Respondents as to unfavorable matters and propriety of grounds of appeal

Where the punishment of a judgment is different from that of the judgment and a severe punishment is imposed, the appeal on the ground of inconsistency with it shall not be a legitimate ground for appeal, as it returns to the defendant's assertion of unfavorable matters.

Articles 410, 68, 71, and 448 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Defendant 1 and one other

The original judgment shall be destroyed.

This case is charged to the Seoul High Court.

Co-defendant 3 and 4 of the original judgment, Defendant 1 and Defendant 4 of the first instance judgment, defense counsel Kim Jong-sung in the case of the original judgment, are sentenced to one year of imprisonment in the original judgment. Although the original judgment "for three years from the date on which the decision became final and conclusive", Co-defendant 3 and 4 of the original judgment shall be sentenced to two years of imprisonment, and the execution shall be suspended for five years of imprisonment (for example, eight final and conclusive judgments), respectively. The inconsistency between the reasoning of the judgment and the text of the judgment shall be deemed to fall under the case where there is a low reason for the so-called judgment under Article 410, Article 410, Article 19 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

However, according to the original judgment, the court below acknowledged that the defendant is punished by two years by imprisonment with prison labor in each case, and that the execution of each term of five years has been postponed, and it is clear that the defendant is punished by imprisonment with prison labor in each case, and that the execution of each term of three years has been suspended, and it can be viewed that this is less than the reason for the judgment. Therefore, the original judgment may be viewed that there is an error like the theory in the theory of lawsuit at the next point. Accordingly, the defendant's argument that there is an excessive punishment as recognized in the reason for the judgment than the punishment determined in the original judgment, but the ground for appeal that asserted the disadvantage of the defendant cannot be treated as a legitimate ground for appeal.

In the same defense counsel, the second point of the appeal No. 2 is not required to be stated in the judgment, but the date of preparation of the judgment shall be specified pursuant to Article 71 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and in the case where a judge who has rendered a so-called trial cannot sign and seal at the time of preparation of the judgment, "in the case where a judge who has made a so-called trial cannot sign and seal" means the case where there is a reason that it is impossible to affix an official seal at the time of preparation of the judgment, as an annual date of preparation of the judgment, and in the protocol of the trial of March 3, 4283, the presiding judge stated on March 3, 4283 as the date of preparation of the judgment, and "in the protocol of the trial of March 3, 4283, the presiding judge shall decide whether to sentence the said judgment, reading the reasoning of the judgment, and reading the reasoning of the judgment, it is clear that this judgment was prepared at the time of preparation of the judgment, and therefore, it cannot be seen that there is a judge's lack of signature and seal within 2 months after two months.

However, according to the original judgment and records of part outside the original judgment, the date on which the original judgment was prepared was prepared was prepared on March 3, 4283, and this part of the original judgment was recorded in the same original judgment. Despite the absence of signature and seal of two judges in the same original judgment even though this part of the original judgment did not exist in the same original judgment, it is identical to the previous original judgment, but if the second part of the last part of the original judgment and the second part of the protocol of the trial and the second part of the protocol of the party members were comprehensively reflected in the facts which are obvious facts to party members, the last 4283 ruling was prepared after the last 6.25 incidents, and it is not reasonable to interpret that the original judgment was prepared after the last 30 days of the original judgment, which was prepared after the second 6.25 days of the original judgment, and it cannot be viewed that it is a violation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, which is based on the premise that the original judgment was prepared after the second 20th day of the original judgment.

The grounds of appeal No. 3 acknowledged that the defendant's name was voluntarily aided with the male political party funds, and that Article 4 of the National Security Act was applied to the defendant's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 3's non-indicted's non-indicted 1's non-indicted.

(2) Following the court below's decision that Co-defendant 4 did not provide money to South and North Korea, but it is sufficiently recognized that the defendant's statement of Defendant 2's public prosecutor's interrogation statement to the same purport was a whole of the interrogation protocol of public prosecutor's statement to the same purport in the court of the court of first instance, which was made by the defendant as the defendant's non-indicted 2's living assistance cost. However, although the defendant stated some of the facts that correspond to the ruling of the court below when he would allow judicial police officer's assistance in handling affairs, the defendant's statement of public prosecutor's interrogation statement to the same effect was not a mere fact that the defendant was detained first in the police officer's old age 63 and was able to make assistance in the police officer's first time after his birth, and that the defendant's statement of public prosecutor's interrogation statement to the court below was more likely to be conducted by the defendant's non-indicted 3 with physical and mental disorder because he was detained by the defendant's non-indicted 2's old life.

