(a) Decision on whether the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy verifies the economic value and the right to reject the application for mining under the Mining Industry Act;

(b) Time when the application for mine name reorganization under the Mining Industry Act enters into force;

Since mining life correction Board shall be deemed to revise a part of the application for mining, the matters indicated in the capacity for mining life correction shall be one application filed by adding to the original application, and thus, it shall be filed from the time of later filing of the application for minerals.

Articles 17, 25, and 46 of the Mining Industry Act; Article 24, Article 25, Article 41 subparag. 9, and Article 37 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act

Yellow money and one other (Attorney Jung-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Minister of Commerce and Energy

(Attorney Hong-il, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 62Gu42 delivered on September 30, 1963

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the plaintiffs' representative, Jung-young and Lee Jong-hoon's grounds of appeal.

(1) As to the ground of appeal No. 1, Article 25 of the Enforcement Decree of the Mining Industry Act, the state of mineral reserve does not necessarily have to be determined only with dump, but it is determined by relevant public officials based on the results of active investigation by the public officials concerned (see the judgment No. 94 of November 9, 1961). This is obvious even if see the judgment No. 94 of the 4294, and evidence No. 10, No. 12-1, No. 14-2, No. 14 of the evidence No. 4 (Notice of Non-Public Officials) No. 10, No. 12 (Notice of Non-Public Officials' Personnel Management) of the 1, No. 14-1, No. 12 (Notification of Non-Public Officials' Personnel Management) of the 1961, the defendant's administrative disposition is a fundamental material for the examination of dignity limited to the fump and the dump of the 398% of the mineral area.

In light of the purport of Article 17 and Article 25 of the Enforcement Decree of the Mining Industry Act, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, upon considering the purport of Article 24 and Article 41 subparagraph 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, shall consider that the applicant may reject the application for mining in cases where the application is filed based on the sample collected from the inside of the mine designated by the applicant for mining business and it is judged that the applicant has no economic value and that the application is not proven. The Supreme Court decision refers to the purport that the application for mining in this case shall not be based on only the sample sample pointed out by the applicant when the application for the establishment of a mining right is filed. Thus, the above precedents are not appropriate in cases where the application for the establishment of a mining right is not filed in this case. Therefore, as mentioned above, it is reasonable to reject the application for the removal of the application for the plaintiffs' mining in this case, and it is difficult to view that the application for mining in this case is unfair even if the evidence presented by the defendant was lawfully examined, and even if it is found that the application for the plaintiff's mineral extraction was found to be 398%.

The following arguments are further discussed, namely, that the vicinity of the mining area is the light zone of iron, and if the high-quality tin is adjacent to the mining area, it is the nearest place in this context that there is a luminous tin such as the surrounding light in the mining area is sufficient in light of our experience rules, and even if the dignity of the plaintiffs is low, it is difficult to view that there is no economic value in the above special circumstances, and the court below neglected the determination as to such special circumstances.

However, there are special circumstances such as the paper, so it cannot be said that there is no iron mine having economic value in this case. Therefore, this issue belongs to the independent opinion of the appellant.

Therefore, unless the court below did not decide on such special circumstances, it cannot be said that it was a deviation from the determination on important matters that could affect the judgment, without merit.

(2) As to the ground of appeal No. 2, the light-type mining ground for appeal is deemed to revise a part of the application for mining, the matters indicated in the mining-type mining-type mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-based mining-related

However, in light of the provisions of Article 37 of the Enforcement Decree of the Mining Industry Act Article 46, the reorganization of the name of mineral applied for registration is considered only when the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy grants permission for the establishment of mining rights for the mineral applied for. Therefore, only in such cases, it shall be deemed that the same effect as the retroactive application is the same as the filing of the mining application when the mining application was filed first. Therefore, the logic cannot be adopted to the purport of the contrary.

Next, I examine the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal.

(1) As to the ground of appeal No. 1, some of the above representatives are the same as the grounds of appeal No. 6, and thus, the explanation is invoked. The remainder of the grounds of appeal is as follows. In other words, the court below's finding that the steel scrap should be more than 27% if the steel scrap is to have economic value by the testimony of the witness 6-1 and the witness 6-1 and the witness 27% of the iron scrap should be maintained by the testimony of the new iron, the new iron, and the Kim Chuncheon is an erroneous board which is not in violation of the rules of evidence or due to the lack of reasons

However, if the record is examined in detail, it is not thought that there is a brut like the paper of the court below. Therefore, there is no reason to discuss it.

(2) As to ground of appeal No. 2, this is overlapping with that of the agent’s ground of appeal No. 2, thereby citing the above decision.

(3) On the third ground for appeal No. 1, only with the statement on the evidence No. 1, it cannot be deemed that there was a timely fact or reason that mining has no economic value pursuant to Article 26 of the Enforcement Decree of the Mining Business Act.

However, when considering the statement in Gap evidence No. 1, it can be said that the steel scrap filed by the plaintiff had no economic value, and therefore, it is not possible to employ this issue guidance.

(4) On May 5, 1961 at the lower court, the Plaintiffs asserted that on April 15, 1961, at the time when the Defendant re-afusing the original mining area, it would have been accepted by the Defendant at that time, and that on April 15, 1961, the Plaintiffs would have been investigated with a thickness of the pit number of the pit number of the Plaintiffs, but the Defendant did not investigate this point, and that it was erroneous for the lower court to have omitted its decision on this point.

However, as seen above, the effect of the luminous reorganization that the plaintiff already submitted depends solely on whether or not the plaintiffs have permitted the establishment of the luminous mining filed earlier. Therefore, it should not be said that there was any error that the defendant did not investigate the luminous mining resources at the time of re-inspection. Therefore, even if the court below omitted its decision on this point, it should not affect the judgment of the court below. Thus, there is no ground for appeal.

(5) As to the ground of appeal No. 5, the court below's argument is closed on September 10, 1963, and this is stated in the court below's statement as of July 16, 1963. In light of the records, the court below's attack method during the period (as of August 27, 1963 and September 10, 1963, the fact that the statement, submission or examination was made, evidence No. 15, and witness Kim Jong-soo's testimony) is not considered.

However, the date of the closing of argument indicated by the judgment of the court below shall not be recognized through the entire record, since it is a clerical error in September 10, 1963. Thus, this issue is groundless.

However, the date of the closing of argument indicated by the judgment of the court below shall not be recognized through the entire records, since it is a clerical error in September 10, 196. Thus, this issue is groundless.

(6) On October 26, 1962 in the court below's records, when examining the verification protocol of October 26, 1962, the Kim Jin-jin Examination protocol of October 26, 1962, the protocol of October 7, 1962 and the protocol of appraiser Cho Nam-nam Examination protocol of October 7, 1962, the fact that the judge's three judges (the presiding judge Hongnam, the judge Lee Jae-young) were involved, is that only the judge's formation was involved.

However, since the issue of who is a judge involved in the pleading is a provision on the method of pleading, it is obvious in light of the provisions of Article 147 of the Civil Procedure Act that can be proved only by the entry in the protocol, unless the investigation is destroyed or lost. If so, it is nothing more than the development of logic from an independent point of view on the premise that the above protocol is all false documents.

Therefore, all appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing parties.

It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge)