable for the payment of insurance proceeds even if the plaintiff issued the first day check before the date of the issuance of the check and the first day check were issued before the date of the payment of insurance premiums, in light of the insurance solicitor's contribution to the expansion of the insurance solicitor's business scope, the insurer who received benefits from the insurance solicitor's extension of the insurance solicitor's business scope can not be viewed as satisfying the above general interests of the insurance purchaser's insurance company's financial interests based on non-compliance rules.

(2) The insurance contract which covers the death of another person as an insured event shall obtain the consent of the insured in accordance with Article 731(1) of the Commercial Act. Since this provision is considered a mandatory law, the consent of the insured should be in a way that the insurance contract becomes an element of the insurance contract in question.

However, since the collective security insurance policy of this case requires the written consent of the insured, the court below stated that the judgment of the insured's consent on the death insurance of another person is necessary to exclude the risk of gambling insurance and the risk of murder of the insured, and therefore, in the case of collective security insurance, the representative of the organization or the user of the organization and the insured collectively concludes an insurance contract with the insured members as the insured, and thus it is sufficient for the defendant's implied consent or presumed consent without the insured's individual consent. Since the demand for the written consent of the insured by the above insurance policy of the defendant was made unfairly strict restriction on the type or requirements of the insurer or the policyholder, the defendant's demand for the written consent by the above insurance policy of the insured was made invalid in light of the principle of good faith or the principle of fairness. Accordingly, the defendant is obligated to pay the insurance money to the defendant unless the plaintiff offered the above collective security insurance with the implied consent of the

However, the legislative intent of Article 731(1) of the Commercial Act is to exclude the risk of infringement of human rights, i.e., the risk of infringement of public order and good morals, without the consent of the victim in light of the ethics of the general society, and the risk of infringement of public order and good morals, and further such risk cannot be treated equally. However, just on the ground of the reasoning of the judgment below, it is reasonable to deem that the applicability of the above terms and conditions of the collective security insurance of this case cannot be denied.

The above determination by the court below cannot be deemed to have erred by misapprehending the legal principles on ordinary terms and conditions.

(3) In light of the above, the part against the defendant among the original judgment is unfair, and this part is remarkably contrary to social justice and equity, so the arguments pointing this out are with merit, and they are remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination without any further proceeding to decide on the remaining points of the original judgment. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-ju (Presiding Justice)