피고인 1 변호인 김세완 상고이유 제1점은 원심판결 이유중……피고인 1은 남로당 공소외 4가 4281년 9월 중순경 인천시 인천흥업주식회사 응접실에 내방하여 남로당 확장기금으로 금 백만원을 제공하라고 요구하여 왔고 동년 10월 초순경에는 22세가량의 성명미상자로부터 우 동 요구를 받고 동월 하순경 공소외 1이 내방하여 공소외 4와 우 성명미상청년과 공모한 정을 고하면서 종전의 요구액 백만원을 30만원으로 감액 요구하였음으로 피고인은 동년 11월5일 오전10시경 우 회사 응접실에서 현금 30만원을 공소외 1에게 남로당 찬조금으로 제공하였는데 차 사실은 당심공판정에서의 피고인의 판시부합되는 공술 급 원심공판조서 급 검사피의자 신문조서 사법경찰관 사무취급자 피검자신문조서 중 판시에 부합되는 공술기재부분을 종합하여 인정한다 하였으나 1,2심 공판조서, 검사 및 사법경찰관 사무취급자 각 피의자신문조서 기타 자수서 제1건기록에 의하면 피고인 1은 인천갑부의 자손으로서 8.15해방전후를 통하여 문자 그대로 고루거각에서 호화스러운 생활을 하였고 일정시대 부협의원이였고 독실한 천주교신자이었고 민국당 지방간부이였기 때문에 남로당계열들의 심각한 증오감을 음으로 양으로 간접직접으로 받아오던 차에 4281년 9월 중순경 남로당원 공소외 4가 피고인회사 응접실에 내방하여 남로당 확장기금으로 백만원을 제공하되 만일 불응하면 생명재산에 가해라도 할 기세와 언행을 뵈임으로 다소 공포를 감하고 있던 터에 동년 10월 초순부터 누차에 걸쳐 자택노변, 회사응접실등에서 22세 가량의 성명미상자로부터 우 동 양의 요구와 협박을 받아 잔악무도한 여수,순천사변 돌발(동년10월22일오전2시발생)의 보가 라디오로,신문으로 전하여 경인일대는 물론 남한각지의 인심이 소동되고 각자가 전전긍긍하는 처지에 기중에도 피고인같은 입장에 처한 인사로서는 공포심이 극도에 달하였는데 동월하순경 친지로 믿고 의심치 아니하였던 공소외 1이 내방하여 천만의외에도 자기는 남로당원인데 공소외 4와 우 성명미상자 청년과 공모한 정을 고하면서 종전의 요구액 백만원을 30만원을 감액요구하고 만약 거절이면 너는 과거 친일파이니 내말 한마디면 너의 생명이 왔다갔다 한다는 말과 불온한 기세에 극도로 위포감이 폭발되면서 경찰에 고할여지 없이 무의식 중 동년 11월5일 오전 10시경 우 회사 응접실에서 현금 30만원을 공소외 1에게 제공하여서 피탈된 것이 분명함으로 원심은 사실오인의 혐의가 충분하다 운하고 동 변호인 김세완 상고이유 제1점은 원심판결 이유중……피고인 1의 소위는 국가보안법 제4조 에 해당한다 하였으나 국가보안법은 4281년 12월1일 법률제10호로 공포되었다가 4282년 12월 19일 법률 제85호로 개정되었는데 본건 범행은 국가보안법공포 25일 전에 감행된 것이기 때문에 특별한 명문이 없는 이상 소급적용할 수 없는 것인데 법률제10호로 공포된 국가보안법에는 하등 명문이 없음으로 문제될 것이 없고 법률 제85호로 개정된 국가보안법부칙 제2항에 소급적용의 명문이 있으나 차는 법률 제10호로 공포된국가보안법시행당시까지 소급될 것이고 기 이전까지도 한정없이 소급될 이유는 없음. 왜냐하면 법률 제10호로 4281년 11월 1일 이전에 소급할 것을 명언치 아니한 이상 불소급원칙에 의하여 불소급명언을 한 것과 동일함. 과연이라면 법률이 일단 명언하여 효력이 발생된 이상 다시 전언을 취소키 불능한 것임으로 결국 원심은 법률적용에 착오가 있다 운하다.

According to the judgment of the court below, the defendant et al., who was guilty of the crime against the defendant, etc., committed an act in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, and committed destruction of fire prevention or other important agencies, and was demanded to deliver money and goods for the purpose of happiness and public peace. According to the above judgment of the court below, if the defendant et al. were to voluntarily aid the defendant's 4th day of November 5, 281, and the defendant 1 provided 300,000 won in cash to the defendant's 1's 4th day of November 10, 200, and the defendant 3 did not apply the above provision to the defendant's 1's 4th day of November 12 of the same year to the defendant's 4th day of the above judgment, and the defendant's 4th day of November 12 of the same year to the defendant's 1's 5th day of the above judgment, the court below held that the above provision was retroactively applicable to the defendant's 1's 4th day of the above judgment.

Justices Kim Byung-ro (Presiding Justice)